People's Democratic Republic of Algeria

Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research

University of Constantine I
Faculty of Letters and Languages
Department of Letters and the English Language

Arab Americans in Post-9/11 America:

The Locus of Racism and the Change of Dynamics

Thesis Submitted to the Department of Letters and the English Language in Candidacy for the Degree of 'Doctorate Es-Sciences' in American Civilization

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19/01/2022
2021

ABSTRACT

In the United States, no other ethnic group has been under suspicion and surveillance as Arab Americans in the aftermath of 9/11. Despite constitutional statements and legislations on civil rights and individual liberties, Arab Americans were compelled to redefine their identity to be consistent with Americanism and prove their Americanness. This research analyzes the status of Arab Americans in the United States' racial framework in post-9/11America. In addition to highlighting the role the attacks played in altering the nature of the racial paradox, its consequences, and impacts, this research investigates the conversion of Arab Americans' posture from invisibility to hypervisibility. More, it sheds light on the collaboration of the general public, media, and government for racializing Arab Americans. As a result, the locus of racialization shifted from imagined misconceptions and ill-mannered stereotypes to more overt and aggressive attitudes that became manifest in hate crimes, unjustified detentions, and deportations. For a better understanding of the racialization of Arab Americans prior and following 9/11, this research scrutinizes different theories on race, identity, and prevailing stereotypes. It concludes that the legitimation of racialization operated as a catalyst for the construction of a hegemonic discourse on the Arab/Muslim terrorist.

Keywords: United States of America, Arab Americans, Muslim Americans, Racialization, Stereotypes, Orientalism, post-9/11, 'war on terrorism'

ملخص

في الولايات المتحدة، لم تكن أي مجموعة عرقية موضع شك ومراقبة مثلما تعرض له مواطنو أمريكا من العرب عقب أحداث 11 سبتمبر. بالرغم من البيانات الدستورية والتشريعات الخاصة بالحقوق المدنية والحريات الفردية، وجد عرب أمريكا أنفسهم ملزمين بإعادة صياغة هويتهم مع ما يتماشى والنزعة الأمريكية مع إثبات أمركنتهم. لهذا السبب جاءت هذه الدراسة لتحلل مكانة ووضع عرب أمريكا في الإطار العرقي للولايات المتحدة بعد أحداث الحادي عشر سبتمبر، كما تهدف إضافة إلى ذلك إلى إبراز الدور الذي لعبته هذه الهجمات في تغيير طبيعة التناقض العرقي وتبعاته وآثاره، وتبحث في وضع العرب الأمريكيين الذين يغيبون ويهمشون تارة ويوضعون في الواجهة تارة أخرى وربطهم بكل صورة لها علاقة بتلك الأحداث.تهدف هذه الدراسة أيضا إلى تسليط الضوء على مساهمة وتكافل الرأي العام والإعلام والحكومة من أجل عنصرة عرب أمريكا. وكنتيجة لذلك، تحولت العنصرة من المفاهيم والأحكام المسبقة والنمطية الخاطئة إلى مواقف أكثر علنية وعدوانية تجلت في جرائم الكراهية، الاعتقالات والترحيلات بدون مبرر. لأجل فهم أوضح لوتيرة ومعدل العنصرة ضد عرب أمريكا قبل وبعد 11 سبتمبر،اعتمدت هذه الدراسة على تحليل عدة نظريات متعلقة بالعرق، الهوية، والأنماط المسبقة السائدة،لتخلص هذه الدراسة إلى أن شرعنة العنصرة عملت كمحفز لبناء خطاب الهيمنة الذي يصور العربي كإرهابي مسلم.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الولايات المتحدة الامريكية ¸العرب الامريكيون ¸ المسلمون الامريكيون ¸ العنصرة ¸الصور النمطية ¸الاستشراق ¸ ما بعد 9سبتمبر ¸الحرب على الارهاب

RESUME

Aux États-Unis, aucun autre groupe ethnique n'a été soupçonné et surveillé en tant que les Arabes-Américains à la suite du 11 septembre. Malgré les provisions constitutionnelles et les législations sur les droits civils et les libertés individuelles, les Arabes américains ont été contraints de redéfinir leur identité pour être cohérente avec l'américanisation et prouver leur américanisme. Cette recherche analyse le statut des Arabes américains dans le cadre racial des États-Unis post 9/11. En plus de mettre en évidence le rôle que les attaques ont joué dans la modification de la nature du paradoxe racial, ses conséquences et ses impacts, cette recherche étudie la conversion de la transformation de la posture des Arabes américains de l'invisibilité à l'hypervisibilité. En plus, elle met en lumière la collaboration du grand public, des médias et du gouvernement pour la racialisation des Arabes américains. En conséquence, la racialisation est passée de stéréotypes aux manifestations agressives telle que les crimes de haine, les détentions injustifiées et les expulsions. Pour une meilleure compréhension de la racialisation des Arabes américains avant et après le 11 septembre, cette recherche examine différentes théories sur la race, l'identité et les stéréotypes dominants. Elle conclut que la légitimation de la racialisation a servi comme catalyseur de construction d'un discours hégémonique du terroriste arabo-musulman.

Mots clés: États-Unis d'Amérique, Arabo-américains, Musulmans américains, Racialisation, Stéréotypes, Orientalisme, post-9/11, 'guerre contre le terrorisme

DEDICATION

To my beloved parents, wife, and children

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AAI	Arab American Institute
AAUG	Association of Arab-American University Graduates
ABC	American Broadcasting Company
ACCESS	Arab Community Center for Economic and Social Service
ACLU	American Civil Liberties Union
ADC	American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee
ASU	Association of Syrian Unity
AUB	American University of Beirut
CAAM	Coalition of American Assyrians and Maronites
CAIR	Council on American-Islamic Relations
CART	Computer Analysis Response Team
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CNN	Cable News Network
DEC	Detroit Energy Company
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DOD	Department of Defense
DOHUD	Department of Housing and Urban Development
DOJ	Department of Justice
DOL	Department of Labor
DOT	Department of Transportation
ECC	Eastern Christian Church
EEOC	Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
ESL	English as a Second Language
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FNL	Front of the National Liberation
HRW	Human Rights Watch
INS	Immigration and Naturalization Service

KKK   Ku Klux Klan

LET   Lashkar-e-Taiba

NAAA   National Association of Arab Americans

NAAC   Network for Arab American Communities

NAIF   North American Imams Federation

NBC   National Broadcasting Company.

NGO   Non-Governmental Organization

NOW   National Organization for Women

NPO   Non-Profitable Organization

NSARI   Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative

OEF   Operation Enduring Freedom

OIF   Operation Iraqi Freedom

OIG   Office of Inspector General

PGRA   Provisional Government of the Republic of Algeria

PIJ   Palestinian Islamic Jihad

PLO   Palestinian Liberation Organization

PSA   Passenger Service Agent

PTSD   Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder

SPOT   Screening Passengers through Observational Techniques

SRI   Special Registration Initiative

TATP   TriAcetoneTriPercoxide

TSA   Transportation and Security Administration

USA PATRIOT Act Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act.

WASP   White, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant

WMD   Weapons of Mass Destruction

WWI   World War I

WWII   World War II

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General Introduction

Background and Context

Following the 9/11 events, "Arabs/Muslims" as a stenographical expression was added to the dictionary to depict individuals and communities that, because of their religious affiliation and ethnic origins, had become perceived as terrorists and associated with international terrorism. The phrase embeds the process of racialization that has combined and reduced diverse cultures, languages, and religious beliefs into one categorical *Other*. This stereotypical image resulted in making Arab/Muslim Americans easy targets of official and popular backlash and racialization. Initially introduced to illustrate the mistaken interchangeable use of the two concepts, the term "Arab/Muslim" refers to the framework in which a new phase of racialization has emerged.

Notwithstanding that Arab/Muslim American(s) as a concept as well as a subject became prevalent and eminent in post-9/11 America, one notices the emergence of a tendency toward racialization that exclusively targeted Arabs and Muslims through the use of specific conceptions such as radicalism, fundamentalism and terrorism. This leads to the question of whether what Arab/Muslim Americans are witnessing is a process of racialization or a problem of religious intolerance which is deeply rooted in divergences of religious and cultural ideologies. Ethnic and social studies argue that racialization changes and develops. This change takes different forms including the one whereby it shifts from an intended misinterpretation of nature or biology; the one based on skin colour and other physical traits, to the meant misinterpretation of culture and what the term encloses; politics, religion and other beliefs.

Most studies conducted on the subject of racialization against Arab/Muslim Americans support the notion that this form of racialization is built upon cultural frameworks and never on biological ones. Other studies have dealt with this shift from another dimension; they stressed the way in which racialization of Arab Americans functions and shows that it operates at the level of their communities and less at an individual level. While individual Arab/Muslim Americans are stereotyped as fundamentalists and terrorists, their communities are deamericanized and deemed as a potential threat to America's democracy and freedom. In this way, even Arab/Muslim individuals who are able to move beyond the cultural shell and cross the dividing line from *them* to *us* but still belong to this racialized group are perceived as bombs that could explode at any time.

The process of racialization experienced by Arabs/Muslims in the United States is deeply rooted in the nation's racial history. The aftermath of 9/11 witnessed the emergence of an American national consensus that Arab Americans do not fit into the recognized framework of the American racial composition. Without taking into account the anthropological fact that they belong to the Semitic human stock which is originally considered as a white race, Arabs who live in the United States have had a long unclear history and undecided relationship to whiteness and citizenship. This situation postponed the placement of Arab Americans within the whites' racial structure.

Statement of the Problem

Despite the fact that Arab Americans became more visible following September 2001, literature about them, in the ethnic as well as social studies, is still very limited compared to other ethnic groups in the United States. In fact, the increasing number of Arab Americans and their influence are significant factors that

urge researchers to promote their knowledge over this diverse ethnic, religious, and cultural minority. This lack of knowledge led to various problems, confusion, and misconceptions of their religion, culture, ideology, and way of life. In light of this need, it is very important to investigate and analyze the way in which Arab Americans were subject to different forms of racialization from their early arrival to the United States during late 19th century up until the contemporary period. Furthermore, the scrutiny of the pace of racialization before and after 9/11 plays a conceptual role in better understanding the shift of Arab Americans' racial status in the American ethnic framework.

For the sake of highlighting the historical challenges that Arab Americans have faced, it is crucial to explore the impact of the American mainstream society, governmental policies, and media portrayals on Arab Americans' assimilation, acculturation, and integration. These challenges cannot be fully covered without the examination of certain elements of high priority such as social and cultural identity, citizenship, whiteness, and Americanness. After 11 September 2001, there was an increased interest at all levels to understand the culture, history, religion, and language of Arab Americans. This increase coincided with the intensification of racialization that was manifested in hate crimes, violent attitudes, and the regeneration of old images associated with the orient and otherness. Post-9/11 political climate shows that the movement of Arab Americans from "invisibility" to "hypervisibility" corresponds to an alteration in the nature of racialization. It shows that September 2001 was not the starting but turning point in racializing Arab Americans. The collaborating efforts of government, the general public, and mainstream media made racialization more apparent, systematic, and oftentimes legitimate.

Research Questions

This research attempts to answer different questions: What is the difference between racism and racialization? How does a group become racialized? Is racialization new or has its roots in the American ethnic history? How do government, media, and the general public coordinate to produce a racialized group? How do stereotypes and generalizations participate in and negotiate fields of meaning about Arabs/Muslims in relation to domestic (the American security strategy) and foreign policy (war on terror)? Does the association of Arabs/Muslims to terrorism affect the status of Arab American citizenship in the U.S.? How has the shift in Arab Americans' portrayals become a ground through which racialization has been intensified and aggravated? Do the aforementioned theories go hand in hand with the systematic process of racialization of Arab Americans?

Aims of the Research

Within this complexity lies the purpose of this research. The major aim of this research is to analyze the pace of racialization against Arab Americans post-9/11 through the lenses of four major social and ethnic theories. It argues that the compatibility of these theories with what Arab Americans are experiencing post-9/11 is evidence that they are subject to systematic racialization by the American government, general public, and media.

Concisely, it aims at examining two focal points: the status of Arab Americans in post-9/11 America's racial framework and the contours of racialization against Arab Americans before and particularly after 9/11 events in the United States. Through the analysis of the appropriateness of existing theories on racialization as a process and the role played by media to racialize a particular racial group, it sheds

light on the way in which racialization was aggravated immediately after the identification of September 2001. Furthermore, this research aims at examining the ethnic and religious dimensions of racialization and the way in which cultural elements related to Arabs and religious concerns related to Islam and Muslims were used as weapons against Arab Americans.

The examination of different aspects demonstrates that the collaboration of governmental policies with general public attitudes resulted in the creation of a *racialized other*. This research aims at clarifying the nature of racialization and argues that the process of *othering* Arab/Muslim Americans is neither biological nor physical but is built upon cultural and religious considerations. While every single Arab American is delineated through his/her association with a particular cultural and religious background, Arab/Muslim Americans are presumed to have certain characteristics which require that each be dealt with in relation to his cultural and religious environment. However, following 9/11 events, 'moderate' Arab/Muslim Americans -seen as those who adopt the American version of Islam who were able to cross a civilizational line and were generally perceived as tolerant and liberal- turned into potential threats and terrorists.

It is of utmost importance to clarify that the frequent use of 9/11 in this research does not necessarily refer to the events of that date. In most cases, its usage refers to two major points that this research places under the same frame: the symbolic redefinition of the American identity and multiculturalism and, most significantly, an axiomatic and self-explanatory icon that refers to the innocence of the United States and guilt of Arabs/Muslims. Among other purposes, this research aims at highlighting that 9/11 is not the starting point of racialization against Arab Americans but a turning point in this centuries-old process. This research asserts that the slash standing

between 9 and 11 epitomizes the cultural and civilizational gap between the U.S. mainstream society and Arab Americans and, simultaneously, justifies the systematic racialization.

Methodology of the Research

Methodologically, a score of approaches are used for the conduct of this research. First, the historical/descriptive approach is used for tracking early Arab immigration to America and the history of racialization. Second, the analytical approach is of utmost importance in the examination of data and cases and placing them under the context of racialization. It is applied for the creation of ideological bonds between the conceptual and the theoretical contexts of this research. Third, the content analysis approach is used for studying the development of racialization and scrutinizing certain patterns, images, and perceptions. Fourth, the progressive course of research has required the utilization of the qualitative sociological approach. It is used for measurement of changes that occur at the level of theories and ideologies. Finally, discourse analysis is useful when analyzing President Bush speeches.

Literature Review

It is very important to indicate that the context of racialization cannot be fully understood without a deep examination of past and current literature on Arab Americans. Edward Said's *Orientalism* (1979) is among the outstanding studies that cover western perceptions of the Orient and the narrow lenses of western bias, discrimination, and negative stereotypes. Said argues that whenever the *Orient* –or east- is the subject of discussion, western scholars, authors, journalists, and politicians protrude their own unexpressed hopes, fears, and desires. They fail to directly confront their prejudices and inferior/superior, self/Other or *us/them* as well as other

dichotomies. Said asserts that the westerners' description of the easterners is more useful in understanding the ideology of the one who describes but never the one described. This tendency is part of what one might call a legacy of western imperialism, prejudice, and misperceptions. Said came to the conclusion that, "because of Orientalism the Orient was not (and is not) a free subject of thought or action" (*Orientalism* 4).

Nadine Naber's works are useful because they provide an intelligible and instructive examination of the early arrival of Arabs to the United States and of the question of whiteness, identity, assimilation, and other experiences. Her works provide a comprehensive display that helps understand the current state of Arab Americans before and after 9/11. Her collection contextualizes the condition of Arab Americans within the dynamics of post-9/11 politics and institutions. Naber discusses the social construction of race, racial categorization, and Arab Americans' social and racial situation in the United States' racial framework. Naber's *Race and Arab Americans before and after 9/11: From Invisible Citizens to Visible Subjects* (2008) asserts the 'invisibility' and 'hypervisibility' of Arab Americansin the pre and post-9/11 period.

Undoubtedly, the works of Alixa Naff are placed among the most comprehensive and interesting studies available on the history of Arab ethnicity in the United States. *Becoming American: The Early Arab Immigrant Experience* (1993) is a fascinating documentary work that covers early settlement and assimilation of the first and second waves of Arab immigrants. With a particular reference to the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries, *Becoming American* is built upon a thorough two decades investigation and over 300 hours of recorded interviews with early-arrived Arabs and their families. Notwithstanding the absence of secondary data

needed for the conduct of such narratives, Naff was successful in using memories and experiences in creating a well-written and original literature. Naff's works are considered as unusual and ingenious contributions to the field of ethnic studies.

One of the most notable books that illustrate the way in which Arabs are portrayed in the American media is Jack Shaheen's *Reel Bad Arabs: How Hollywood Vilifies a People* (2001). Shaheen, a well-known scholar who devoted his academic career to intensely discuss Arab representations and stereotypes in films, catalogues over 900 Hollywood movies featuring negative stereotypes of Arabs/Muslims. He asserts that degenerating and dehumanizing Arabs is a very important step to convince the public over launching war against them. The Arab-Israel conflict, Oil Embargo, and the Iranian Revolution represented useful topics that confirm and perpetuate the prevalence of these negative stereotypes in American movies.

Michael Suleiman's *Arabs in America: Building a New Future* (1999) is a brief history of Arab-Americanization that provides useful information about the old battle over citizenship, whiteness, and Americanization. In other studies, Suleiman highlights periods of conflict in the Middle East (the 1956 Suez War, the 1967 and 1973Arab- Israeli wars, and the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon). For academia related to Arab American studies, these periods are interesting and deserve full scrutiny and examination because of the intensification of racialization against Arab Americans as a result of the political retaliation in the Middle East. Similar to Suleiman, the contributions of Helen Hatab Samhan to the field of Arab American studies are immense. In her different publications such as "Not Quite White" (1999) and "Politics and Exclusion" (1987), Samhan—who served as executive director of the Arab American Institute (AAI)—elaborates the questions of whiteness and

citizenship, the creation and growth of Arab American organizations, the participation of Arab Americans in the political process, and different social and political concerns

In his "Arabs in America: An Overview" (1983) and "Anti-Arab Racism and Violence in the United States" (1994), Nabeel Abraham examines anti-Arab racism and discrimination in the United States that generally takes place during the periods of military intervention in the Arab and Islamic worlds. He argues that Americans, in general, public turn a blind eye on all forms of racialization whenever the targeted are Arabs/Muslims. This is reflected through the increasing number of attacks on Arabs, Muslims, and other people perceived mistakenly as Arabs and Muslims in the United States. Abraham refers to the role played by media in redeploying a specific imagery and stereotypes of Arabs and Arab Americans. The examination of his essays shows that the state of fear and apprehension that Arab Americans experienced intensified during the administration of George W. Bush, particularly with the adoption of the 'war on terrorism' strategy.

In her *Arabs and Muslims in the Media: Race and Representation after 9/11* (2012), Evelyn Alsultany offers a conclusive analysis of Arab Americans' racial representation focusing on the imagery of external threat and unequal portrayals in the American media. She demonstrates the violation of Arab American civil liberties, the way in which an entire ethnic group is racialized, and how racialization is a regrettable but necessary evil. Alsultany examines diverse American government manipulations to justify violations of civil rights and Arab Americans scapegoating.

Research Structure

Chapter I sheds light on the conceptual, methodological, and theoretical frameworks of the research. While the conceptual framework aims at drawing distinctive lines between race/racism (as a phenomenon and ideology) and

racialization (as a process), the methodological framework aims at placing the subject at hand (post-9/11 racialization of Arab Americans) into a particular structure. The use of different theories of Social Identity, Cultivation, Differential Racialization, and Racial Triangulation is of utmost importance in analyzing main points including whiteness, identity, citizenship, stereotypes, and post-9/11 politics. The theories are also important for the analysis of racialization process, including deamericanization, Othering, demonization, and victimization. This theoretical chapter examines the methodological approaches applied for the conduct of this research. It highlights the reasons and aims behind the utilization of each approach (the historical, analytical, content analysis, and social qualitative approaches) in this research.

Chapter II is a historical investigation of the literature on Arab Americans' early immigration to the United States. The material is presented chronologically, beginning with an analysis of the nature and ideologies of first and second waves of immigrants, the different challenges they faced, and the religious/cultural nature of the newly established Arab American communities. Among different challenges, the question of racial categorization (whiteness) and the way in which early Arabs were perceived in the United States (racialization and profiling). In addition, it discusses the media's pejorative portrayals of Arabs and the roles it play in perpetuating a particular imagery about Arabs and Arab Americans. The chapter also provides Americans, early depictions of Arabs and their culture, the regeneration of old myths and misconceptions, and most importantly argues that ethnic and religious racialization of Arab Americans is as old as the early arrival of Arabs there.

Chapter III highlights American politics on the international and domestic levels following September 2001. In addition to analyzing the nature and ideologies of Bush and his neoconservative staff, the chapter covers the United States foreign

policy, namely the war on terror and the new American security strategy. It scrutinizes the PATRIOT Act, American citizens' involvement in surveillance and reporting, and the way in which the image of Arab/Muslim Americans was reconfigured based on their portrayals as suspects and potential threats.

Chapter IV examines the general confusion between the term 'Arab' and 'Muslim' and the way in which they were utilized interchangeably. Throughout coverage of government and media's regeneration of the orientalist discourse and stereotypes, the chapter demonstrates the shift of racialization against Arab Americans. While racialization before 9/11 was represented through verbal and derogatory remarks and defamatory portrayals, post-9/11 showed more violent aggressive and hostile attitudes. More, it investigates the subsequent forms of public and government racialization in the public sphere (public spaces, workplaces, schools, and airports). The analysis of two public campaigns, Ad Council's "I am an American" and CAIR's "I am an American Muslim", indicates attempts at 'whitening' the image of Arab/Muslim Americans and refuting the American conviction that Islam is synonymous to terrorism and all Muslims/Arabs are terrorists.

CHAPTER I

Conceptual, Methodological, and Theoretical Frameworks

Introduction

This chapter sets the frameworks according to which Arab Americans and racialization are scrutinized in this research work; therefore, it is divided into three main parts. Part one (the conceptual framework) tracks meanings of racialization in modern academia particularly social and ethnic studies. Through a brief analysis, it covers the history of racialization in the United States and answers the question of whether what Arab Americans were subject to was systematic racialization or ordinary forms of discrimination. Part two (the methodological framework) highlights the techniques and different approaches used for the conduct of the research and links certain social and racial theories to the way Arab Americans were racialized post-September 2001. Part three (the theoretical framework) illustrates theories on race, society, and the media and measured their compatibility with Arab Americans' racialization.

I.   The Conceptual Framework

1.1. What is Racialization?

In recent years, racialization has become one of the important concepts in the sociology of race and ethnicity. Following its first use by the French psychoanalyst and anti-colonial thinker Frantz Fanon[1], definitions of racialization differ from one discipline to another. Its antonym deracialization refers to the loss of the quality of a

specific race due to the increasing mixture of populations. Many sociologists note that the term deracialization predated racialization. Others write that racialization was used in the first half of the twentieth century and disappeared to re-emerge lately within the sociology of race and ethnic studies. The emergence, vanishing, and re-emergence of racialization interpreted its changing definitions and explained the different usage of the concept in sociology (Rohit and Bird 603).

1.1.1. Academic Definitions

The different debates over the meanings of racialization as a term or as a phenomenon have not reach consensus (Fanon; Das Gupta et al.; Murji and Solomos). The*Merriam Webster.com Dictionary* defines racialization as "the act or process of imbuing a person with a consciousness of race distinctions or giving a racial character to something or making it serve racist ends" ("racialization"). In "Racialization: The Genealogy and Critique of a Concept", Rohit Barot and John Bird attempt to trace the different sociological definitions of racialization. Their analysis concludes with considering the concept of racialization. They considered that the concept of racialization was more than a simple extension of race as an idea but the "ideology in which all intergroup differences are racialized" (609).

In his *Racism* (1989), Robert Miles fully develops the idea of racialization; he uses the concept to describe racial categorization (74). He explicitly notes that:

> I therefore employ the concept of racialization to refer to those instances where social relations between people have been structured by the signification of human biological characteristics in such a way as to define and construct differentiated social collectivities. The concept therefore refers to a process of categorization, a

representational process of defining an *Other* (usually, but not exclusively) somatically. (75)

Through analyzing 'the burden of acting white' hypothesis, Tyson Karolyn and other scholars explain the way in which racialization evolves. They argue that emphasis extends from the process of consolidating and essentializing certain groups into racial groups, as a first step, and then it extends to associating these racial groups with certain characteristics and behavioral traits as the second and final step (Tyson et al. 583-584). Racialization as a process extends from racial and religious groups such as Arab Americans, Muslims, Blacks, and Hispanics as Richard Alba argues in his "Bright versus Blurred Boundaries" (2005) (38) to particular polices including the Welfare state, the G.I. Bill[2], and poverty as Nick Kotz demonstrates in his article "'When Affirmative Action was White': Uncivil Rights" (2005). With particular reference to the benefits the federal government allotted to WWII veterans, Kotz notes that African Americans did not benefit as much as White Americans from the measures as "the law was deliberately designed to accommodate Jim Crow."

1.1.2. Arab Americans in the Racial Hierarchy

After a long struggle for proving their whiteness, Arab Americans of the Middle East and North Africa were racially categorized with the Europeans as people who belong to the white race. In 1997,the Management and Budget Office, classified Arab Americans into a newly-created ethnic category; 'Middle Easterners'. Many anthropologists considered the decision as an indirect attempt to exclude Arab Americans from the circles of whiteness. Worse, post-9/11 sociopolitical climate showed that the introduction of the PATRIOT act, although

never referred to Arab Americans directly, authorized constitutional violations and legitimizedracialization. Regardless of the fact that Arab Americans share the same phenotypic similaritieswith White Americans, they are barred from the white mainstream for social and historical reasons. Consequently, the exclusion of Arab Americans along with other ethnic groups from the American social and cultural scene, as illustrated later in 'See Something Say Something' campaign, widens the social and ideological gap between the nation's different races (Bonilla-Silva 38).

1.2. Race vs. Racialization: Overlapping Concepts

The controversial experience of sociology with the subject of race and the connotations derived from it resulted in the emergence of a number of intricate and intersecting concepts. However, the historical construction of race as an ideology constitutes ethno-racial conceptualization through the social process of racialization.

1.2.1. The Academic Debate

In recent sociological studies, racialization has become an important problematic and an influential concept in the sociology of race. In respect to the necessity of accepting racialization as a concept, Stephan Small notes that:

> In general it is used to suggest that social structures, social ideologies and attitudes have historically become imbued with 'racial' meaning, that such meanings are contingent and contested, and that they are shaped by a multitude of other variables, economic, political, and religious. It emphasizes the continuing need to see the intricate

relationship between 'racial' meanings and other (economic, political, religious) meanings. (qtd. in Zakharov 3)

In their attempts to distinguish between studies on race and others on racialization, sociologists of racialization insistingly disclaim the reality of differences which, in racist discourse, are regarded as stemming from the existence of diverse human races. This view is reinforced through the use of the safe argument that race as a term is a socially determined construct. Thus, the use of 'racialization' as a term serves as an appropriate substitute of the term 'race'. On the one hand and according to Nikolay Zakharov in *Race and Racism in Russia: Mapping Global Racisms* (2015), the questionable scientific meaning of race does not independently make the term racialization a more appropriate systematic instrument in sociological analysis. On the other, the term racialization is in itself flawed in case charting the results of the process of racialization is not possible, specifically, living the experience of race, "along with the ideas that inform the process of race formation-or racial knowledge" (46).

Sociologists argue that the idea of race's overemphasis on social structure and historical context is confronted by the notion that racialization brings it (the idea of race) closer to the area that is accessible to sociological analysis. Moreover, Zakharov insists that the notion of racialization is the most appropriate tool for the study of the processes of racial formation since it acknowledges that racial discourses should be examined taking into considerations the way social relations are built and structured (3). Terminologically, race and its stemmed concepts, such as racism and racialization, are used mistakenly to refer to the analytic tools that are used in order to uncover and identify "social processes of exclusion, the assignment of identity, the construction of hierarchies, and the conduct of purges" (3).

Other views argue that the concept of race should now be used by sociologists as it indicates nothing. Such views are considered rational for some and exaggerating for others. In their "Racialization: The Genealogy of Critique of a Concept" (2001), Barot Rohit and John Bird enlist numerous views that support the notion of the emptiness of race. They argue that Michael Banton's *Ethnic and Racial Consciousness* (1997) and Robert Miles' *Racism* (1989) consider the concept of race as an intellectual error. Furthermore, their analysis of Michael Rustin's "Psychoanalysis, Racism and Anti-racism" (1991), show that race is depicted as an empty signifier and dangerous because of its very emptiness. Rohit and Bird emphasize Gaston Bachelard's perception of race, as illustrated in *L'activité Rationaliste de la Physique Contemporaine* (1951), as a part of what he named as lapsed history; that part of series of errors that humans believed and committed (601). Unlike the vanished beliefs and theories dated back to the period of prehistory, race still remains as part of the lived experience of many people, and it is this problem of the lived experience of people on one side and uneasiness of sociology with the conception of race on the other side, that seems to explain the current emphasis and popularity of racialization (601).

1.2.2. Racialization in United States: Historical Overview

Historically, the practice of defining internal and external enemies of the United States and placing them within a specific racialized framework has always been prevalent and omnipresent. The created, and oftentimes, generated stereotypes are readily manipulated through different tactics as the ones of reversion and regression. While Native Americans had long been portrayed as violent, savages, and barbarians, Asian Americans had been historically racialized in different occasions. Initially depicted as the yellow threat, chink, coolie, and gook, Asian Americans

became known as the ethnic minority that stands against the western values and culture. Chinatown, the most important concentration of Asian Americans, was portrayed as the center of all evils; drug deals, child labor, immigrants' abuse and other forms of illegal practices (R. Lee 8).

The portrayal of Black Americans as stupid, backward, and naive corresponds to the Latin Americans' image as Chicanos (coward), aliens, drug dealers, and retarded whose culture was documented as "Latin spitfire or suffering Madonna, exotic erotic or hot-blooded super macho, stoop laborer or drug warlord, illegal immigrant or exiled freedom fighter" (Habell-Pallen and Romero 8). In his *Screening Asian Americans*(2002), Peter Feng argues that the ameliorated representation of Native, Latin, and Black Americans did not mark the end of racialization as a process, but it was just an illusion of its end. He notes that:

> There is no such thing as a positive or negative representation, rather, there are representations that are mobilized positively or negatively depending on the discursive context [...] it is not the images themselves that are contested so much as their discursive deployment. Both mainstream and marginal representations of Asian Americans articulate the terms whereby the borders of the American body politic are policed. (5)

Based on the distinction between race and racialization, the research aims at exposing a very vigorous discrepancy between the official rhetoric and actual practices of both the American government and the day-to-day interactions between Americans and Arab Americans. The enactment of PATRIOT Act best suits this discrepancy. While it never referred to Arab Americans directly, all PATRIOT act's provisions and subdivisions targeted them in a direct way. Moreover, sociologists

remark the continual way in which the connotation of many conceptions as race, identity, and citizenship are altered and reinterpreted during different periods of time.

1.3. Racialization and Arab/Muslim Americans

Literature on racialization against Arab Americans in the United States is not as well covered as the ones of certain ethnic groups as Black, Asian, and Hispanic Americans. Investigating the subject shows that there exists a continuing debate over whether Arab Americans are subject to racialization or not. According to Pratt Ewing in *Being and Belonging: Muslims in the United States since 9/11* (2008), the media coverage and federal laws, particularly the PATRIOT Act, have brought the subject of Arab Americans' racialization into the scene. He notes that:

> The racial crystallization of the category of Arab-Muslim legitimized a distinction between an American Us to be protected through homeland security measures and the dangerous immigrant Other who came under intense surveillance. Even those who had considered themselves Americans suddenly found themselves excluded from the sphere of those who were to be protected (2).

This ongoing debate extends to include other questions as the similarities and differences between racialization and ethnic/religiously-based discrimination, and the nature and ways in which Arab Americans are perceived in terms of religious and racial concerns. Moreover, it covers the interchangeable use of Arabs and Muslims and vice versa. This interchangeability applies to the use of racialization as synonymous to racial profiling and Islamophobia as well. In spite of the fact that the use of the racialization theory to understand Muslim experiences in the United States

is very important, other ethnic studies scholars took another stance. According to Andrew Shryock's "The Moral Analogies of Race: Arab American Identity, Color Politics, and the Limits of Racialized Citizenship" (2008), the racialization theory is a political tool that "attempts to…give Arabs and Muslims a more secure place within dominant structures of American identity politics" (98). He argues that racialization of Arabs/Muslims is not consistent and that they "are defined instead by their association with highly specific (and racially misconstrued) cultural forms" (99).

1.3.1.   The Media and Arab Americans' Racialization

Field researches that were conducted over the use of mainstream media in the racialization of Arab Americans in the United States, mainly states and cities were Arab Americans are concentrated, were successful in tracking many stereotypes and portrayals related to Arab Americans. Throughout their analysis of *The New York Times* articles from the year 2000 to 2004, Joseph Suad, D'Harlingue Benjamin, and Wong Alvin in "Arab Americans and Muslim Americans in *The New York Times,* Before and After 9/11" (2008), came to the conclusion that Arab Americans, compared to other immigrants, are portrayed as having stronger connections to their countries of origin. More than that, Arab Americans are considered as "highly religious" compared to other Americans because they have a greater loyalty to religion over nation and have strong ties to Arab/Muslim American organizations nationwide and worldwide. They concluded that Arab Americans are perceived as "high risk citizens" who are ready for "irrational religious rage" (234).

In the same Context, mainstream media was used to analyze the racialization of Arab/Muslim Americans following 9/11 events. Researches were conducted for the sake of capturing religious identity and the way it is used to organize social inequality

when those religious identities are central to political conflicts. Michelle Byng, professor in the sociology department at Temple University, Philadelphia in her work "Complex Inequalities: The Case of Muslim Americans after9/11" (2008) analyzed American newspapers in the northeastern parts of the United States. Particularly, she investigated articles from *the Washington Post* from May 2002 to May 2003 to appraise the way Arab/Muslim Americans were racialized in the aftermath of 9/11 attacks. She asserts that the religion-based inequality that Arab Americans are subject to was a simulation of the racial-based inequality. This claim challenges the views of those who argue that "benign markers of difference" are a main component in American society (659).

Media studies aimed at situating the representations of many ethnic groups into the larger processes that create them. Accordingly, Sohail Daualatzai examined the ways in which the 'War on Terror'was connected to 'War on Drugs'. He found out that campaigns were produced through the creation of two situations: a. Portrayals of all Arabs and Arab Americans as terrorists and b. Portrayals of all Blacks and Black Americans as criminals (89).

Regardless of the type of violence associated with each group, it is common that both are considered as permanent threat to the nation's homeland security and "formed the twin pillars of U.S. statecraft in the post-Civil Rights era" (Daulatzai 97). One notices that the American national identity is constructed in opposition to the 'terrorist' and 'criminal'traits attributed to Arab and Black Americans' identities respectively. Daualatzai's study concludes that the amalgamation of these two frames into one character reflects the Black/Muslim; i.e.: simultaneously, criminal and terrorist, which is considered as the greatest threat to the nation.

II. The Methodological Framework

1.4.1. Data Collection and Coding

The target population the research focuses on is Arabs who live in the United States with particular emphasis on the period post-September 2001. Sampling involves different steps. First, it uses two principal search engines: Primo Library Portal of the University of Berlin, Germany and the Almena Portal of the University of Valladolid, Spain. Through these portals all electronic material, including books, dissertations, theses, journal articles and other sources containing the expressions and words 'Arab/Muslim' and/or 'Arab/Muslim American,' including every possible variations of the terms such as 'Arabness/Islam' and 'Middle Easterners' were collected. All were skim-read and the ones that include at least one indication to Arabs in the United States were retained. When collecting data about Arab Americans, it is preferable to include the entry 'American' in the original search terms. This is because 'Arab(s)' as a term has a broader sense and searching it alone without mentioning 'American' run the risk of amassinga huge data that is beyond the reach of this research.

Due to the nature of the subject in hand, the methodology of data collection, after coding, contained a variety of primary sources. This research relies most heavily on official published documents (records, hearings, speeches, and reports) from the U.S. House of Representatives, the Senate, and other Congress-related agencies (such as the Government Accountability Office), official reports, federal regulations, and memorandums of major state departments (namely DOJ, DOD, DOL, DHS...etc.), unpublished official documents such as federal courts' cases (district courts and courts of appeal), as well as investigations, reports, and surveys of Non-Governmental Organizations (Human Rights Watch) and non-partisan think tanks (Pew Research

Center and the Project for research in Journalism). Furthermore, reports and surveys of organizations of interest to Arab Americans such as the Council of Arab American Relations, American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, and the Arab American Institute were of utmost importance to this research.

Notably, the use of certain unpublished documents, particularly federal court decisions, is the major difficulty encountered in this research. Our request of documents from American institutions was submitted to strict scrutiny as it necessitated a copy of the ID, an official document that proves our status as researcher, and a justification of our need for these documents. We received these documents through our personal email and for exclusive personal use.

Analyzing stereotypes related to Arab Americans necessitated the use of coding. The process starts with a prerequisite picking up of codes and continues with the ones that develop from the course of the research. After coding all direct and indirect references to racialization, codes are created to explain racial representations found in the data that the coding scheme did not already include as well as the codes that were collected before approaching the data. The majority of the codes have been determined before analyzing the data in order to apprehend the major constructs of interest. With particular emphasis on race, the codes break down the different ways of understanding race to figure out the way it is applied to Arabs and Muslims. These codes include biological references to race such as color of the skin (tanned, brown, dark brown, and white), cultural and religious references to race (*Hijab*, beard, and Arabic language), and other codes such as orient, oriental, eastern, foreign, middle eastern, and others.

1.4.2. Research Approaches

In order to examine and evaluatethe data collected through the research process, this thesis is built around a number of approaches. First, the historical/narrative approach is used to better understand Arab Americans' early immigration and experiences of racialization, particularly racial profiling and the question of whiteness, that are dated back to the late 19th century. Because the major focus of this research is not post-9/11 racialization solely, the historical framework becomes a necessity. It aims at illustrating the fact that the process of racializing Arab Americans is as old as their early arrivals. Its purpose is to show that Arab Americans' invisibility did not halt early forms of racialization.

Second, the analytical approach is used in highlighting different components related to the main questions as pre and post-9/11 stereotypes, American security strategy, PATRIOT act, and other instances where the process of racialization is manifested. Moreover, this research depends on this approach in associating racialization with the four theories of Social Identity, Cultivation, Differential Racialization, and Racial Triangulation as discussed below.

Third, because many scholars consider content analysis as a "detailed and systematic examination of the contents of a particular body of material for the purpose of identifying patterns, themes, or biases" (Leedy and Ormrod 102), this research deemed it as one of the most important approaches to consider. In addition to facilitating the study of past events, content analysis approach enabled measuring, describing, and analyzing temporal change which suits the ambivalent pace of pre and post-9/11 racialization. For this purpose, it is used chronologically to examine and analyze changes over time. Furthermore, this approach allows easy scrutiny and

investigation of how racialization changes from one period to another as is the case of differential racialization (Buddenbaum and Novak 128). Since there is no contact with the targeted Arab American populations, the use of content analysis in reviewing and scrutinizing the readily available documents, at any time and place, makes the study of the process of racialization very convenient and more practical.

Fourth, the qualitative sociological approach is mostly used to measure the process of change and the development of a particular ideologies or theories (Eisenhardt 542; George and Bennett). It is an outstandingly useful approach for any research that seeks to examine "a particular phenomenon and the context within which the phenomenon is occurring" that involves using "multiple sources of evidence-converging on the same set of issues" (Yin 31-32). Throughout the analysis of the history of Arabs in the United States before and after 9/11 events and the different forms of racialization they were subject to, the qualitative sociological approach permitted this research to focus on distinct events where many aspects of racialization are manifested. In particular, it addresses:

a) the production of a new racialized category of Arab and Muslim Americans post-9/11 attacks;

b) recalling racialization whenever needed; Native Americans, Black Americans, Japanese Americans, Hispanics, and Arab/Muslim Americans;

c) the intensification of racialization that resulted in hypervisible Arab/Muslim Americans post-9/11; before that, they were invisible;

d) fluctuating racialization against Arab Americans; from verbal and media's biased stereotypes before 9/11 to violent, aggressive, and demonization of an entire racial group;

e) public and governmental campaigns to demonize Arab Americans including the PATRIOT Act, "see something, say something", "flying while Arab", and other racialized measures;

f) finally, the orchestrated defamatory campaigns targeting Arab/Muslim males, students, and women that span the years of the neoconservative administration of George W. Bush.

These approaches are pursued under the seventh edition of Modern Language Association (MLA Format).

III. The Theoretical Framework

For the sake of better understanding the position of Arab Americans in the United States' racial framework and the pace of racialization they were subject to in post-9/11 period, four theories are scrutinized:

1.5.1. In-group/Out-group and Social Identity Theory

To investigate the status and positioning of Arab Americans in America's mainstream society, the way they are stereotyped, and the paradoxes of their depictions as "*part* of the American society" or "*apart* from the American society" following the events of 9/11, this study seeks to analyze the content of in-group out-group within the general framework of Social Identity theory. The latter is considered the greatest contribution of Henry Tajfelto the field of psychology. In his work "Individuals and Groups in Social Psychology" (1979), Tajfel states that 'social identity' refers to the individual's sense of who he/she is based on his/her membership to a particular group(s). All Groups, regardless of their nature, (ethnic,

sport teams, family…etc.) are important sources of pride and self-respect. They provide people with a sense of social identity and belonging to the social world (186). On his side, S. A. McLeod in his article "Social Identity Theory" (2019), proposes that the process of stereotyping certain ethnic and religious groups is based on a natural cognitive process; i.e.: the tendency to gather things. In doing so, he argued, we inevitably tend to spot the light on the remarkable differences between groups as well as the remarkable similarities of items and features within the same group.

One of the findings of this research is that racialization as a process is the fruit of these prejudiced views between ethnic and religious groups within the same societal circles. These prejudicial attitudes can be understood as an interpretation of the practice of social categorization whereby the culture of *us* and *them* dominates. This culture is reflected through placing one group inside the mainstream society and culture and placing the other one outside; i.e.: in-grouping and out-grouping.

In-group bias refers to a form of the unfair favoring of a specific ethnic or religious group or the belittlement of another. In psychology as well as sociology, race relations theories strive to explain the nature and impacts of this phenomenon. Simply, In-groups and out-groups refer to belonging and 'unbelonging' (estrangement) of an individual to society or a whole group (ethnic or religious) to a nation's mainstream. In in-group and out-group theory's conceptualization of social and self- categorization, any individual or a group can define himself/ itself through ethnic and religious affiliation, economic and social status, ideological orientation, and other dimensions as gender (Tajfel and Turner 55-56).

In-group bias has two dimensions, evaluative and behavioral. On the one hand, evaluative in-group bias refers to the classification of a particular group as better (more positive and less negative) on dimensions of judgment; as such, it is closely related prejudice as a concept. On the other hand, behavioral in-group bias refers to the inclination to favor the in-group over the out-group in some way, for example, in terms of the allocation of resources or rewards; in this case, it is considered as a form of discrimination. Out-group bias, the inclination towards favoring the out-group over the in-group, is much less prevalent than in-group bias but generally it does not exist in the circles of intergroup relations (Tajfel and Turner 59).

In the United States, media plays a profound role in the construction of cultural, religious, and ethnic identities. Because the white middle class forms the in-group or majority, it was the media's target audience. This fact affects information on the out-groups, the choice of the covered events, and even the terminology used to cover events. Usually, the media's negative depiction of out-groups shapes the general perception and builds Stereotypes. Unintentional stereotypes are not typically violent and aggressive; however, they participate in transmitting distortions and misconceptions in the news' stories. Unfortunately, misconceptions and stereotypes related to Arab Americans -highlighted in chapter two- affect the way in which they perceive themselves and others perceived them. On this account, it is hard for the majority of Arab Americans to audaciously express pride in their ethnic belongingness while the majority of Americans accept and believe the stereotypes they routinely receive from media.

1.5.2. Cultivation Theory

During the 1960's, Professor George Gerbner of Pennsylvania University conducted a research project over investigating the impact of watching television on the viewer's perception of the real world. The conclusion of the research was the introduction of the cultivation theory. Out of their studies over television, viewers, and particularly television violence, cultivation theory advocators argue that mass media implants attitudes and values of a specific culture throughout associating those values to certain members who represent that culture. While mass media implants (cultivates) an inexact and often fallacious worldview, the viewer thinks that it actually mirrors real life (LaRose and Straubhaar 422). Cultivation theory supporters believe the long-term effects of television's influence are "small and gradual, yet cumulative and significant" (LaRose and Straubhaar 241).

Nowadays, mass media facilitates the circulation of information through its transfer of news from one place to another. In addition to the news conveyed, mass media communicates messages to the general public and plays a major role in forming standpoints and mainstream images. In a Gallup poll conducted in 2013, 2,048 Americans were asked what they consider as their main source of national and international news. With more than 55%, of the polls, television was the preferred and most credible source of news and information for Americans (Saad). However, with its trend to make news' stories more exciting and mind-blowing, television may not actually be the most trustworthy source for many.

The lack of confidence in the media is confirmed by two prominent Americans: a president of the United States and a career journalist. First, in his 2006 interview with Diane Sawyer, correspondent of the *American Broadcasting*

Company (ABC), PresidentGeorge Bush told her that he did not prefer to get his news from journalists but from people he trusted. He explained: "I get my news from people who don't editorialize. They give me the actual news, and it makes it easier to digest, on a daily basis, the facts" (Gargaro). Second, Ken Auletta correspondent of *The New Yorker* with a long experience at the White House came to the conclusion that senior staff members of the Oval Office consider media as a special interest group with the agenda of making money instead of serving the interest of the nation and its citizens (Project for Excellence1).

In addition to conveying information to the public, the media plays other important roles. It influences all what might become national political issues and for how long those issues will remain ongoing. More, media is powerful enough to make or destroy the reputation of certain groups and even decide the winners and losers in any political event. In addition to the mentioned roles, it keeps a close eye on the activities of government officials and the entire political process (Wilson et al. 266).

George Gerbner argued that television should cultivate a moderate political perspective in viewers (LaRose and Straubhaar 419), which is not the case as far as Arab Americans are concerned. For this reason, it is more needed than any time before to portray ethnic, racial, and religious groups accurately to close the door for prejudice and misrepresentation.Mass media's use of stereotypes in depicting religious and ethnic minorities is a focal point in this research. It has been firmly established that mass media intends to distort images of certain minority groups and this is the case of Arab Americans. The early distorted images that were constructed following Arab Americans' early arrival to America were fully covered in Jack Shaheen's *Reel Bad Arabs*(2001);distortions, however, were intensified in the post-

September 2001 period. This time, media used the allegation of the 'war on terror' to spread negative stereotypes that turned later into public and governmental practice of racialization against Arab Americans.

In their book *Media Now: Understanding Media Culture and Technology*(2004), Straubhaar and LaRose argued that the transformation of the negative stereotypes from the flashy screens into the daily lives is a matter of a big concern. In the middle of the American campaign against terrorism and the enactment of the PATRIOT act, the main danger that might face Americans is the possibility of being influenced by media images of Muslims and Arabs as "terrorists and warmongers" (424-425). They added that:

> This might lead us to be prejudiced against Muslims or to back policies that punish them unfairly. Indeed, this situation is one in which the media images could be especially powerful. They highlight serious intergroup conflict in the starkest terms and provide the only information that many viewers have about members of a relatively small minority group. These are conditions in which media stereotypes can have very corrosive effects. (425)

Indeed, had it only been for the image of the targeted minority group, the gap could have been bridged. These negative stereotypes have "very corrosive effects" as they affect Arab American opportunities, choices, and their general identity.

1.5.3. Differential Racialization Theory

The discussion of literature related to Arab Americans before and after 9/11 requires the analysis of the way in which the racialization has intensified through time. The examination of the racial positioning of a given group within the general

racial framework of a society is hotly debated. Tomas Almaguer's differential racialization theory was fully covered in his *Racial Fault Lines: the Historical Origins of White Supremacy in California*(1994).Throughout the analysis of the historical development of racism in California in the second half of the 19ᵗʰ century, Almaguer examines the political and economic conditions under which California's different racial groups were built and related to each other. The position of these groups within the racial formation of the United States clarifies the way in which each one is perceived (Almaguer). Differential racialization theory explains how groups blend into the nation's racial pyramid. The complex of the twentieth century race relations suggests that the construction and, later, consolidation of racial groups were gradual. The theory shows that the perception of each racial group is reflected in different manners. While some groups were considered in-group, others were ostracized and deemed out-group (Almaguer).

Challenging sociology's traditional methods of understanding race, the theory of racial formation seeks to clarify how racial groups are formed. It demonstrates that the attribution of race cannot be possible without particular components as nation, ethnicity, and class (Omi and Winant). In its analysis of a racial group's level of adaptability in society, the traditional theory of ethnicity utilized European immigrants as examples. All examples used (including Bohemians, Greeks, Irish, and Poles) were perceived as whites and accepted as Americans (Guglielmo 18; Cybella and Guglielmo 344). This theory is not practical with all racial groups in the United States as it focuses on the gradual upward trajectory of certain racial groups and ignores the trajectory of others. Racial formation theory is more credible because it investigates the different upward and downward trajectories of all ethnic groups in the United States.Post-September 2001 sociopolitical climate is characterized by the shift of

racialization to a new ethnic group. After Native, Black, Asian, and Latin Americans, 9/11 events brought into light Arab/Muslim Americans as the newly racialized ethnic group in the United States.

1.5.4. Racial Triangulation Theory

In her "The Racial Triangulation of Asian Americans" (1999), Kim C. Jean discusses the "Black and White paradigm" and the outdated "bipolar racial framework" as a result of the unprecedented increase of racial mosaic with the growing numbers of Asians, Hispanics and other racial groups that diversified the U.S. population. Kim suggests that the mandate to go "beyond Black and White" remained partly unfulfilled and the most significant shortcoming of the racial hierarchy theory is its notion of single scale of status and privilege. She argues that "since the field of racial positions consists of a plane defined by at least two axes – superior/inferior and Insider/foreigner- it emphasized both that groups become racialized in comparison with one another and that they are differently racialized" (107).

Kim's "racial triangulation" theory that was adopted to measure the scale of the cultural and racial adaptability of Asian Americans is applicable to Arab Americans, the subject matter of this research. This theory suggests that in order to maintain the superiority of whiteness, Asian Americans were racially triangulated between two bipolar axes; the whites and the blacks' positions. Asian American's racial triangulation was analyzed with reference to two main processes:

1. Racial valorization whereby the dominant group (A; Whites) valorizes the subordinate group (B; Asian Americans) relative to subordinate group (C; Black Americans) on cultural and racial grounds

2. Civic Ostracism whereby the dominant group (A; Whites) constructs subordinate group (B Asian Americans) as permanently foreign and unable to be culturally and racially assimilated with whites for the sake of ostracizing them from any civic and political participation (107).

This figure explains racial triangulation theory and the adoption of racial valorization and civic ostracism.

Figure 1: Racial Triangulation of Asian Americans (Kim 108)

It is very important to note that Racial Valorization and Civic Ostracism are linked to particular racial and cultural terms without taking into account the natural changes in ethnic cultures and the main differences between the Asian and Asian American culture. Describing the American mainstream's perceptions of other cultures, Paul Gilroy states that "Culture is conceived…not as something intrinsically

fluid, changing, unstable, and dynamic, but as a fixed property of social groups" (qtd. in Kim 107). The adoption of differential racialization and racial triangulation frameworks to Arab Americans and the way they are racialized would come to the conclusion that the Arab American model as a terrorist is not far from the Asian American one as a foreign. Arab Americans can easily be placed as an intermediary group between blacks and whites. Research on the racialization against Arab Americans explains the racial logic in the resemblance between Arab Americans and other racial groups based on certain phenotypic measures.

Conclusion

The analysis of conceptual and theoretical frameworks of the research asserts the existence of remarkable compatibility between the way in which Arab American were/are racialized and the aforementioned theories. While in-grouping and out-grouping corresponds to the process of othering and excluding Arab Americans from the United States mainstream society and cultural mosaic, cultivation theory correlates with the involvement of media in spreading stereotypes and misconceptions about Arab/Muslim Americans. More, differential racialization conforms to targeting Arab/Muslim Americans in post-September 2001 and the demonization of an entire ethnic group. Finally, racial triangulation theory, which was originally introduced for better understanding the position of Asian Americans in the U.S. racial frame, complies with the racial categorization of Arab Americans as neither white nor black.

CHAPTER II

Arabs in America: History, Experiences, and Challenges

Introduction

This chapter serves as a historical survey of early Arab immigration to the United States. In addition to covering the nature, origins, and characteristics of first and second waves of Arab Americans, it illustrates different experiences and challenges they encountered at the individual and community levels. In addition, it analyzes the way in which these challenges, particularly racial categorization, whiteness, identity, and acculturation, stood as obstacles in the Americanization of early Arabs. The chapter proceeds to analyze misconceptions and stereotypes related to the image of Arabs, the role the media plays, specifically Hollywood stereotyping, in regenerating old myths and delusions, and Arab Americans' reaction to media and public racialization. It concludes with comparing racialization of Arab Americans post-9/11 to the internment of Japanese Americans following the Pearl Harbor attacks of the 1940s and shows that the systematic process of racialization is as old as American history and can be regenerated whenever it is needed.

2.1.   Early Arab Immigration to the United States

The pursuit of a better life is a substantial reason behind Arab immigration to the United States. Arab immigrants were attracted by the American dream and the desire for a new land of opportunities where people were prosperous, but little did they know. Racialization accompanied nearly all generations of Arabs in the United States, and for various reasons, the question of identity remains the basic drive behind

all forms of bias against Arab-Americans. From the early wave of immigration dated back to the late 19th century till the 9/11 events, researchers on race relations noted that Arab Americans were largely invisible in the American political and cultural spheres. While some argue that this invisibility is the result of their success at assimilation, others suggest that the limited number of Arab Americans compared to other racial groups resulted in the absence of influence and involvement in American mainstream society.

Besides, for political, economic, and social factors, the first half of the 20th century witnessed an influx of Arabs who overwhelmingly were Muslims into the United States. According the U.S. Bureau of Census, in 2000, Arab Americans' number was slightly over one million; the Arab American Institute (AAI), however, estimates it to about 3.5 million. Although oftentimes viewed as a homogeneous community, the majority of Arab Americans are Christians; yet mainstream media associates them with Islam and frequently use the terms 'Arab' and 'Muslim' interchangeably. This amalgamation necessitates clarification.

Arab Americans are Americans of Arab origins whose ancestry can be traced back to one of the Arab countries in the different parts of the world, namely Africa and Asia. The overwhelming majority of Arab Americans descend from 5 out of 22 Arab countries: Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Egypt, and Iraq. Historically, Arabs moved to America in two main waves, First (1880s-1940s) and Second (post-WWII-2001) (Erickson & Al-Timimi 309). However, the chronology of Muslim presence in America is debatable. Historically, it had been documented that as early as 1539, Estevan the Moor, a Morisco from the city of Azamor, Morocco joined one of the Spanish explorations in what is nowadays Arizona and New Mexico (Restall 182; Mehdi 62).[3]

2.1.1. The First Wave (1880s-1940s)

Settlement of Arabs in notable numbers in America, however, is dated back to the last quarter of the 19th century. Under the orders and encouragement of the Ottoman Sultan Abd al-Hamid II, many Arab merchants joined the Philadelphia International Exposition of 1876 and went back with stories of "money in the streets" in the new world (Naff, *Becoming American* 77).

Because Syria and Lebanon were parts of the Ottoman Empire, immigrants from these parts of the Arab world, known then as Mount Lebanon or Greater Syria, were referred to as 'Turks' or 'Syrians. According to Khalaf, returning immigrants and their stories of success and glory which were recounted "with dramatic gesture around the flickering light of an olive oil lamp on a stormy night in a mountain village with all the relative and friends packed into the one-room cottage" spurred more waves of Syrian immigrants to America (32). The U.S. immigration census refers to the arrival of 2 Syrian immigrants in 1869, 69 during 1870s, and 4,683 between 1887 and 1891. By the end of the 19th century, the number of Arab immigrants increased to 20,000. This pattern grew continuously to the extent that the number of Syrian immigrants increased to more than 80,000 prior to WWII. Table 1 enumerates Syrian immigrants' numbers entering the United States up to 1938.

YearNumber		YearNumber		YearNumber	
1869	2	1903	5,551	1921	5,105
1871-1880	67	1904	3,653	1922	1,334
1887	208	1905	4,882	1923	1,207
1888	273	1906	5,624	1924	1,595
1889	593	1907	5,880	1925	/
1890	1,126	1908	5,520	1926	227
1891	2,483	1909	3,668	1927	/
1892	/	1910	6,317	1928	341
1893	/	1911	5,444	1929	442
1894	/	1912	5,525	1930	332
1895	2,767	1913	9,210	1931	180
1896	4,139	1914	9,023	1932	149
1897	4,372	1915	1,767	1933	135
1898	4,275	1916	676	1934	100
1899	3,708	1917	976	1935	103
1900	2,920	1918	210	1936	99
1901	4,064	1919	231	1937	162
1902	4,982	1920	3,045	1938	61
				Total	124,753

Table 1: Immigrants from Greater Syria to the United States, 1869-1938 (adapted from Khalaf 33)

In general, the generation of immigrants from Greater Syria represented the bulk of the first wave Arab Americans. It included Arabs who descended from the Levant[4]; particularly, Syria and Lebanon (Samhan "Not Quite White" 210). On the eve of WWII, the total number of the first wave Arab community reached about 200,000 (Samhan "Politics and Exclusion" 12). Noteworthy, is the influence of western powers in encouraging Arab immigration. The area, enjoyed relative autonomy and was considered as a separate district from the Ottoman Empire.

The transformation of the Levant's economy from a pre-capitalist to a free market-system had negative impacts on the inhabitants of the region. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 was successful in changing the nature of the economic lifeline between the eastern and western parts of the world. Active ports of the Levant, nowadays Middle East, during the Silk Road era were replaced by Egyptian ports, mainly Alexandria, which made it easier for Europeans to bring Chinese and Japanese

commodities. The latter resulted in the deterioration of the local economy of the Middle East including negative impacts such as high taxation, wide scale unemployment, and high tariffs on imported goods (Naff 110). The social and economic problems that faced Middle Eastern Arabs represented a push factor for immigration to the United States during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The introduction of a series of immigration restrictions during the 1920s in the United States did not halt Arab immigration to America; it only pushed them to move south into Mexico and other Latin American countries, particularly Argentina and Brazil. The socio-economic problems account for the immigration of ¼ of the region's population.

The imposition of military service on Christians was another push factor. Initially, the Ottoman Empire imposed military service on Muslims only and no Christians were accepted in the Ottoman army. But in 1908, under pressure from the European powers to respect the ethnic and religious rights of minorities, the Ottomans ratified their constitution and allowed the enrolment of Christians in the army. To escape military service, Christian Arabs made their way to the United States. Thus, money lenders, steamship agents and even smugglers played a very important role in increasing the number of Christian Arabs in the United States (Khalaf 19).

More educated compared to Arab Muslim immigration, first wave Christian Americans were small in number but mature politically. They encountered western education earlier as American missionaries in the Levant played a significant role in the widespread of education in Lebanon. Those pioneered the establishment of the first high school in 1834, and by the end of the 19th century, thousands of Arab Christians were attending missionary schools. Founded in 1866, the Syrian Protestant School that became known as the American University of Beirut in 1922 (AUB)

produced generations of intellectual leaders. The interaction of Christian Lebanese students with American educators increased their political awareness and paved the way for the creation of a free press. Most importantly, they conceptualized certain positive images of the paradise-like, freedom and liberty as America's portrayals. Stressing on this dynamic encounter, a Syrian immigrant in 1903 in New York put it:

> The teacher in an American mission school had a great many pictures of American cities, streets and scenes, and I could see that life in that land was very different from ours. I heard about the telephone, telegraph, and railroad, and as I already knew about ships on account of seeing them go by on the water, it began to dawn on me that there was a very great and active land outside of Mt. Lebanon and that it might be possible to find something better to do than be a monk (Hitti 55).

Hitti argued that the preliminary aim behind the establishment of educational schools in the Levant was to reform and purify the Eastern Christian Church (ECC) through the spread of Protestantism. However, the encouragement of Arabs to immigrate had never been intended. What had been intended, as Hitti noted, was the rise of nationalism to unify Arabs against the Ottomans (55). The collapse of the Ottoman Empire resulted in an easy penetration of the western powers into different parts of Greater Syria. The League of Nations legitimized colonial forces (France and Britain) to control the area under the veil of mandates. Then, following the Balfour Declaration and the establishment of the state of Israel, 1917 and 1948 respectively, Palestinian immigration to America witnessed a boom.

Similar to the push factors, many pull factors were decisive in determining the process of immigration of many Arabs to America. The first wave of Arab immigrants is well placed under the umbrella of New Immigration that included eastern

Europeans, Jews, Turks, and Greeks. Attracted by economic opportunities as a result of the large scale industrialization, early Arab Americans were much alike other immigrants. Millions of immigrants to America from the 1880s to WWI were poor, unskilled, and low or non-educated. Most of them were unmarried males who moved to America to make money and return home (Naff 211-212). Yet, greatly fascinated by the socioeconomic environment, freedom and liberty, and the immigration restriction measures, the overwhelming majority decided to stay in America.

2.1.2. Identity, Affiliation, and Challenges

The question of minorities and identity affiliation is a hot scholarly topic of debate. Arab Americans, much more like Latin Americans, Black Americans and other ethnic groups whose cultures were different in nature from the American one faced mainstream challenges such as the Anglo-Saxon norms and conformity, the melting pot, cultural pluralism, as well as other ideologies. Being uneducated and unskilled resulted in a delay of the social and cultural integration of the overwhelming majority of Arabs within the American mainstream society. More, unlike the other ethnic minorities such as the Italians, Chinese, and Poles who established their own ethnic societies upon the arrival to the U.S., Arab Americans settled in different parts of America thus reduced the opportunity of community-building (Samhan "Politics and Exclusion" 12-13).

The influx of Arab immigration to the United States coincided with, and was greatly affected, by American Nativism. The nativists aimed at reducing the numbers of the foreign labor force. They claimed that immigrants were responsible for all sorts of social and economic afflictions that the U.S. suffers from as well as the increasing levels of poverty and criminality. In addition to the nativist movement, the 'Hundred Percent Americanization' movement created more tensions among all ethnic

minorities including Arab Americans. This movement considered all hyphenated Americans as guilty and responsible for all national ills. It called for forcing all ethnic minorities living in the U.S. to adopt particular principles such as national loyalty, cultural integration, and to accept all programs related to citizenship awareness. More, the movement called for the necessity of the adoption of the Anglo-American mainstream culture instead of the original cultures, languages, values, and attitudes (Samhan "Politics and Exclusion" 13).

Arab American culture was considered as the most unfamiliar of all immigrants during that era (Cainkar "Social Construction" 258). Physical and cultural characteristics such as dark hair, darkish deep skin, uneducated and unskilled, poor, catholic or orthodox played a conceptual role in creating negative stereotypes about early Arab Americans. These characteristics and others put Arab Americans in a direct confrontation with the White, Anglo-Saxon, and Protestant American mainstream (WASP). Religiously, even being Christian had never been an advantage for first wave Arab Americans. On the one hand, they were victims of prejudice and other forms of antagonistic attitudes of the anti-Catholic movement in the Midwest. On the other, they were targets of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) because they were considered as "Colored, Catholic, and foreign" (Saloom 61-62).

In reaction, a series of federal and states' laws were introduced, they were discriminatory and biased. Legal battles of whiteness and legibility to naturalization are as old as the early arrival of the first wave Arab Americans. First, one should note that the American classification of the Arab race was inaccurate. Because the majority were subjects on the Ottoman Empire, Arab Americans of the early 1880s were classified 'Turks' (Naff "Arabs in America" 12). In fact, only in 1899 did immigration officials classify Arabs of Greater Syria 'Syrians' instead of Turks, Greeks, or

Armenians. The lack of a 'common identity' of Ottoman Arabs and the emphasis on family ties and ethnic affiliation represented another obstacle. Consequently, national identity was substituted by certain ethnic and even religious groupings such as Maronites, Druze, Catholic, and even with names of regions and villages (Suleiman "Introduction: The Arab American" 4-5). More, only in the 1930s did the U.S. government start to classify each Arab minority group according to its national origin. This resulted in the emergence of 'new' hyphenated Americans with new labels such as Lebanese-Americans, Egyptian-Americans, or Iraqi-Americans (Saloom 60).

Besides government discriminatory legislations, courts began to question the 'whiteness' of Arabs; i.e.: whether their birthplace and racial appearance qualify or disqualify them for naturalization. In fact, courts' intervention resulted from the decision of the Federal Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization to verify the eligibility for naturalization of certain categories of immigrants. In several states, Arabs were categorized as Asians (Turks) and consequently they were not considered as free white men (Samhan "Politics and Exclusion" 14). As a protesting act, the Association of Syrian Unity (ASU) sent a delegation to Washington D.C. the latter presented historical documents and geographical maps to prove the Caucasian origins of the Arab race but the case was rejected (Samhan "Politics and Exclusion" 4).

Historically, the first of such 'whiteness' cases that affected the Arab community was in Georgia, and later in Cincinnati, where Arab applications for American citizenship were rejected. The courts decided that applicants were Turks of Asiatic birth and consequently not free white (Suleiman "Early Arab Americans" 43). Again, in 1915, a Charleston, South Carolina court ruled discrimination against Arabs. A judge put it clearly that in addition to the fact that 'Syrians' are not free white men, the 1870 Act of Congress meant that *only* free white men from Europe are eligible for

naturalization (Failinger 10-11). Attitudes of discrimination against early Arab Americans were omnipresent. In Birmingham, Alabama, a candidate for coroner, a position in the court system, raised flyers saying "They have disqualified the negro, an American citizen, from voting in the white primary. The Greek and Syrian should also be disqualified. I don't want their vote. If I can't be elected by white men, I don't want the office" (qtd. in Gualtieri 162).

Identity problems, political upheavals and difficulties facing those who want to return home and the introduction of immigration restrictive legislations contributed to the determination of Arab Americans to stay in America. Assimilation became more than a necessity for them since they were no longer sojourners but residents and this could not be realized without the active participation in the daily life activities, such as elections. Being Americanized was understood as parting from old practices and traditions, especially at the level of the social dimension. Women enjoyed more freedom and independence and family affinity became less stressed. Peddling was a very important element that made the assimilation of early Arab Americans possible. Throughout the process of crisscrossing different regions and states, pack-peddlers were learning English, penetrating deep into the American society and sometimes entering homes of the natives (Naff "The Early Arab" 25).

2.2. Post-WWII Arab Americans: the Second Wave (1940s-2001)
2.2.1. Characteristics

The decade following World War II was characterized by the influx of Arab immigration to the United States. Different in nature compared to the first wave immigration, the new immigrants were mostly Muslims, males and females who came with their families and sometimes alone. The second wave changed the dynamics and

scale of religious affiliation of all Arab Americans. The ratio reversed with estimates that 60-65% were Sunni and Shiite Muslims (Naff "Arabs" 130). Furthermore, they were more educated, highly skilled and often times professional. Many students were sent by their different governments, mainly Egypt and Iraq, through different scholarship programs that aimed at forming future leaders who will participate, after returning homes, at modernizing their own countries (Abraham "Arabs in America" 19). Unexpectedly, for many professional and personal reasons, thousands of these students preferred to settle permanently in the United States. Alixa Naff in "Arabs in America: A Historical Overview" (1983) suggests that the reasons of that refusal were neither professional nor personal. The governmental systems of ruling some Arab countries, dictatorships, corruption at the highest authority levels and political upheavals encouraged Arab Americans to remain in the U.S. These same reasons boosted into a 'brain drain' from many Arab countries (20).

Second wave immigration was not as homogeneous as the first one. Post-WWII Arab Americans came from different Arab countries. In addition to Mount Lebanon/Greater Syria that represented the homeland of the early Arab Americans, immigrants came from Jordan, Palestine, Iraq, Egypt and North Africa. The declaration of the state of Israel in 1948 resulted in the expulsion of about 80,000 Palestinians. Years later and following the June War of 1967[5] between Arabs and Israelis and the occupation of more Arab territories, a similar number of Palestinians left their homelands to the United States. More, the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War in 1975 and the Israeli invasion of the southern Lebanon in 1982 pushed many Lebanese (mostly Muslims) as well as Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon to immigrate. In addition to the political problems, religious factors affected the immigration of certain minority groups in the Arab world such as Copts of Egypt,

Maronites of Lebanon, Syriacs of Iraq, and the Chaldeans of Syria (Orfalea*Before the Flame* 177).

As a matter of fact, the termination of the National Origins Act that had been the backbone of U.S. immigration policy since the 1920s and its substitution with the Hart-Celler Immigration Act of 1965 paved the way for more Arab immigration to the U.S. Giving priority to relatives of U.S. citizens and other permanent residents, as well as other employment preferences (skillful and professional immigrants), this act put an end to the de facto racial discrimination against Southern and Eastern Europeans and Asians and Arabs. Consequently, the locus of immigration shifted from Western Europe (Britain, Germany and France in particular) to Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Asia including the Middle East and North Africa. Statistics of Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) show that more 275,000 Arab immigrants entered the United States between 1954 and 1980 (Kayal 102).

Arab Country (AlphabeticalOrder)	Number of Immigrants	Arab Country (AlphabeticalOrder)	Number of Immigrants
Algeria	4,236	Palestine (till 1975)	3,500
Bahrain	245	Qatar	162
Egypt	55,210	Saudi Arabia	1,540
Iraq	41,085	Sudan	1,752
Jordan	55,463	Syria	26,823
Kuwait	3,145	Tunisia	3,366
Lebanon	51,950	U Arab Emirates	269
Libya	3,134	Yemen, North	8,417
Morocco	11,864	Yemen, South	2,419
Oman	162	Arabia&W. Sahara	255
		Total	274,997

Table 2: Arab Immigrants to the U.S., 1954-1980 (adapted from Kayal 102-103)

The rise of Arab nationalism and anti-colonial attitudes in the Arab world determined the orientations and ideologies of second wave immigration. Overall,

political maturity, well developed ideologies of civil liberties, freedom and openness, individualism and popular participation in decision-making through the establishment of democratically-elected governments enabled second wave immigrants to engage easily in the American politics and society. More importantly, many events played a significant role in shaping the identity of second wave immigrants: The 1967 Arab Israeli war and its consequences had a considerable impact on the Arab community, including early and newly arrived immigrants, in the United States. The Israeli occupation of Palestinian and other Arab territories (West Bank, Gaza Strip, Sinai and the Heights of Golan), the American official support to Israel, and the biased American media and its celebration of the Arabs' defeat pushed Arabs to stand together and establish organizations to preserve and protect their interests as an ethnic group. Such reaction took place as the more aware second wave immigrants joined forces with the well assimilated first wave ones to form a strong affiliation and establish a unified Arab community. For the sake of confronting the different challenges facing them, both groups drew together over one pronounced Arab identity putting an end to the old group affiliations such as Lebanese-Americans, Egyptian-American…. (Suleiman, "Introduction: The Arab American" 4).

Post-1965 is characterized by the entrance of a more politicized group of Middle Eastern immigrants. The arrival of this Muslim majority with a strong nationalistic identification that was boosted by post-colonial era ideologies coincided with the Civil Rights Movement in the United States. This period witnessed government loosening of immigration laws to counteract accusations of racism. Thus, what was known for Arab Americans as a paradise-like land of dreams turned out to be a racist ground.

2.2.2. Crisis-associated Identity and Coping Mechanisms

The American media representation of Arab Americans throughout events taking place overseas such as the Iranian hostage crisis, the oil embargo, Iran-Iraq conflict and others was successful in portraying Arab Americans as troublemakers and enemies of the United States. The 'crisis-associated identity' of Arab Americans participated in creating stereotypes and tended to place them outside the American mainstream society. The U.S. Census Bureau classification of the Arab Americans as 'white' did not include them within the major American ethnic groups. In the discourse of American Ethnic studies, only four ethnic groups were fully covered and examined. These groups are the Afro-Americans, Latin Americans, Asian Americans, and Amerindians or Native Americans. Arab Americans were mentioned whenever it comes to deal with violence and conflict in the Middle East (Saliba 308).

In fact, the social exclusion of Arab Americans resulted in more damaging results in news coverage, popular culture, and government discourses. Hollywood movies, for example, depicted Arabs as violent, barbaric, women abusers, and terrorists. What Jack Shaheen described as the "New Anti-Semitism" against Arab Americans was very frequent during the last forty years of the 20th century (Shaheen *Reel Bad Arabs* 6). After documenting hundreds of American movies depicting Arabs negatively, Jack Shaheen stated clearly that, for Americans, Arab Americans were:

> Sub-humans and fanatics who believe in a different god, who
> don't value life as much as we [Americans] do, [and who are]
> intent on destroying us (the west) with their oil or with their
> terrorism. The men seek to abduct and brutally seduce our
> [American] women; they are without family and reside in a
> primitive place (the desert) and behave like primitive beings. The

women are subservient resembling black crows-or we see them

portrayed as mute, somewhat exotic harem maidens. (Shaheen

"Culture Interview")

Negative portrayal of Arab Americans continued as a result of Arabs' defeat in the 1967 war against Israel. In fact, a new level of hostility was created by Jewish Americans and American supporters of Zionism and the state of Israel (Samhan "Politics and Exclusion" 25). One should note that alienation, intimidation, and marginalization were common practices. Arab academics, public participants and even pro-Arab cause activists were intimidated. Candidates for public offices from Arab descents or pro-Arab were spotted and marked for defeat. The Jewish lobby and associations were successful in matching any kind of sympathy with Arab Americans with being anti-Israel and anti-Semite. The portrayal of 'good' Arabs became a burden as one of Hollywood producers put it: "some of us are reluctant to present good Arabs, even good Arab-Americans in our movies, because we will be labeled pro-Arab" (Shaheen *Reel Bad Arabs* 30).

No less damaging than 'political racism', other forms of racism contributed in conceptualizing anti-Arab xenophobia that targeted Arab Americans as a result of the nature of their identity (culture, religion, and ethnicity) in the same way other ethnic groups have experienced (Latinos and Africans); hence, 'jingoistic racism' is another form of hostility against Arab Americans. Nabeel Abraham defined jingoistic racism as a blending of "knee-Jerk patriotism," that can be developed into a form of chauvinism and "home-grown white racism" toward the non-Christian, non-European ethnic communities that is generated by an excessive form of ethnocentrism, false patriotism, and political alienation ("Anti Arab Racism" 193).

Marginalized by hostility and other forms of racism, Arab Americans were pushed to create and develop mechanisms to cope with them. Built around the question of identity, these mechanisms aimed at identifying the nature of identity and consider it as the locus and most significant dynamic feature within the community as well as the individual:

a) **Ethnic denial** is one of the used mechanisms; many Arab Americans neglected their Arab and Islamic origins and adopted more specific references such as Copts, Maronites, Jordanians, and Syrians. Others completely denied their roots and referred to themselves as Greeks, French, or Italians (Abraham "Arabs in America" 19).

b) **Ethnic isolation** was another coping mechanism. Adopted by the new immigrant middle class and non-skilled Arabs, it is represented by the withdrawal of many Arabs from their ethnic groups to live into their own ethnic enclaves.

c) Second and third generations of Arabs who immigrated to America adopted another mechanism: **ethnic integration**. It emphasized the remarkable similarities between the Arab culture and the American one and the common roots of Islam and Christianity. Moreover, they stressed the necessity of acculturation and the multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and multi-cultural nature of the United States (17-18).

This approach provided the genesis for the creation of many Arab American organizations such as the association of Arab American University Graduates (AAUG) in 1967, the national Association of Arab Americans (NAAA) in 1972, the American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC) in 1980, and the Arab American Institute (AAI) in 1985 (Abraham "American Arabs" 11).

2.2.3. The Experience of Arab American Communities

Early Arab Americans (Christians and Muslims) share a common heritage; they have a long historical affiliation to their religious and sectarian beliefs as well as to their political orientations. However, immigration records until 1899 and census records until 1920 reveal that all Arabs living in America were recorded along with Greeks, Iranians, Turks, Armenians, and others and were categorized as Turks from Asia. The increase of immigrants after the 1920s is reflected in the creation of a separate classification. Arab Americans were considered as *Syrians*. What is new about this categorization was that it included all Arabs from Great Syria without noting the religious differences between them. Non-Syrian Arabs outside Greater Syria were classified as *Other Asians* and North African Arabs as *Other Africans* (Naff 108). In his *Becoming American: The Early Arab Immigrant Experience* (1993), Alixa Naff wrote:

> The Syrians are, of course, a non-Western people. They were shaped for life by the mores and institutions of small, self-contained communities; their individual places in their community's strata and their world view differed significantly from those of mainstream Europeans and Americans. Moreover, the Syrian-American community was and, to a large extent continues to be, fragmented. It is, reflecting the homeland, a conglomeration of village and religious subgroups which share a language and a common cultural heritage, even though perceptions of that heritage differ. The story of the Syrian immigration must, therefore, be viewed against such a background. (7)

In the early 1930s, a Christian community composed of Syrians and Lebanese was created and was successful, to a certain extent, in sponsoring different social

activities such as providing scholarships and in seeking better relations between its members and other communities. This community was led by an American-born and English-speaking generation that considered itself American first and Arab second. This is reflected through their degree of acculturation and assimilation that was not affected by the political and social problems at their homeland such as the declaration of the State of Israel in 1948 and the arrivals of a second Arab wave of immigrants to the United States (Abraham "Anti-Arab Racism" 159).

In addition to being the main occupation of early Arab Americans, peddling had negative impacts on Arab Americans' social life. These impacts included replacing the traditional extended family with the nuclear one, weakening the paternal influence and authority, extending working hours (at the expanse of sacred days for Muslims), more maternal engagement in family business, and parents looking after their businesses and staying away from home resulted in the Americanization of their children (Naff "Becoming American" 130). In early Arab American communities, youth were encouraged to found their own household following their marriage. However, they were urged to preserve all ties, including loyalty and affiliation, to the wellbeing of the big family. Aside from being occupied by their own businesses, Arab American women (mothers and wives) did not abandon their roles and duties toward the family. In order to adjust to their new environment, they started to have fewer children and spend less time preparing American fast food instead of time-consuming Middle Eastern meals (Cainkar "Palestinian Women" 93-94).

Arab American Women's efforts to support churches and youth groups were so productive. By WWII, gender-based segregation in churches and other social gatherings had disappeared except among Muslim immigrants and in mosques. Women were treated equally and the predilection of having male children over

females had vanished. However, choices of women were, to a certain extent,

controlled and arranged, and they were generally tied up to their husbands' beliefs.

Most of the time, family-arranged marriages resulted in ideological clashes between

parents and their adolescent children (Smith 106).

Regardless of the good intentions of the two parties and their families' support,

marriages between Muslim men and Christian women often face critical problems.

One of the major problems is that marriage in the American context generally means a

union of two individuals rather than two families which uncertainly meet for family

occasions only. For Muslim Arab Americans, marriage is considered as the union of

families, with parents and other relatives who traditionally prepare all the

arrangements. While these arranged marriages are less common in many urban areas

of Arab countries, many immigrant families bring expectations that hinder the

contracting of marriage in the American scene between Muslims and non-Muslims.

Marriage is commonly understood as linking two families rather than simply two

individuals; this notion is partially adapted but never fully ignored in Arab American

communities (Smith 114).

The intermarriage of Arabs and non-Arabs as a result of American culture's

influence on Arab youth, mainly learning centers, media, and military service, resulted

in shaking family relationships. Decades following their arrival to America, the

question of living in two cultures, i.e.: preserving their own culture and

simultaneously accepting Americanization, is no more a major problem. Unarranged

marriages were permitted and children were allowed to stay single and to choose their

spouses. Compared to Christian Arab Americans, Muslim Arab Americans remained

traditionally-minded and had to follow the rules and instructions of their faith (Isaksen

65-66).

Families originating from Greater Syria represented the keystone of early Arab American identity and social organization. Families of the first generation were constrained by the acculturation and assimilation processes. However, the second generation, in addition to keeping their fathers' culture and values, accepted the American cultural elements that were compatible with the essence of their household conceptions. Children were raised to be fully aware of the American culture, respect strong family ties and values, and concurrently develop relations with people from different ethnic groups. Later generations, however, took a distance from their cultural origins and ancestry. Turning to their parents and grandparents was the only way to get informed about their ethnic origins, cultural ideologies, and values (Ba Yunus and Kone 69).

The overwhelming majority of early Arab immigrants settled close to their workplace and businesses and preferred to live in narrow ethnic circles. They were city-dwellers who lived in middle class districts and many were able to establish small ethnic neighborhoods as the Egyptians and the Yemenites. The newly established communities, predominantly Muslims who were employed in the industrial sector, were unified and formed a relatively larger community. In Dearborn, Michigan, for example, this community increased following the influx of Arab immigrants from Palestine, Yemen, and refugees from Lebanon and Iraq. The growing Arab American community in Michigan was well organized; the fact that facilitated the assimilation of the new comers. Regardless of the sectarian differences between Sunni and Shiite Arab Americans who form the majority of Michigan's Arab population, these two religious groups came closer in face of American antagonistic attitudes against Arab Americans. The Arab-Israeli wars fortified the bonds between all Arab Americans regardless of their religious and political orientations. However, late immigration

generations proved to be more idealistic and patriotic with a strong desire to maintain and revive their traditions. The increase of the Arab American population is reflected through the building of new mosques in the United States, which is essential--in addition to the Arabic language—to their faith. Most Muslim immigrants and their Imams are trying continuously to revive religious discipline and knowledge of both Arabic and Islamic teachings (Akbar).

2.3. Orientalism and Regeneration of old Stereotypes

2.3.1. Racial Profiling vs. Whiteness: The Hard Equation

It is noteworthy that the locus 'target' of racial profiling as a practice rotates depending on the socio-historical context. In his *Orientalism* (1979), the Palestinian scholar Edward Said advocates the notion that the creation of a group, religious or ethnic, which is targeted, criminalized, racialized, outlawed, or suspected is of utmost importance in consolidating a definition of the American national identity. According to him, the construction of the concept of the *Other* plays a significant role in conceptualizing the *Self*. This *Other* is distinguished by its racial differences, religious affiliation, national origins, social classification and gender (333). Many historians referred to the components of the American national identity vis-à-vis other ethnic identities such as Black Americans, Latin Americans, Asian Americans as well as other racial groups and the way in which they interact with the American mainstream identity. Edward Said notes that the construction of a specific *Oriental* identity helped in the constitution of the *Western* one. The racialized identity that indicates the position of the *Other* on the basis of which the nation identifies itself during the times of crisis is continually regenerated whenever needed to serve certain political and economic objectives. Accordingly, Native Americans were identified as savages,

Black Americans as criminals, Latin Americans as aliens and Chicanos, Asian Americans as foreigners, and Arab/Muslims Americans as terrorists (252).

The use of the media in the definition of the American national identity through stereotyping the Other's religious and ethnic identity plays a central role in creating targeted racial profiles. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was depicted as the enemy of humanity as a result of its attempt to spread its communist ideology. The Soviet Union was portrayed as the opponent of U.S. democracy and the Soviets were depicted as spies. During WWI, German Americans were portrayed as Huns and barbarians and were suspected of espionage to Germany. During WWII, the mainstream media supported and justified Japanese Americans' internment because Americans saw them as two-faced, untrustworthy, and loyal to their country of origin (Alsultany 16).

The quest for "the real American" is constantly being engaged and reengaged in political debates as well as in American popular culture. Following 9/11 events, there existed no answer for "who is the real American?" without associating the subject to Arab/Muslim Americans. In *Watching Race: Television and the Struggle for Blackness* (1995), Herman Gray notes that:

> In the idealized desire for national unity served up nightly on evening cable and network newscasts, new actors - this time Arabs, Palestinians, Islamic fundamentalists - have quickly become the bodies and cultures that the logic of race marks as different and therefore potentially threatening to the national order. Television's role in this process is absolutely central, for it is television that makes these images and representations of difference meaningful, legible, and familiar. (xix)

Noticeably, momentary multiculturalism replaces the historically stressed whiteness of the American citizens depending on political and economic circumstances. During times of wars and crises, mainstream media temporarily suspends the prevailing whiteness from the national imagery and replaces it with the necessity of the temporary incorporation of the different ethnic groups into a unified national American identity; i.e.: being American comes first and hyphenated second. Ideologically produced by the government (presidential speeches) and the media (shows where white and black cops arrest an Arab), momentary multiculturalism is operated to build a national consensus over certain governmental policies and legislations such as the War on Terror and the Patriotic acts following the 9/11 events. According to Steven Chermak in his "Marketing Fear: Representing Terrorism after September 11" (2003):

> Ideological, political, and cultural differences disappeared in the media following such crisis events and were replaced with a language of a national unity. For example, a political body united was shown as Republican and Democratic representatives sang "God Bless America" on the steps of the Capitol building. Interestingly, racial differences were also eliminated and the media discovered racial harmony in the streets following the attacks. The media described it as a day without racism. One reporter claimed that "after the attacks, some Black Americans noticed that whites talked to them more and others felt less vulnerable to racial profiling". (17-18)

Chermak argues that post-9/11 was marked by no more racial profiling but by momentary multiculturalism. He described the way in which Black Americans supported the policies of George W. Bush and New York's Mayor Rudy Giuliani. An

interviewed boy declared that he was transformed from "being a black" before 9/11 to become "an American, more than ever" following the events. A reporter explained how black and Latin teenagers "no longer think of the policemen as enemies," and that policemen "no longer eye them with suspicion". Ironically, during this period of multicultural harmony, huge numbers of black and Latin Americans were imprisoned (18).

In fact, the process of Arab Americans' racialization during and after 9/11 cannot be easily understood without a full analysis of the nature of their racial posture before 2001. Arab Americans suffered from the paradoxical classification of their race that ranged them as whites and non-whites at the same time (Samhan "Not Quite White" 210). Furthermore, they had never been considered as a part of or fit into the categorized ethnic minority groups in the United States (Asian, White, Native, Latin…). Instead, they were excluded from the scope of whiteness and deemed as "not quite white" (Bhabha 86). This resulted in placing them outside the ideological scope of the mainstream society.

The nature of Arab Americans' racial profiling differs from the ones used to racialize Black Americans, Latin Americans as well as other racial minorities. They were racialized depending on certain phenotypic features. The two main markers used to racialize Arab Americans were their religions and their political orientations:

First, with racialization based on religion, one might notice that Arabness and Islam were used interchangeably. Mistakenly and often intentionally, all Arabs were considered as Muslims and all Muslims as Arabs. Islam was depicted as a symbol of backwardness, barbarianism, and violence and the perverse version of Christianity and Judaism (Joseph 260).

Second, political racialization considers that any kind of sympathy with the Palestinians or the support of establishing an independent Palestinian state in Palestine as anti-Semitic and anti-democratic ideologies that should be criminalized. Israel is portrayed as the sole democratic nation in the Middle East; a nation surrounded by terrorist and totalitarian regimes whose main purpose is to destroy civilization and democracy there (Naber et al. 6). This racialization contributed to isolating, marginalizing, and making Arab Americans *invisible*.

The American racial categorization system did not include Arab Americans as a race or as one ethnic group but as a composition of different multiracial groups tied together because of certain commonalities such as culture and language. When Arab Americans claimed affiliation to the Semitic branch of the Caucasian race, their main purpose was to prove the whiteness and consequently to gain American citizenship. In fact, it was easier for fair hair, bright skinned and Christian Arab Americans to pass the test of whiteness and therefore acquire American citizenship. Darker skinned and Muslim Arabs were not successful in doing so. Even when their whiteness was recognized, it was not advantageous to them. During the 1960s and 1970s, violent actions against Arab Americans were not recorded as forms of racial discrimination as a result of their new white status. Worse, this racial discrimination against Arab Americans cannot be taken into courts because whites "are not eligible to sue for racial discrimination" (Saliba 309).

It is very important to understand that questions over race and racism are limited to the nature of the relations between whites, on the one side, and Black, Latin, Asian, and Native Americans, on the other. Racialized Arab Americans are not as visible as the other categorized racial groups in the United States. Academic works, inside and outside the United States, overlook the racial discrimination against Arab

Americans throughout spotting the light on Black, Latin, Asian, and Native Americans; in one way or another, they accepted the racial configuration set by the United States government and its agencies.

Consequently, Arab Americans were way back from the above mentioned racialized groups as far as resisting racism is concerned; they were just starting to name discrimination forms practiced against them. Some Arab Americans preferred to be identified as North Africans or West Asians while others avoided being distinguished and accepted the equivocal racial status thinking that this "indeterminate status" is closer to whiteness than the other identifications. More, Arab Americans' racial identification was complicated by the fact that they were identified as non-whites by white Americans and white or close to whiteness by the other racialized groups such as Black, Latin, Native, and Asian Americans. This fact did not allow unity and sympathy between Arab Americans and other racialized groups (Naber "Ambiguous Insiders" 51).

Not included or invisible in public racial discourses before 2001, the latter placed Arab Americans first in the post-9/11 period. The repeated question was whether Arab Americans were treated fairly or were they subject to different forms of racial discrimination. Newspaper articles and TV talk shows' debates on racial profiling and whether it is fair or not came to the front. However, the racial paradox shifted when Arab Americans moved from being invisible to a more visible status. A Gallup poll that was conducted days after 9/11 attacks showed that even African Americans supported racial profiling of Arab Americans; the percentage was as high as 71%. Contrarily, among the consequences of the backlash against Arab and Muslim Americans was the establishment of "cross-ethnic, racial and religious coalitions" (Naber "Ambiguous Insiders" 43). Government racial campaigns such as a

deportations, detentions, racial profiling, revising INS legislations, and violent and discriminatory acts were forms of overt racialization. In addition to the ambiguous identification of Arab Americans as a "part of us" or "apart from us", ethnic and religious racialization intensified and new forms of racial discourses against Arab Americans emerged. The enactment of certain measures was determinant in altering the racial nature of the United States. Lisa Lowe notes that "legal institutions function as flexible apparatuses of racialization and gendering in response to the material conditions of different historical moments" (22).

In addition to whiteness and its effects, citizenship represented another dilemma for Arab Americans. Historically, U.S. citizenship was greatly affected by the racial affiliation and representation. Access to visas, legal representation, and other basic rights in the United States were determined by the way a group is racialized and represented. Arab American citizens faced different challenges such as the one of belongingness. Even before 2001, citizenship for Arabs and Muslims was contended by views suggesting that Arabs and Muslims do not fit into the American context and its progressive ideology. Colonization, immigration, Eurocentric imagined society, racial classification, and early attitudes with racial minority groups were watershed moments that complicated a precise definition of citizenship. Arab Americans, similar to other racial groups, have had an unstable citizenship status; sometimes granted, other times denied. Lighter skinned Christian Arabs were luckier than dark skinned Muslim Arabs based on the assumption that the latter would not adequately assimilate. Even when obtaining citizenship, it had never been advantageous. In addition to the newly introduced and rewritten legislations that urged deportation and denied them citizenship, Arabs and Muslims were perceived as foreigners and therefore do not have an equal right to belong (Samhan "Not Quite White" 217).

2.3.2. Media, Arabs/Muslims, and Arab Americans: Stereotypes and Myths

As defined in Oxford Learner's Dictionaries, stereotype refers to the beliefs or judgments about people based on fixed ideas about them which are oftentimes not true "Stereotype". According to many sociologists and psychologists, a stereotype is the most appropriate way to convey the truth and untruth about an individual or an ethnic/religious group. As a matter of fact, overemphasizing certain stereotypes drives people to view and to place certain groups under certain stereotypical umbrellas and pushes them unintentionally to believe that all people from this ethnic or religious group behave in the same way (El-Farra 1). Generally, stereotypes are harmful to any racial or religious group because any perceptions of that group are applied to all individuals who belong to it. Estrella Abreu et al. notice that "when one perceives an individual as a member of a particular stereotyped group, the perceiver's mind activates the group-relevant cognitive structure and processes" (693).

Introduced by George Gerbner in the 1960s, the Cultivation Theory explains the way in which sitting hours watching television influences the audiences' perceptions, attitudes, and values. The theory emphasizes the fact that long-term exposure to television and addicting certain programs and shows impact the viewers' thought process (Severin and Tankard 1024). As the only vehicle used by the viewers to know about and interact with people from different racial and ethnic groups, the mass media makes people aware of others' cultures as well as the nature of their social relations. The media-presented pictures and stereotypes are deemed as guides to construct social realities. However, the media disregard positive characteristics and focus on negative stereotypes which are more profitable and of great interest for viewers. It widely covers the minority extremist subgroups instead of the moderate, open minded and law-respecting majority of any racial group. Spotting the light on

deviants, fundamentalists, and radicals makes certain dramas and shows highly

demanded (Tan 253). For Joyce V. Higgins in "Transnational News Media Role in

Building Consensus about Communities" (2001),

> When the news media presents an object, certain attributes, properties
>
> or traits of that object are emphasized and others de-emphasized. The
>
> media's selection and presentation of an object's attributes are thus
>
> transferred to the public's agenda and affects how the public thinks
>
> about or feels about the object. (114)

The negative portrayals are successful in conveying messages that these

dangerous and barbarian racial minorities should not be trusted and their assimilation

in the American mainstream society is not possible. Another tactic used by media to

solidify certain stereotypes is focusing on characters of different race (exempting

white) and different religion (exempting Christianity). Accordingly, these examples

result in distorted perceptions. Worse, the representation of these bad characters

(Arabs, Muslims, and other racial groups) becomes the reality in the minds of these

viewers. Research concluded that violence and its representations in the media help in

activating "hostility and aggression-related concepts in memory." These activated

concepts interpret any other's behavior as malevolent and antagonistic (Roskos-

Ewoldsen D. et al. 58). This prescription suits bad Arabs and Muslims whose

characters and cultures have become represented in the American media.

2.3.3. Stereotypes in Hollywood Movies

In spite of the efforts that were made to eliminate the racial and ethnic

stereotypes from Hollywood movies, the last three decades have witnessed the

increase "in number and virulence" of the biased and judgmental portraits of Arab

Americans (Shaheen *Reel Bad Arabs* 28). Except those considered as pure Americans,

all racial groups were, at one time or another, portrayed negatively. Following September 2001, racialization machines turned to Arab Americans. In his "Hollywood Now Plays Cowboys and Arabs" (1998), Goodstein argues that "after years of virtual invisibility, Arab-Americans are finally finding prominence in Hollywood movies--as terrorists and villains. They are only the latest in long line ethnic groups and nationalities cast in stereotypical bad-guy roles…" According to Shaheen, the four main myths that constitute the stereotypical portrayal of Arabs are wealth, barbarianism, sex maniac, and terrorism. On his side, Karl A. Kozlovic in his "Islam, Muslims and Arabs in the Popular Hollywood Cinema" (2007) argues that Arabs were depicted as one of three Bs:

> … billionaires, belly dancers or bombers who, as the prototypical Other (as perceived by the Judeo-Christian West and within the colonial discourses) are characterized as heathen, evil, uncivilized, anti-modern, unreasoning, cruel, antagonistic, obsessive, rascally, barbaric, punitive, blood-thirsty, villainous, dissolute, hot-tempered, money grabbers, lustful, polygamous, patriarchal or bumbling buffoons. (218)

In western collective memory, Arabs were seen as illiterate, uncivilized, and silly Bedouins. The view that Arabs are not able to use technology effectively was common. During the 1973 Arab-Israeli war[6], many Americans were surprised by the initial Arab success in passing through the Israeli army's defense lines. This surprise was not because Arabs succeeded in doing so, but because they were Arabs. Decades of media stereotypes portraying Arabs as silly made it hard for Americans to believe that Arab success (Wheatcroft).

These stereotypes are basic components of any Hollywood product related directly or indirectly to Arabs and Arab Americans. The disability to change these

stereotypes was one of the dilemmas that faced many ethnic and Arab American studies. Shaheen expressed: "I can't say the celluloid Arab has changed. That is the problem. He is what he has always been--the cultural "other." Seen through Hollywood's distorted lenses, Arab looks different and threatening" ("The Mummy Returns" Web). Shaheen argued that aggressive portrayals and stereotypes of Arab American were not different from those related to other racial minorities. One might suggest that Hollywood's hostile stereotypes of Arab Americans are mere regenerations of past experiences. Native, Black, Latin, and even Jewish Americans experienced the same defamation ("The Mummy Returns"). Ignoring the harmful outcomes of these stereotypes, Hollywood turned a deaf ear vis-à-vis the increasing campaigns against injurious slander. According to Savage, "Hollywood has played a direct role in fanning the flames of suspicion and hatred towards Arabs and Arab Americans. This had been insidiously accomplished by representing them in thousands of roles as the source of all that is evil in world culture."

Investigating how Hollywood used myth and ideology as weapons to misrepresent Arabs and Muslims, John C. Eisele in "The Wild East: Deconstructing the Language of Genre in the Hollywood Eastern" (2002) refers to the necessity of the creation of a specific genre he named the 'Eastern'. He argues that the use of certain themes such as Arabian nights, Sheiks and their lascivious way of life, and maidens and mistresses plays a conceptual role in conveying slanderous images about Arabs and Islam. He adds that the Europeans considered the Middle East as a historical site of encountering mysteries and Myth (91). Additionally, the nature of the relationship between the West and the East was fully covered by Edward Said's *Orientalism.* The book tackles the notion of Otherness and the way in which some westerners used it to define themselves. It spotlights the four major principles used to portrait Arabs and

Muslims. The first principle focuses on the observable and remarkable differences and ignores all resemblances between westerners and easterners. The second overemphasizes generalized identifications and perceptions of Arabs and Muslims while it ignores cultural and ethnic diversity. The third tenet is a western suggestion to create a definition for the 'Orient' because of its 'incapability to define itself'. Finally, the fourth principle recommends that the East is an unsafe and disarrayed area that needs to be organized and secured by the West (301). In other words, Hollywood's depictions fortify the idea that Arabs and Muslims (the Orient) are different from the Americans.

Following the same line of thinking, Said advocates that the notion of *Orient* is used as a synonym of the other and it is perpetuated in western consciousness. Later, he argued, it amassed a "wide field of meanings, associations, and connotations … which did not necessarily refer to the real Orient but to the field surrounding the word" (203). The Crusades, colonialism as well as other historical encounters between the West and the East have played a conceptual role in portraying Arabs and Muslims with certain stereotypes such as barbarianism, cultural inferiority, and religious backwardness. The flow of these stereotypes for centuries resulted in their perpetuation far from their ideological and historical contexts. Said's analysis suggests that "this information seemed to be morally neutral and objectively valid; it seems to have an epistemological status equal to that of historical chronology or geographical location" (205). Theses stereotypes and portrayals, which are in fact *illusions* the westerners have forgotten they are *still illusions*, are considered as justifications for the unjust and hostile attitudes against Arabs and Muslims.

Racial discrimination against Arab Americans is deemed a rule instead of being an exception. In her article "The Rules of Forced Engagement: Race, Gender,

and the Culture of Fear among Arab Immigrants in San Francisco Post-9/11" (2006)

Nadine Naber argues that Americans justify the exclusion and racialization of Arab

Americans by assuming that their ethnic affiliations and cultures are inferior and

primitive compared to the American ones (240-241). She sheds light on the way in

which Arab Americans are depicted. Instead of being depicted in different images as

other diverse ethnic groups and individuals, Arab/Muslim Americans are portrayed as

one homogeneous ethnic, religious, and cultural group. According to Naber, Arab

Americans are perceived as a "monolith in popular North American media images"

("Ambiguous Insiders" 37). Similarly, Steven Salaita notes that Arab Americans

"have been homogenized in various American discourses as an unstable

Southern/Third World (i.e., foreign) presence" (qtd. in Naber "The Rules of Forced

Engagement" 245). Historically, placing ethnic discrimination against Arab/Muslim

Americans in post-9/11 events is wrong. He adds that "it would be foolish to

conceptualize anti-Arab racism as a byproduct of 9/11… a more responsible

conceptualization will locate anti-Arab racism within a heterogeneous and multi-

temporal complex of historical factors" (qtd. in Naber 251).

Many researchers have noticed that stereotyped images about Arab Americans

were derived from or parallel to the derogatory classical images related to Blacks and

Jews. The main difference in the portrayal of each ethnic and religious group is "to fit

contemporary circumstances" (McCarus 121). Racialization and ethnic profiling is not

a new phenomenon but is an old one modified whenever it is needed. Hollywood

filmmakers used old perceptions in composing ideas about new movies. According to

Goodstein "each set of villains reflected headlines and anxieties of its era." From the

Soviet enemy of humanity, Hollywood's "new cinematic enemy is the Muslim

extremist."

Hollywood's depiction of the American as the *good* guy and the Arab as the *bad* guy is the result of America's history with the Arab world, namely its side-taking with Israel in Middle East conflicts. This shows that media contents are reflections of America's international relations and foreign policies. Hollywood content, be it fictitious or not, is recycled into life realities whereby Islam is depicted in association with violence and terrorism in reference to the 9/11 attacks. This way, it represents Muslims as radicals and extremists that are driven by their faith to commit violent actions against the United States. In her "Images of Islam in US Media and their Educational Implications" (2010), Liz Jackson argues that "mass media associates Islam and Muslims, by and large, with terrorism, portraying the religion and the group most frequently as unreasonable, fundamentalists and/or prone to reactive violence" (6). She added that the mass media's visual representation of Islam contributes to the public vision of Islam as harmful and dangerous and Muslims as radicals and fundamentalists (7).

Throughout identifying more than 900 movies that featured Arabs and Arab Americans, Shaheen's *Reel Bad Arabs: How Hollywood Vilifies a People* (2001) traces the history of Arabs' depiction in Hollywood from its early history to modern times. This book was updated in 2009 adding another 300 movies. Shaheen reviewed a list of films after searching libraries, audio and video archives, museums, and the internet for movies related to specific key terms such as Sheikhs, Bedouin, Desert, Egypt, and Algiers (Shaheen *Reel Bad Arabs* 12). He came to the conclusion that Arabs were depicted according to the following: 'Sheikhs' referred to the wealthy and conspiratorial Arabs, portrayed as "oily, militant, and ostentatious" and "aspiring to buy up chunks of America" (12). 'Villains' referred to antagonists, bandits, and outlaws "who are trying to rape, kill or abduct fair-complexioned Western heroines"

(16). Depicted as 'maiden', Arab women are "humiliated, demonized, and eroticized in more than 50 feature films" (22). The 'Egyptian' is seen through mummification and resurrection of the pharaohs (24-25). The 'Palestinian' is used frequently as synonymous with terrorism, hatred, and hostility; Shaheen noticed that more than 50% of the movies depicting Palestinians negatively were "filmed in Israel" (27). Finally, the 'Algerian' is the pirate and sea robber from the 'Barbary Coast' of the 18th century.

Shaheen refers to "the propaganda machine" which degrades images of minority ethnic groups and simultaneously advances heroic images of white Americans. This propaganda is represented by plots revolving around heroic Americans who stand against violent and terrorist Arabs. In his PhD dissertation entitled "Negotiating the Representations of Arabs in Hollywood Films: Perspectives and Interpretations" (2015, Essa S. Al-Ajmi revealed that the movie *Rules of Engagement* (2000) and similar movies which focus on the stereotypical negative representations of specific ethnic groups including Arabs were funded and produced in collaboration with many American government agencies and institutions such as the Department of Defense (DOD), National Guard, Marines and Navy, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (68). John Cones in his *Patterns of Bias in Hollywood Movies* (2012) qualifies justifications of such productions as ridiculous. In fact, in self-defense, Hollywood accused Arab Americans of being "narrow minded and straight laced". More, it insisted that Arab Americans must perceive these propagandist movies as entertainment rather than anti-Arab propaganda and that any form of racial and religious defamation is totally rejected (25-26). In sum, Hollywood's responsibility for anti-Arab propaganda is clearly seen in the following anecdote: Following the Oklahoma City bombing of 1995, American news

commentators and political analysts were quick in their accusation of Arabs and Muslims. When an Arab American spokesman was asked about the reasons behind that, he answered through listing a number of Hollywood movies that portrayed Arabs and Arab Muslims negatively (26). Thus, Hollywood is proved to exercise a strong influence on American citizens, politicians, and media. Its responsibility in the demonization of Arabs and Muslims cannot be denied.

2.4.   The Response: Arab American Rising Up to Racialization and Stereotypes

Arab Americans quest for an equal American citizenship free from racialization practices and public hostility took different forms: building up community social, educational, professional and political frameworks such as social clubs, ethnic networks, education programs, and political activism. On their side, Arab American endeavor to denounce all form of anti-Arabism.

2.4.1. Arab American Organizations: A Historical Survey

As a result of negative perceptions of Arabs in American public opinion, different organizations were created to serve Arab Americans' social, political, religious, educational, and professional needs. Some of these prominent and nationally-based organizations focused on providing social services, alms, and the conduction of debates about politics in the Arab world. The drive towards association-building among Arab Americans is not new. Already in the 19th century following their settlement in the United States, Arabs of Greater Syria sought to maintain their cultural identity. This strive was illustrated by the establishment of Syrian social clubs and ethnic networks.

By the turn of the 20th century, and for various reasons, Arab Americans associations flourished. As the area with the largest concentration of people from Arab ancestry in the United States, Dearborn, Michigan is considered as the location of most Arab American organizations. Most prominent is the Arab Community Center for Economic and Social Service (ACCESS). Founded in 1971, it provides a large number of services including social, health, training, and employment programs for Arabs Americans. Leading among its activities is the opening of the Arab American National Museum in Michigan. More, ACCESS gathered scores of grassroots Arab American organizations into the Network for Arab American Communities (NAAC) (Samhan "Losing the Battle" 132-133). Unlike other smaller organizations, ACCESS cooperates with larger groups such as the Arab American Institute (AAI) and the Arab American Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC).

First generation Arab Americans chose Washington D.C. Metropolitan area to create their social clubs, lobbying organizations and other networks (mainly professional). However, despite the fact that political participation of Arab Americans in the American political process was very limited, it was very important for the members of the Arab American organizations to participate (Samhan "Losing the Battle" 133). Before the outbreak of the June war of 1967, Arab Americans did not feel the necessity of establishing a political influence as a group. Rather, many individuals were occupying leading positions in political parties, labor unions, medical and educational institutes, and entertainment but never pretended to represent the voice of Arab Americans.

Far from religious, sectarian, and political orientations, Arab Americans felt the need of establishing an organization for all Arabs in America. In 1967, their efforts resulted in the establishment of the Arab-American University Graduates (AAUG). It

was the first secular, nationwide organization that was formed for the sake of

propagating one Arab identity and simultaneously engaging in public life and in U.S.

politics. AAUG worked towards whitening the image of Arab Americans, creating an

Arab lobby that influences American foreign policy in the Middle East, and providing

accurate information to the general public. Michael Suleiman, one of the founders

noted that "U.S. hostility towards Arabs and the concept of Arabism was so extreme

and so widespread among policymakers and the general public that the AAUG

considered it practically useless to attempt to have an impact on the political process

and public policy" ("Arab Americans" 47). AAUG failed to unify and represent Arab

Americans; for that, it did not last long.

The National Association of Arab Americans (NAAA) is another organization

was founded in 1972 by many intellectuals such as the then President Richard Nixon's

advisor Colonel Peter Tanous, Georgetown University Professor HichamShirabi, and

Attorney Richard Shidyaq. A Lebanese American-based organization, NAAA

emphasized Middle Eastern affairs (ignoring other parts of the Arab World) and was

restricted to the professional network (excluding the non-professional majority of

Arab Americans). As a lobbying association, NAAA advocated an independent state

for the Palestinian people and a unified Lebanon (Orfalea*The Arab Americans* 217).

AbdeenJabara, one of the NAAA founders noted that the association was built on

constructs different from the old ones. Unlike AAUG, he added, NAAA was not an

association of common immigrants but the one of "good, red-blooded, God-fearing,

flag-wavering Americans" from the first and second generations of Arab immigration

(Orfalea*The Arab Americans* 218). More, while NAAA aimed at influencing

American legislations, AAUG aimed at helping Arab Americans nationwide. Needless

to say that NAAA was badly viewed by Arab Americans at large. Its support for the

Arab American candidate for Congress George Corey in 1979 is considered as one of the reasons behind his defeat; the claim that Corey is linked to Arab oil interests and terrorist organizations resulted in a setback and dramatic defeat in the primaries (218).

Unlike the overwhelming majority of Arab American politicians, James AbouRazek, South Dakota representative in Congress and former member of NAAA, criticized American unconditional support to Israel and its foreign policy in the Middle East. Instead of seeking a second term as congressman, AbouRazek created an organization that would take into consideration all Arab American issues and preoccupations. Consequently, the American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC) was created in 1980 as a result of ethnic discrimination and in reaction to negative portrayals of Arab Americans (219). It worked for the advancement of Arab American interests, conduct political lobbying, report on racial profiling and discrimination, and encourage political participation, ADC merged with NAAA for the sake of establishing a strong and influential Arab American organization. Shortly after its foundation, ADC became the most powerful and influential Arab American organization in the United States. ADC board of directors included five congressmen in addition prominent members like Edward Said, HichamShirabi, and Reverend Jessie Jackson. ADC widened membership to include all ethnic groups, be they Arabs or not, that suffered from discrimination (219). The Committee emphasized the creation of solidarity and cooperation between all Arab American communities. It launched the initiative of opening a legal office to deal with cases of discrimination and defamation and involve in court trials.

Rising voices claiming an end to negative stereotypes and defamation of Arab Americans resulted in the creation of the Arab American Institute (AAI). Founded by the executive director of the ADC James Zugby in 1985, AAI aimed at influencing

U.S. politics through the creation of political alliances. Its program known as "Yalla Vote" focused on urging Arab Americans to participate actively in government through voting and running for different political positions. Seeking a nationwide spread and an extensive representation, AAI established a government relations department and network of national grassroots to interact with congressmen. For that, it organized different meeting between different Arab American communities and congressmen. Among other achievements of AAI is the initiation of talks with the Departments of Justice and Transportation over different subjects of anti-Arab and anti-Muslim bias such as airline profiling, spread of derogatory stereotypes in media, and secret surveillance (AAI "About Us").

Focusing on education and research is one among the top priorities of the Institute. It made the most accurate demographic statistics of Arab Americans in the United States which is useful for the U.S. Census Bureau; it also opened it for the general public. Along with the National Network of Arab American Communities (NAAC), AAI helps in organizing the Arab American national Day of Service and urges for more understanding of the Arab community, its culture, and way of life among the non-Arab U.S. citizens. Because of these activities, Chaldeans, Assyrians, and Maronite Catholics—represented by the Coalition of American Assyrians and Maronites (CAAM)—sent an official letter to President Bush, his Vice President Dick Cheney, the heads of the 12 departments, and all members of the House of Representatives and Senate on 27 October 2001. The letter was a protest against AAI for including them in its count of Arabs and those having Arab ancestry (*Assyrian International News Agency* web). Ignoring their claims, the AAI continues to count these three 'culturally different' ethnic groups among Arab Americans arguing that their use of Arabic as a language is a proof that they have Arab roots.

2.4.2. Countering Anti-Arab Americans Public Perceptions

Numerous national and international encounters between Arabs and Americans played a very important role in conceptualizing an American public image of Arabs and the way they think. The most significant and still continuing events that shaped these negative portrayal, stereotypes, and conceptions are the Arab-Israeli conflicts. The American media and its use of imbalanced sources and distorted images widened the gap between Arab American and American public.

Following the declaration of the Israeli state in 1948, the American press and movie-makers rushed to celebrate what they considered a historical event, which was of utmost damage for Arab American. Hundreds of articles and news editorials were published in leading newspapers and magazines praising the outstanding future and the western-like style of life of the newly declared state. In 1952, the American novelist John Hersey wrote an article for *The New Yorker* where he hailed the Israelis and described them as "Magnificent, visionaries, able to somehow look through the dust around them and see phantasm of future plenty" (qtd in. Mart 54). Increasing numbers of movies that depict the plight of the Israelis, the establishment of the Jewish state, and the Holocaust continued to be published in the subsequent years stressing the identical American-Israeli culture and the necessity to support the newly born nation. America's improving relations with Israel had a negative impact on Arabs and Arab Americans. Arabs, the enemies of Israeli settlers, were perceived as the savage Indians who stood against the civilized white man in early American history.

Michelle Mart linked the "Americanization of the Israelis" to a "simultaneous demonization of Arabs"; it even depended on it (5). The victimization of Israelis and criminalization of Palestinians, who were depicted as Israel-hating terrorists and

aggressors, created anger and a feeling of injustice among Arab Americans. This unbalanced coverage placed Arabs in a violent and hostile position and Israel as a frail nation that seeks protecting itself and its people. This is reflected through the favorable reference to Israel and the unfavorable reference to Arab countries, their leaders, and their policies (El-Farra 5). Arab Americans did not accept this depiction as well as U.S. government side-taking with Israel. Arab American scholars stood up to face injustice, defamation, and stereotyping.

Referring to Americans' intentional ignorance of Palestinians' plight for decades, Shaheen noted that the perception of Palestinians as terrorists is derived from the repeated stereotyped images and the exclusions of other portrayals outside Hollywood circles. He added that:

> Absent from Hollywood's Israeli-Palestinian movies are human dramas revealing Palestinians as normal folk… Never do movies present Palestinians as innocent victims and Israelis as brutal oppressors. No movie shows Israeli soldiers and settlers uprooting olive orchards, gunning down Palestinian… No movie shows Palestinian families struggling to survive under occupation, living in refugee camps, striving to have their own country…. (Shaheen *Reel Bad Arabs* 26)

The identification of Arabs as terrorists is synonymous to their perception as the enemy. The use of these two words is applicable to any Arab individual or action the Americans disagree with. One notices that media is careful to be neural and impartial when similar actions are committed by other ethnic groups (non-Arabs). According to Shaheen, the vast majority of the "265 million peace-loving" Arabs are ignored while "the radical fringe" that contains few individuals is fully highlighted.

Throughout the portrayals of few radicals, the image is generalized to Arab Americans who became viewed as the "bad guys" (28).

John Cones analyzed the way in which Arabs and Israelis were portrayed in movies. *Giant Shadow* (1966) referred to the American unconditional support to Israel following the declaration of 1948. Kirk Douglas, the famous Hollywood star and movie protagonist, is "… Col. Marcus, the legendary American soldier who helps shape up Israel's fighting force in 1948" (19). *Rosebud* (1974) tackled the subjects of politics, espionage, CIA, and the Arab-Israeli war. It dealt with kidnapping five girls of wealthy families by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Vienna-born producer of the movie Otto Preminger is identified by the *Katy Film Encyclopedia* as Jewish. According to Cones, *Twenty One Hours at Munich* (1976) depicts the barbarian nature and terroristic attitudes of Arabs and particularly Palestinians who kidnapped and slaughtered Israeli athletes during the Olympic Games of 1972 (19).

What is important here is not the question of whether these movies should or should not have been made but whether they are balanced by movies that depict Israeli terrorism against the Palestinians. The main difference between Arab terrorism and Israeli terrorism is that the first is practiced by individuals and the second by the state. State-sponsored terrorism which is practiced by Israel is deemed legitimate and self-defensive in the eyes of Americans and other allies. Arabs and Arabs Americans have no chance to watch movies that portray Israeli raids against innocent Palestinians because the Hollywood chain of production and distribution is dominated by Jews whose alignment and loyalty to Israel is unquestioned.

The 1995 Oklahoma City bombing consolidated American beliefs that all Arabs are terrorists and they do not value human life the way Americans do. Worse, movie producers used political events as proofs to deny any accusations of

stereotyping and racializing. "We are not stereotyping" they argue "just look at your television set. Those are real Arabs" (Shaheen *Reel Bad Arabs* 29). The least to say about the coverage of 1995 Oklahoma City bombing is that it was prejudicial and biased. Few minutes following the blast, political analysts and reports represent it as a terrorist attack and pointed accusing fingers on Arab Americans. Steven Emerson, a homeland security expert, declared in one of his comments on the event "not to believe Islamic groups" even if they "deny their involvement" (qtd. in El-Farra 1). The impossibility of accusing any American of this bombing necessitated looking for a scapegoat; Arab Americans were the most appropriate.

The Oklahoma Hate and Harassment Report of 1995 stated that from Wednesday morning till the arrest of the bomber Timothy McVeigh in Friday afternoon, all those who appeared to be Arabs and Middle Easterners were suspected. Among all other racial groups, Muslim and Arab Americans became easy targets of "widespread fear and intimidation, commonplace verbal harassment at school, in public and in the workplace, and a significant number of physical assaults and hate crimes" (Cajee). In less than 48 hours, many violent incidents of hate and vengeance occurred. Among these incidents are: the miscarriages of an Iraqi woman after a home attack by individuals who linked the attack to Muslim and Arab Americans, physical assaults in different public places as supermarkets and parking lots, individuals and Islamic centers' hate calls, and shooting a window of a mosque in Stillwater, Oklahoma. (Cajee).

Based on predisposed and false allegations, Arab Americans faced a wave of hate and violent acts. Shaheen argued that "though no American of Arab descent was involved, they were instantly targeted as suspects. Speculative reporting, combined with decades of harmful stereotyping, resulted in more than 300 hate crimes against

them" (*Reel Bad Arabs* 7). Arab Americans are still experiencing racial and religious discrimination, absence in the decision-making circles, lack of strong organizations and effective lobbies, and demonization because of the continuing struggle between the Palestinians and the Israelis.

2.4.3. Arab Americans vs. Japanese Americans: History Repeats Itself

11 September 2001 attacks on the United States are considered as a seminal event in American history. Many historians considered the events as the worst foreign attack on the United States since the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor of 7 December 1941 to which it is often compared. The two events were allegedly a surprise, the numbers of casualties were similar (3,000 for 9/11 events and 2,400 for Pearl Harbor attacks), and both events were used as justifications by two different presidents to declare war. Nonetheless, both events have remarkable differences because of the nature and circumstances surrounding the attacks (Rosenberg 9; Anas).

In Pearl Harbor, the United States was attacked by a sovereign nation as an attempt to neutralize American military activities during WWII and the majority of the deaths were from the military. Following the attack, tens of thousands of Japanese living in the United States were arrested, their homes and businesses were targeted, and many were driven to the detention camps simply because, as Japanese, they were perceived as a threat to America's homeland security (Shirley and Mauer). Showing no respect to Japan and its long history of relations with the United States and the Japanese who lived in America as early as its coming to existence, and despite their legal residency or citizenship status, Americans perceived the Japanese as 'Japs'; a derogatory stereotype referring to the inferiority of Japanese; this stereotype from WWII persists up till now.

In his *War without Merci: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (1987), John Dower refers to journalist Ernie Pyle who gained his popularity from covering the war in Europe and was transferred to the Pacific in early 1945. Pyle's reports of the Pacific war were "carried by almost seven hundred newspapers and reached an estimated fourteen million readers" (78). In his comparison between Germany and Japan, both war-enemies of the United States, Pyle notes that "in Europe we felt that our enemies, horrible and deadly as they were, were still people … but out here I soon gathered that the Japanese were looked upon as something subhuman and repulsive; the way some people feel about cockroaches or mice." Few days following his arrival, he depicted some Japanese prisoners in a fenced-in enclosure: "they were wrestling and laughing and talking just like normal human beings;" he added: "and yet they gave me the creeps, and I wanted a mental bath after looking at them" (qtd. in Dower 78).

The treatment of Japanese living in the United States disclosed a clear official and public stigmatization of the Japanese as a different race. Under President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Executive Order 9066 of 1942, more than 110,000 Japanese Americans were evacuated from their homes in California, Oregon, and Washington and detained in many 'relocation centers' inside the United States. As it had been disclosed later, the U.S. President, Department of War, Department of Justice, and Congress all participated actively in racializing Japanese Americans. Racialization against Japanese Americans was very explicit: all those descend from Japanese origin should be categorically identified as a possible threat to the national security simply because he is Japanese. Government mistrust increased around aliens who came from enemy nations as well as all persons descend from Japan, be they foreign-born (referred to as issei) or American citizens (referred to as Nisei) (NARA, *Japanese-American Internment*).

In his diary, Secretary of War Henry Stimson, who assumed major responsibility in the application of Executive Order 9066, estimated that second generation Japanese Americans were more dangerous compared to their immigrant ancestors. He wrote that the U.S. government had two options in dealing with them; either to be totally evacuated from the coastal areas "or by frankly trying to put them out on the ground that their racial characteristics are such that we cannot understand or trust even the citizen Japanese. This latter is the fact but I am afraid it will make a tremendous hole in our constitutional system to apply it" (qtd. in Dower 80).

At the simplest level, dehumanizing the Japanese participated in enlarging the gap between "us" and "them" to the point where it was perceived to be practically unbridgeable. Following the defeat of Japan and the end of the war, Japanese Americans were gradually allowed to reconstruct their lives; they were reconsidered as American citizens but with very little and often no affiliation to Japan. Today, Japan is a strategic ally to the United State.

Post-11 September 2001 general atmosphere in the United States has been very different for Arab Americans. Following the attacks, President Bush, on many occasions, announced that the United States was not in a state of war against Islam. Furthermore, he repeatedly declared that Islam is a peaceful religion and those who committed the bombing attacks do not represent Islam and its tolerant teachings (White House; Hamblin; Baer and Greene). Bush's national security strategy and foreign policy, however, contradicted these official declarations. He used these attacks as a justification for series of pre-emptive wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The reliability and accuracy of the arguments used to justify war on terror (particularly war against Iraq) have been constantly questioned as to their truth and reliability.

The nature of the enemy of Pearl Harbor and that of 9/11 was different. In Pearl Harbor, the enemy was Japan; a deeply-country rooted whose history is based on an internationally known dynasty and a firmly homogeneous culture. The United States defeated Japan in a war using traditional military actions. In the war on terror, the enemy is Al-Qaida; one of the most powerful *jihadist* organizations in the world with a rather short history global proportions. Composed of a core group of operatives and leadership largely based in Pakistan and Afghanistan, Al Qaida has ties with a number of affiliate organizations around the world. Historically, the group and its adherents are accused of many 'terrorist attacks' (*Mapping Militant Organizations* 1). Although the group is headquartered in Afghanistan, the American official documents stress the Arabic roots and the Islamic ideological orientations of the group and its founder Osama Bin Laden. As a result, 'war on terror' continues and it is considered as the longest of all Americans wars abroad, even surpassing the Vietnam War.

In one of his speeches referring to his administration's efforts to counter terrorism, President Barack H. Obama announced that with the existence of a new shape of terrorism as Al-Qaeda, the definitions of war as well as the nature of the threat have changed. He insisted on the necessity to introduce of a new security strategy that emphasizes nonmilitary tactics rather than traditional armed actions. In the 2015 national security strategy, the Obama administration shifted from "a model of fighting costly, large-scale ground wars in Iraq and Afghanistan" to "a more sustainable approach that prioritizes targeted counterterrorism operations, collective action with responsible partners, and increased efforts to prevent the growth of violent extremism and radicalization that drives increased threats". This new strategy was performed through shifting the approach from large numbers of combat troops to the deployment of smaller troops to advice and trains the local forces (Heeley et al. 10).

Few years following the end of World War II, Japanese Americans were no longer perceived as the enemy. In contrast, two decades following 9/11 events and announcement that the attackers were Arabs and Muslims, Arab/Muslim Americans are still perceived as the enemy. Among many issues, national loyalty, citizenship, and even the teachings of Islam are still questioned. Hours after 9/11, countless attacks targeted Muslim and Arab communities in the United States without taking into account that not all Arab Americans are Muslims and that the majority of Muslims Americans are neither Arab nor Middle Easterners (Pew Research Center web).

As a matter of fact, Arab American faced many challenges in the post-9/11 period. These challenges went beyond their national origins to include religion: Islam. In his thesis on homeland security and defense entitled *Combating Prejudice: Understanding Media Prejudice towards Muslims and Advocacy Organizations' Efforts to Combat It*, Jay Teitelbaum notes that when *FOX News* was criticized for its partial and biased coverage of Islam, it claimed that its reports were not prejudicing, rather the reporters were "brave enough to tell the truth about the dangerous nature of Islam" (26). Others provided a profound analysis on *FOX News* and the way it focused on negative portrayals of Islam and Muslims. The examination of its stories from 2007 to 2008 shows that the channel overemphasized reports about Muslims in terrorism-related stories and simultaneously ignored the other one billion Muslims who had nothing to do with terrorism (Vultee 629). Because terrorism stories attract viewers, *FOX* stresses religion only when the story involves Muslims. However, *FOX* does not question Christianity when a Christian American commits a terrorist act as was the case of Timothy McVeigh with Oklahoma City bombing of 1995.

Conclusion

The analysis of the historical status of Arab Americans in the United States shows that they are a unique population due to their peculiar and ambiguous position in the American racial mold. The latter guarantees free access to whiteness for some ethnic groups rather than others. However, Arab American communities are composed of a young population that was continuously growing as the influx of immigrants from the Arab countries was in progress since the late 1880s. It is very important to note that understanding the composition of the population, the different waves of immigrants and the circumstances that surround their arrival, and their experiences with identity and assimilation is essential to fully understand that racialization of Arab Americans is not dated to, as many scholars of ethnic studies note, post-9/11 era but as early as the early arrival of the first wave.

As many scholars on ethnic studies argue, pre-9/11 Arab-Americans suffered from invisibility in the American society; they were neither present in the mainstream public sector and popular culture nor included in debates over ethnic minorities in the United States. The association of invisibility with suspicion reflected in excluding Arab Americans from the social framework of the American society. This isolation helped American neo-Orientalists to retrieve and recreate stereotypes and tropes about Arabs, Middle Easterners, and their culture. In fact, the brief comparison between demonizing Japanese Americans following Pearl Harbor and Arab Americans post-9/11 aims at proving that certain aspects of racialization are recalled and redeployed whenever needed. Post-9/11 witnessed the intensification of racialization and more conflation between race and religion in identifying Arabs and Muslims in the United States. The unexpected visibility that turned into hypervisibility later produced many problems to Arab Americans at schools, workplaces, streets, and ultimately every

social scene. The following chapter highlights the public and government's

coordinating efforts to racialize Arab Americans post-9/11.

CHAPTER III

United States' Post-9/11 'War on Terror' and

Arab Americans' Hypervisibility

Introduction

Undoubtedly, 9/11 represented a turning point in the history of the world, particularly the one of the United States. Throughout the declaration of a new foreign policy they termed 'war on terror', post-9/11 policies of the American President George W. Bush and his neoconservative administration aimed at reinstating America's hegemonic position worldwide regardless of the used means. Domestically, the introduction of a series of laws targeting Arab Americans, namely the Patriot Act, resulted in a governmental as well as public complete infringement of Arab-American rights. The government, media, and public collaboration resulted in the racialization of Arab Americans.

Political analysts note the government-sponsored campaign that targeted Arab Americans violated the Bill of Rights and other provisions of the U.S. Constitution. These policies had counterproductive effects. Among these was the public panic and terror from everything that is deemed or related to Arabs and Muslims; the fact that widened the gap between Americans and Arab Americans. It is very important to note that post-9/11 era reflected in a new trend of politics that identified a specific ethnic group and precipitated a considerable amount of social and psychological malaise and mental depression.

3.1. Authoritarian Neoconservatives: Double Standards and Inconsistency

On September the 1ˢᵗ 2001, President Bush delivered three different speeches. The first was a short speech (1:23 minutes) in Emma Booker Elementary School, Florida where he was at that moment of the 9/11 attacks. The second speech (2:07 m.) was at Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana and the third (4:30 m) was from the White House, Washington D.C. As an attempt to find answers to what was happening, President Bush introduced a new approach to the American rhetoric. His three speeches and remarks were brief and ambiguous.

According to Michael Welsh, Bush used an 'empty language' to induce people to abide by his instructions. He added that his statements were ambiguous, vast, and bore different interpretations (12). The analysis of certain statements sheds the light on the fact that Bush's call for duty (patriotism) necessitates accepting the official version of 9/11 story. Bush insisted on defining 9/11 under the frame of *we* and *them* or *with us* and *against us.* His version of democracy violated the official American one; the attempt to bind some Americans together and alienate others threatened certain American principles as diversity, civil rights, liberties, and dialogue. This new 'Right-wing" version of speech suggests a revision of the American character. Many historians agree that Bush was successful in creating a very limited fundamentalist version of history and gave himself the power to control its evolution right after the events of 9/11.

The Right-wing discourse, particularly the Bush speeches and his interpretation of 9/11 events, had a long-term social and political impacts at the local and international levels. Specific terms as *them* were used as a cover to justify violent American actions against people, at home and abroad, and infringements on American democratic principles. The new American security strategy that emerged post-9/11

was dominated by ethnic and religious racialization. This shift in the ʿracial consciousness' was demonstrated by the increasing numbers violent actions, such as hate crimes and harassments, committed by American civilians against Arabs, Muslims, Middle Easterners, and others resembling Muslims like Hindus, Sikhs, and others. Noticeably, Bush divisive speeches played a significant role in creating a new era in American history characterized by a racialization atmosphere.

3.1.1. Neoconservative Ideology

In his analysis of the contemporary version of conservatism and its affiliation to authoritarianism, John Dean noted in his *Conservatives without Conscience*(2006) that George Bush and his Vice President Dick Cheney are identified as authoritarian neoconservatives. He referred to the strong link between their ideologies, policies, and governing methods and their authoritarian characters. Dean spots light on their personalities, particularly their intolerance with opposing views, exclusion as one of their *modus operandi*[7], and the powerful use of their authorities often beyond the limits of the U.S. constitution (39). His study of authoritarians, their principles, and psychological effects is greatly influenced by the works of Bob Altemeyer. Dean writes:

> [To] study authoritarians Altemeyer and other researchers have used carefully crafted and tested questionnaires, usually called "scales," in which respondents are asked to agree or disagree with a statement such as "Our country desperately needs a mighty leader who will do what has to be done to destroy the radical new ways and sinfulness that are ruining us," or, "A 'woman's place' should be wherever she wants to be. The days when women are submissive to their husbands and social conventions belong strictly in the past." As a professor of psychology,

Altemeyer has tested (usually anonymously) tens of thousands of first-

year students and their parents, along with others, including some

fifteen hundred American state legislators, over the course of some

three decades. There is no database on authoritarians that even comes

close in its scope, and, more importantly, these studies offer empirical

data rather than partisan speculation (48).

Dean's investigation placed Bush's rhetoric into the context of the increasing

levels of neoconservative authoritarianism in the American political scene. He

considers Bush's exercise of certain authoritarian policies as very dangerous

neoconservative attitudes (54). According to Dean, the excessive use of executive

powers by President Bush and his security advisors threatens the balance of the

American system of government and is deemed as a victory for the neoconservatives

and authoritarians.

The neoconservative version of conservatism is different in its principles from

the old school. While the traditional schools' major principle is the maximization of

freedom, the new version aims at minimizing it through the implementation of

policies of submission and coercion (qtd. in Dean 18). Analysis of the ideology and

practice of neo-conservatism as well as the description of right-wing authoritarians

shows they share the following characteristics:

a. Inconsistent beliefs as a result of the blind acceptance of the authorities' views

instead of their own;

b. prejudice and hostility to minorities and the firm belief on the in-group/ out-

group ideology;

c. equal opportunity as one of the community's building-bases is not existent in

their vocabulary;

d. belief on self-righteousness; the world is a dangerous place and it is torn by violence and crimes;

e. think of themselves as chosen by God to be guardians of the public morals; more ethical and religious than others as a result of their adoption to firm religious beliefs;

f. characterized by the adoption of hypocrisy and double-standards (rhetoric vs. attitudes) (Dean, *Conservatives without Conscience* 55)

In addition to creating a divisive climate in the American society, Bush's *part of us or apart from us* policy that framed patriotism as abiding by or submitting to one central authority is a reflection of these characteristics. In fact, the depiction of neoconservative policies of the authoritarians as natural and necessary is deemed as an attempt from the U.S. President and his close advisors to convince Americans and gain their support for their 9/11 story version. Dean suggests that "most conservative…oppose equality" and the only way to differentiate between liberal views and conservative ones is the definition of equality (13-14).

Authoritarianism suggests that having greater powers means increasing access to truth and thus manipulating it the way it fits them politically and even morally. Authoritarians like to be similar to God; in a way, they create their discourse and their followers accept it as the official and true story. It is very important to note that considering people with power as a source of information results in an understanding of truth which is inherently related to the hierarchical structure of human society.

More, according to authoritarians' ideology, the interpretation of the word *freedom* is turned upside down. Freedom is understood as "equal under the law" and Jefferson's "all men are created equal" should be interpreted the same way. Under certain circumstances, law itself is alterable based on ideologies of people occupying

the highest political and economic positions in their societies. Authoritarians entailed that freedom must mean either freedom to obey or reject rules put by powerful authorities or freedom to punish the ones who did not abide by the given rules (Dean 13). Post-September events authoritarian rhetoric implied that those *who are with us* are *equally good* and those *against us* are *equally bad.* The Right-wing authoritarian interpretation of freedom contradicts the principles of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution.

3.1.2. Neoconservative Discourse

Scholars thoroughly highlighted the double standard discourse and policy that marked the Bush administration security strategy following September 2001. While Bush and his security advisors were advocating and defending freedom ideologically, their policies aimed at limiting individual freedom on the practical level. Dean analyzed this contradiction when he stressed the fact that neoconservatives, namely intellectuals, try to rationalize their "illogical, contradictory, and hypocritical thinking" for the sake of serving their own interests (27). Like Christians who believe in Jesus peaceful teachings and simultaneously adopt violence to solve their own problems, authoritarian conservatives assume that one of the aspects of their ideology is that they understand and accept the everlasting contradiction (28). They believe that certain issues as individual rights and ethnic equality/inequality cannot limit the defense of freedom. According to Dean, Bush and his security advisors were successful in creating an environment whereby truth started to be defined as a function of power instead of being a rational knowledge. This view influenced decision-making at the local and international levels and resulted in the institutionalization of enmity in describing any violation of America's proclaimed democracy (36). To escape criticism, Bush overemphasized the nature of radicals not their radical actions.

Politically, it is very important to make distinctive lines and argumentative statements when one refers to right/wrong and good/evil. Placing the war on terror into the good/evil rhetorical framework of the neoconservatives suggests a justification of any violent actions against civilians outside and inside the nation. The different forms of discrimination, hate, and other violent crimes against Muslim, Middle Eastern and Arab Americans were considered as collateral damages. Michael Welsh in *Scapegoats of September 11: Hate Crimes & State Crimes in the War on Terror* (2006) argues that, in addition to the excessive use of executive powers, security policy as well as the rhetoric of Bush and his staff absolved the increased violence that targeted Arab and Muslim Americans (4). On one hand, the use of right and wrong represents the evaluation of an individual or a group under specific ethical and moral framework. On the other, depicting them as evil indicates stereotypical characteristics, the imagined view of evil as a supernatural force that threatens the very existence of human life. Rhetorically, the Bush's claim that *their action was wrong* and *our action is right* is quite different from the one that *we are good* and *they are evil.*

Focusing on the question of who dare to attack the United States instead of resulting damages, causalities, and motives made the last points less important compared to Bush's main claim. Right-wing conservatives consider all countries, groups, and individuals who do not conform to their authoritarian ideologies and their "American identity perception" as anti-American, thus evil. Interestingly, their definition of violence is unstable, contextual, and ambiguous. Authoritarian neoconservatives consider violence as a right action when it is committed by good people against evil; but when violence is committed by evil and bad people against good ones they consider it as wrong. This 'logic' supports the notion that America is a

peaceful nation regardless of the violent actions it commits to solve its problems. These actions, according to neoconservatives, are justified by their religion and their military superiority.

In their book *Collateral Language: A User's Guide to America's New War* (2002), John Collins and Ross Glover referred to Laura Rediehs, a professor of philosophy at St. Lawrence University, New York, who suggests further analysis of neoconservative security policy. Rediehs argues that Bush and his supporters narrowed down the image of evil in terms of persons rather than actions. This view justifies violent actions as the most appropriate reply to past violent actions (66). In his 9/11 speeches, Bush insisted that the declared war on terror "will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated." This statement has one interpretation; the elimination of certain terrorists and their communities could solve the American dilemma. In addition to this, his statement that those terrorists kill "not merely to end up lives" but "to disrupt and end a way of life" advocates equal treatment: i.e.: killing those terrorists and disrupting their communities' way of life. Neoconservatives advocated the use of the same terrorists' actions with similar quality and superior quantity. This so-called 'righteous violence' represents the ideology that committing violent actions against innocent people does not necessarily mean evil. Rather, it can be understood as a preventive action committed by good people against bad ones. Bush stated that going through righteous violence is a necessity:

> Our nation -this generation- will lift a dark threat of violence from our people and our future. We will rally the world to this cause by our efforts, by our courage. We will not tire, we will not falter, and we will not fail (20/9/1).

During the same speech, Bush noted that America will use all its power to defeat terrorists and this commitment is justified by definition since God has chosen the side of good people—America and Americans. He affirmed that "freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we know that God is not neutral between them" (20/9/1). Targeting patriotic Americans, Bush claimed that he was «assured of the rightness of our cause and confident of the victories to come." Neoconservative rhetoric annotates that God validates and approves violence used by certain people in certain circumstances and victory is guaranteed when virtuous and moral people use violence against bad ones. In his *Scapegoats of September 11th",* Michael Welsh noted that the criminal record of certain ethnic groups in the United States increased because of old bad stereotypes. Arab Americans, as an example, are considered as terrorists based on old dyslogistic images (religious and ethnic) of Arabs and Muslims dated back to the age of crusades (43). The use of the Crusade metaphor by President Bush indicates that the old religious and cultural conflict between the Western Christian civilization and the Eastern Islamic one is perpetual. The regeneration of such old pejorative connotations helps in more *othering* of Middle Easterners, Arabs, Muslims, and Muslim Americans.

3.2.   United States Foreign Policy post-9/11

President Bush Statements in the aftermath of 9/11 participated in widening the gap between Americans and Arab Americans. What was interpreted by Americans as patriotic statements was seen by Arab Americans as ethnic comments that target Arabs and Muslims. 'Crusading against evil', 'smoking out terrorists', and other heavy rhetorical statements used by President Bush and his close advisers were interpreted differently (Ghaly13).

3.2.1. Bush's *de facto* Foreign Policy: Megalomania and Self-Righteousness

The use of the term *crusades* by President Bush terrified the whole world and strongly affected America's relations worldwide. Unnoticed by the majority of Americans, the use of the word echoed in all Europe. Europeans feared the revival of ideologies related to the clash of civilizations and the eternal war between Christianity and Islam (Ford). Hubert Vedrine, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, insisted on the necessity to avoid "a clash of civilizations at all costs". He added, "one has to avoid falling into this huge trap, this monstrous trap" which had been conceived by "the instigators of the assault" (qtd. in Ford).

The way President Bush dealt with 9/11 events, terminology of his discourse, and his inconsistency offended all Arab and Islamic countries. Bush's crusades created much discussions and hot debates over the term's connotations. Issues such as the 'clash of civilizations' had a negative impact on relations between Americans and Arab Americans. Each group defended its civilization and refused the other's view claiming that his is the best. These discussions reflected in more tensions and increasing rift (Carroll).

In many presidential speeches, Bush announced that the new foreign policy of the United States of America necessitates the spread of democracy and liberating people from the regimes that use tyranny to rule. This statement and others did not please many Arab and Islamic countries because fingers were pointed at them. Arab Americans reacted to Bush and his administration's bellicose policies differently. These policies "pushed the boundaries of decency" with phrases such as "Islamo-fascism" which in turn have contributed, along with the invasion of Iraq and support for the much criticized Israeli bombing raids on Palestinians and neighboring Arab countries, to "further skepticism of the neocon plan to spread freedom and

democracy" (Burke). Bush's neoconservative ideologies and practices negatively affected the image of the United States worldwide.

3.2.2. American Foreign Policy Post-9/11

Professor Neta Crawford, Chair of the Department of Political Science at Boston University and Co-director of the Costs of War Project at Brown University, noted that the U.S. Department of Defense was not consistent in reporting on "how and when" Afghani, Pakistani, and Iraqi civilians have been harmed in the different military operations ("Human Cost" 2). In fact, patriotic rhetoric and official declarations were far from what was taking place on the ground. Reports estimate that through June 2011 between 30,400-45,600 civilians, insurgents, journalists, and aid workers were killed in the American military campaign against Afghanistan which is known as Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)[8] (Crawford "Civilian Death Afghanistan" 1-2). Concerning Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)[9], a study published in *The Lancet* estimated that the number of civilians and other innocent people killed ranged between 426,000 and 793,000 (qtd. in Crawford "Civilian Death Iraq" 7-8). Department of Defense (DOD) statistics about the number of civilian casualties differ from the ones of the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). The Executive Order on Measures to Address Civilian Casualties stated that:

> The protection of civilians is fundamentally consistent with the effective, efficient, and decisive use of force in pursuit of U.S. American interests. Minimizing civilian casualties can further mission objectives; help maintain the support of partner governments and vulnerable populations, especially in the conduct of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations; and enhance the legitimacy and

sustainability of U.S. operations critical to our American security (qtd. in Crawford "Human Cost" 2).

Sacrificing the lives of hundreds of thousands of innocent Arabs and Muslims for the sake of serving Bush's radical agenda represents the terroristic ideology of American government neoconservatives. This ugly face is reflected through America's foreign policy of replacing its war on terror and eliminating its risk by killing a vast number of Arabs and Muslims. Noam Chomsky, the prominent Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and anti-imperialism scholar, argued, "everyone with close knowledge of the region recognizes that a massive assault on a Muslim population would be the answer to the prayers of bin Laden and his associates, and would lead the U.S. and its allies into a 'diabolical trap,' as the French foreign minister put it" (17).

In addition to his double-faced and hypocritical attitudes, Bush's excessive selfishness overemphasized the suffering of thousands of Americans (the victims of 9/11) while intentionally overlooking millions of people and their massive misery worldwide. Abood wondered about the American policy that favors punishing people for crimes they have not committed. Her list of arguments includes:

1. Avenging the destruction of the twin towers downtown New York throughout bombarding (using the depleted uranium) civilian buildings and homes by the United States and its allies and was considered as collateral damage;

2. imposing economic blockade against Iraq by America and its allies resulted in starving the Iraqi people for decades;

3. long-term state terrorism practiced by Israel and supported by United States against Palestinians. American political support and military supplies to Israel (U.S. F16s, American-made missiles, rockets and Apache helicopters);

4. big scale mass murdering of hundreds of thousands of civilian Vietnamese and Viet Cong fighters. Surprisingly, the majority of U.S. army officials were not charged with war crimes.

5. and military engagements in Bosnia, Sudan, southern parts of Lebanon, Somalia, and other parts of Latin America (576).

Self-righteousness and ethnocentrism made American officials ignore these evil actions worldwide and consider 9/11 events as the deadliest and bloodiest event in human history. Many historians noted that the American official discourse considered American lives as more valuable than lives of non-Americans; civilian casualties of America's war on terror were deemed as necessary and inevitable war damages.

Despite the fact that many Arab Americans (particularly American Lebanese) approved United States' support for the withdrawal of Syrian soldiers from Lebanon; the majority condemned the Bush administration war on terror. They felt that every official statement is against them, their right to live, and the right to self-defense. The situation of Arab Americans was similar to the one of the Japanese following Pearl Harbor attacks (Gerwitz). Bush's double standards denied Arabs and Muslims the right to defend themselves and simultaneously he approved every Israeli action against Palestinians. According to many Arab Americans, Bush used the Palestinian issue to reorient the attention of Americans from their own problems (Jafri). He confirmed and supported his neoconservative ideologies with the continuous humiliating statements against Arabs and Muslims (Merskin 162). While Americans, Republicans and Democrats, supported their nation's new foreign policy, others stood against this new approach in dealing with Arab and Islamic countries, the unconditional support to Israel, Arab American profiling.

In addition to all Arab countries, Arab Americans along with other minority groups condemned American actions post-9/11 events. This condemnation met an official lack of interest about the Arab's feelings and reactions. This ignorance included many Americans who approved those military interventions (Jasser 6). In fact, after more than a decade of 9/11 events, many Americans still racialize, misjudge, and de-Americanize Arab Americans. Opening many fronts as the wars against Afghanistan and Iraq, the increasing threats of terrorism, and the unprecedented spread of anti-Americanism pushed Bush to cover up that critical situation. His administration's allegations of the connection between Osama Bin Laden and the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein as well as Iraq's possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) proved to be mere lies ("About the Ties").

Inconsistent and disturbed, President Bush sought by all possible means to convince Americans that his post-9/11 policies were successful. In June 2004, he held a press conference where he defended the renewal of many expiring provisions of the PATRIOT act. He proclaimed the act's efficacy stating that "since September the 11th, federal terrorism investigations have resulted in charges against more than 400 suspects, and more than half of those charged have been convicted" (Office of the Press Secretary "President Discusses Patriot"). According to *The Washington Post*, President Bush exaggerated the numbers of cases convicted for terrorism. After analyzing different data from the Department of Justice (DOJ), it published a series of reports which concluded that out of 361 cases which are classified as terrorism and terrorist-related investigations, only 39 were convicted with terrorism charges (Eggen and Tate).

Discourse analysts argue that the frequent use of the term 9/11 in President Bush's speeches and addresses indicates that the incident guides his decisions and

policies domestically and internationally. The White House Deputy Press Secretary Scott McClellan criticized him grimly; he declared that President Bush does not admit the commitment of mistakes and never accepts realities (Garnett 984). McClellan described Bush and his administration's 'self-deceit' over different policies and decisions including the war launched against Iraq. Bush and his political and security advisors sought any information that support their position and denied opposite views and information. This part-taking position is deeply rooted in Bush and his neoconservative's ideology of self-reliance in decision-making. Commenting on this, McClellan noted that "the extent to which [Bush] resorts to self-deception…and the sincerity with which he embraces self-deluding beliefs amount to a personality trait that goes directly to larger issues of character and leadership style and carry over into real issues of governance" (qtd. in Garnett 984).

Many political analysts argue that the most important reasons behind the increasing anti-Americanism at the international level and unpopularity of the President among Americans are his isolated acts and decisions. American and international calls for peace and stability and reconsideration of his decision of declaring war against Iraq were denied. Analyzing the President's decisions and policies post-September 2001 showed that the majority were harmful for the reputation of the Republican Party and inappropriate for America's foreign policy and international relations. This misconduct cost the Republicans a big political loss (White House and congressional majority) at the end of his presidential term (Feller). Limiting leadership and decision-making to the presidency was affecting because any government exists within a particular milieu whereby it interacts, influences, and be influenced by its citizens and voting public (Bedford 146). Moreover, overemphasizing the war on terror at the expense of other concerns resulted in worse

political and social atmospheres. This setback was represented through the economy's decline, job losses, and most importantly nationwide insecurity and distrust. The policy of spreading fears of more attacks and aggression against innocent citizens and misconceptions of Islam and its portrayal as 'anti-Christianity' and 'anti-Judaism' played a major role in the increase of hatred, racialization, and ethnic profiling of Arab and Muslim Americans (Greenwald).

3.2.3. The Legacy

Many Analysts stressed the fact that Bush and his staff adopted this policy of fear and anticipation for the sake of diverting Americans' attention from criticizing their failures at home and abroad. The declining political performance of the Bush-Cheney government reflected in the weakest business cycle since World War II. The end of his presidency was marked with a grim financial crisis and the "possibility of prolonged economic slump" (Palley 32). The economic recession of 2007-2008 was among the different economic, social, and political problems that faced President Barack Obama later. The election of a new president from the Democratic Party created American joy because it marked the end of Bush era. In 9 February 2009, President Obama held a news conference where he stated that his administration "inherited a deficit" and it is among the most devastating financial deficits in the history of the United States. This downfall had negative impacts on the lifestyle, needs, and attitudes of Americans (Axelrad).

The Bush era passed but his legacy and its effects endured for along. American troops and civilians in Iraq were targets of hate crimes and assassinations, the fact that destabilized security in both countries. As a reaction to the neoconservative Republican foreign policy, President Obama started his office by signing three executive orders: a deadline of one year for closing the Guantanamo Bay detention

camp, closure Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) secret prisons outside the United States, and prevention of detainee confessions by force (Lygutas 155). He stated that torture and use of violence are to be replaced by the rules of the Geneva Convention (Sedarat and Noueihed).

President Obama strived to change the Bush policies and measures that targeted specific ethnic groups as Arab and Muslim Americans. Unlike Bush, President Obama insisted on respecting all religious practices including Islam, encouraging the adoption of democratic principles, and rejected the adoption of violent actions whatever the reasons. His declaration that the Founding Fathers never violated the law of the land despite the challenges and threats they faced was met with great relief from the Arab Americans. Hoping that Obama's administration will overcome the ethnic and religious racialization, American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee executive director Kareem Shora stated:

> After years of Bush Administration violations of US and International Law, including the recent admitted use of torture on detainees being held under the mantra of the 'war on terrorism,' President Obama's order this morning is a clear signal to our Nation and the World of his intent to follow up on his inaugural speech by returning the United States to its historic role as the world leader and beacon for hope, justice, freedom, and liberty. (ADC *Live on Al-Arabiya*)

As Senator in the State of Illinois, Barack Obama admitted that the United States made many mistakes in dealing with the Middle East. As President, he insisted on healing the damaged relations between America and all Arab and Muslim countries.

He pointed to the necessity of having strong mutual relations resembling the ones that existed before decades (Schemm).

3.3.Arab Americans and United States Security Strategy Post-9/11

3.3.1.Arab Americans' Hypervisibility Post-9/11

As previously mentioned in chapter I, *Orientalism* of Edward Said sheds light on the historical *othering* of the orient in western circles. He argues that the amalgamation of anti-Semitic ideology with the oriental discourse resulted in "the web of racism, cultural stereotypes, political imperialism, and dehumanizing ideology holding in the Arab or the Muslim is very strong indeed, and it is this web which every Palestinian had come to feel as his uniquely punishing destiny" (27). Said defined discrimination against Arab Americans as a "system of representations" guided by motives to bring Arab Americans closer to western education, consciousness, and finally the adoption of western civilization principles (202-203). The analysis of the language of anger used by President Bush following the events of 9/11 showed that he pointed out to expressions of discursive tropes and pejorative connotations. His reference to Islam, Arabs, and Middle Easterners whenever the discourse is over terrorism and violence is considered as an implicit justification of hatred, discrimination and attacks against them (Salaita 251).

It is noteworthy perceptions such as *us* and *we* cannot be fully defined without a clear picture over the *other* and *otherness.* In his own version of the story, President Bush depicts the true American citizens as one homogeneous group (what he frequently refers to as "united we stand"). Likewise, the image of the other emerged more clearly as "Islamic fundamentalism has become a generic signifier used relentlessly to single out the Muslim other in its irrational, morally inferior and

barbaric masculinity and its passive, victimized, and submissive femininity" (Moallem 8). The image of Islam as a force that "limits the mental capacities of its adherents" confirms the American discourse that stresses American superiority and the *others'* natural inferiority (41).

Stereotyping Middle Easterners, Arabs, and Muslims as backward and primitive corresponds to stereotyping the terrorists who threaten America's homeland security as unable to understand the quality and quantity of the damage they cause and how evil their actions are. In accord, Bush suggests that people of righteousness are the only ones who can evaluate the degree of these bad actions and, because of their moral degradation and ideological inferiority, those who commit evil actions cannot be neither understood nor trusted. Logically, accepting the claims of Bush and his neoconservative staff matches with the legitimization of their American security agenda .i.e., the ideology of accusing some people of being naturally predisposed to violence is used as a reason to justify any governmental actions against certain ethnic and religious groups such as Arab and Muslim Americans. Louise Cainkar conducted a research over Arab Americans and the social construction of difference where he illustrated 37 American security policies that were implemented by the United States government post-9/11. Her article "The Social Construction of Difference and the Arab American Experience" (2006) concluded with the fact that 25 out of 37 security initiatives targeted Arab Americans directly and indirectly (255).

The atmosphere of rhetoric in which certain ethical dogmas are interchangeably played (good vs. evil) encouraged more authoritarianism and urged neoconservatives to commit actions *legally* against the *others* and to accuse their opponents as one of *them*. Actually, manufacturing fear is one of the policies that neoconservative authoritarians implement within the violent patriotism they want to

market. Their rhetoric regenerated old ideas of idealism and Americanism with emphasis on certain criteria as whiteness, European ancestry (namely Anglo-Saxon), and Christianity. The *others* (Arabs and other inferior ethnic groups) were portrayed as innately dangerous because their "congenital barbarity" drives them to "irrational violence" (259).

Collins and Glover's *Collateral Language: A User's Guide to America's New War* (2002) scrutinized Bush's reference to America as a civilized and peaceful nation and some other countries as primitive and barbaric. His campaign of war on terror is a "struggle against the barbarians" and America "needs to win a war against barbaric behaviors" (14). Many researchers argue that Bush's violent version of patriotism is associated with a white supremacist agenda. The double standard authoritarian ideologists consider attacks against the United States as unaccepted and unjustified morally and politically. Simultaneously, they justify U.S. and other American-sponsored attacks against Islamic and Arab countries on the claims that these countries are non-white, non-Christian i.e.: evil (Abood 576).

The U.S. government as well as American citizens practiced different scapegoating activities that violated individual rights and civil liberties. Racial profiling against Arab Americans functioned on the historical, political, and social dimensions (Welsh 28). These actions and others made from the American security strategy of Bush and his neoconservative administration legal and natural undertakings. Introduced and implemented immediately following the 9/11 events to warn American citizens of any possible attacks against them, the color-coded terror alert, for example, is one of the Bush administration initiatives to counter terrorism. Under this system, threat levels shift from one color to another depending on the danger of the threat (yellow, orange, red). Many Americans who disproved the war on

terror, however, argue that in addition to the violent and militaristic rhetoric used by the neoconservatives, such kind of warning systems increase the collective stress about expected attacks.

The American logic considered Islam as the major link between Al-Qaida and Arab Americans; mistakenly, however, Arabness is used interchangeably with Islam. This contributed in justifying American violence against Islamic and Arab countries (Afghanistan and Iraq) as well as the increasing levels of hatred and discrimination against Arab Americans. It is very significant to note that U.S. security policy following the events of 9/11 contributed to legalizing racialization overtly through labeling a particular ethnic group (Arab Americans) as suspicious depending on their ethnic affiliation and religious beliefs. In a direct contradiction to and violation of the American constitution and its democratic principles, thousands of Muslim and Arab Americans as well as others considered mistakenly as Arabs and Muslims (Indians and Sikhs) lost their lives, dignity, and security. Moreover, U.S. security policy played a major role in widening the gap between the Arab and Muslim groups in different parts of the nation (the Arab American community in Michigan as an example) and the American mainstream society. Worse, the hundreds of thousands of civilians killed by the Americans during their military campaigns against Afghanistan and Iraq were considered as "collateral damage" (Abood 576).

This biased ethnic and religious discrimination against Arab Americans coincided with a wave of hatred and violence against them. Perry Scott Poyntingand Barbara Perry in "Climates of Hate: Media and State Inspired Victimization of Muslims (2007) argued that hate, discrimination and vilification flourish in certain helped flaming the atmosphere. They added:

> In Western nations… such an environment has historically been
> conditioned by the activity -and inactivity- of the state. State practices,
> policy, and rhetoric have often provided the formal framework within
> which hate crime -as an informal mechanism of control- emerges.
> Practices within the state, at an individual and institutional level, which
> stigmatize, demonize, or marginalize traditionally oppressed groups,
> legitimate the mistreatment of these same groups on the streets. (161)

During the three months following 9/11, the FBI recorded a seventeen-fold increase in the number of hostile and discriminatory attitudes against Arabs, Muslims, and others who look like and have similar names to Arabs and Muslims (Welsh 66). The period witnessed the emergence of anti-Islam discourse that played a vital role in increasing the number of violent and hostile actions against Arab and Muslim Americans. This campaign was directed against Islam as a faith and Muslims as people. In one of *NBC*'s televised speeches, evangelical Franklin Graham[10] stated, "The God of Islam is not the same God. He's not the son of God of the Christian or Judeo-Christian faith. It's a different God, and I believe it is a very evil and wicked religion." On his TV show, Pat Robertson[11] added that Muslim Americans "want to coexist until they can control, dominate, and then if need be destroy" (CAIR *Incitement: Pat Robertson*).

William Lind, member of the Free Congress Foundation, considers Muslim Americans as the fifth column, i.e.: spies, in the United States. He argues that Islam is not as peaceful as it is portrayed and Muslim Americans' loyalties should be made to the constitution as they are American citizens. He went so far when he called for encouraging Muslim American to leave the country as soon as possible. Supporting Lind ideology, columnist Ann Coulter urged for mass deportation of Muslims and

insisted on the American urgent move to invade Islamic countries, kill their leaders and convert people to Christianity (ADC *Report on Hate Crimes 2003-2007*89). Following 9/11 events, religious leaders and governmental officials' hostile rhetoric was omnipresent. Paradoxically, many American high officials, including President Bush, were keen to approach Arab and Muslim Americans. Accompanied by many Muslim sheikhs and Imams, Bush visited the Islamic Center in Washington D.C. where he warned the Americans against targeting Arabs and Muslims and simultaneously praised those who sympathized with the attacked veiled women. This short period of sympathy and support was followed by the introduction of a series of government policies that had negative impacts on Arab and Muslim American communities. Outstanding among them is the PATRIOT Act of 2001 that, at first sight, seems to be a response to counter terrorism.

3.3.2. Civil Rights and the PATRIOT Act

Shortly after 9/11, the U.S. Congress passed the PATRIOT act. Considered as a practical solution to American, international, political, and security problems, the act was a matter of hot debate. While all Americans agree that fighting terrorism is a top American priority, they were divided over the strategies and mechanisms that should be used to deal with it.

The congressional reauthorization of the act in 2006 created further discussions over the questions of civil liberties, individual rights, and American identity as a whole. When it was initially introduced in 2001, many sensitive provisions, known as sunset provisions, were voted for temporary use and were subjected to revision in 2006. These sensitive provisions include section 201 that gave federal law enforcement agents the authorization to intercept wire, electronic, and oral communications deemed to be associated to terrorist actions. Section 209 authorized

them to seize voicemail messages after obtaining a warrant from a federal court.

Expected to be revised in 2006, Congress reauthorized the PATRIOT act, which made

sunset provisions permanent. This includes section 215 that authorized the access to

different personal records and section 206 that gave federal agents the permission to

conduct roving surveillance wiretaps (Friedman 7). This surprised many Americans

because sunset provisions violated individual and civil rights, which led to many

protests.

More, the waves of anger and disagreements that followed the reauthorization

of the act were over added provisions that initially did not exist in the original one.

The new added provision was the 2005 Combat Methamphetamine[12] Epidemic Act,

which banned the sale of many ingredients that were used to make methamphetamine,

considered as an illegal drug (Friedman 8). Many political analysts suggest that the

U.S. government used war on terror as a cover to pass unrelated legislations. Others

see that the ban of methamphetamine had never been because of its danger as a drug

but because of the relationship between terrorism and drug trafficking.

3.4. The PATRIOT Act, 2001

3.4.1. The PATRIOT Act: Analytical Perspectives

On 26 October 2001, the U.S. Congress passed a legislation called Providing

Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (PATRIOT),

commonly known as the PATRIOT act (see appendix 1). The PATRIOT act is a huge

document of over 300 pages, which makes analysis and criticism a complicated task

for legal professionals, historians, political analysts, reviewers and the like. According

to the U.S. Department of Justice, the passage of the PATRIOT Act "played a

significant role in the number of successful operations that protected innocent

Americans from the terrorists' mortal plans." The DOJ report notes that the act "updated many legal provisions in order to account for new technological advances and therefore, permits federal agents of the different law enforcement agencies to effectively collect, analyze, and share intelligence information on terrorism and other related activities" (U.S. Department of Justice "Report from the Field" 1).

The original PATRIOT act is broken into ten titles. Each deals with a specific aspect of law enforcement and security concerns.   The titles are:

Title 1 enhances domestic security to protect against terrorism;

Title 2 enhances surveillance procedures; wiretapping and others;

Title 3 facilitates the detention, prosecution and prevention of money laundering efforts that back terrorism;

Title 4 deals with issues related to the protection of the borders;

Title 5 removes all sorts of obstacles to investigating terrorism;

Title 6 provides for terrorism victims and their families;

Title 7 widens information sharing to protect infrastructures;

Title 8 strengthens criminal laws and increases penalties related to terrorism and terrorist-related crimes;

Title 9 improves and updates intelligence operation and capabilities;

Title 10 provides for miscellaneous provisions (USDOJ *USA PATRIOT Act*).

Passed unanimously by the Senate (98 to 1) and the House of Representatives (357 to 66), this act sought to improve the counterterrorism plan through the implementation of certain tactics. PATRIOT act gave federal investigators permission to use the same tools available before decades to deal with the organized crime and drugs trafficking practiced by the mafia groups and drug dealers. During the floor debate about the act, the Democratic Senator Joe Biden argued, "the FBI could get a

wiretap to investigate the mafia, but they could not get one to investigate terrorists. To put it bluntly, that was crazy! What's good for the mob should be good for terrorists." (Senator Biden, *Congressional Record,* 25 October 2001)

Even before the introduction of the PATRIOT Act, electronic and other forms of surveillance were permitted by courts for the sake of investigating common crime cases that had nothing to do with terrorism and terroristic actions such as mail and passport falsifications and drug trafficking. The act authorized law enforcement agents to gather data taking into consideration information about crimes committed by and related to terrorists. These terrorism-related crimes include the assassination of Americans worldwide, uranium proliferation and the use of certain chemical weapons, the development of WMD, and procuring money and logistics for terrorists. In addition to the use of surveillance to fight terrorism-related crimes, the PATRIOT act permitted the use of sophisticated tools to track undetected terrorists. In fact, decades before 9/11, federal judges authorized the use of roving—or itinerant—wiretaps to track drug dealers, blackmailers and other criminals. To disturb and thwart surveillance, trained and sophisticated criminals used tactics such as changing locations and using different cell phones. Because these tactics became a common action, the PATRIOT act authorized the American Security Agency to use of similar techniques to track terrorists (USDOJ *USA Patriot Act* 2).

In addition, the PATRIOT act authorized a specific form of secret investigation whereby the suspect (terrorist) should not be alerted. This technique was introduced to prevent the terrorist from escaping, killing or threatening witnesses, damaging evidences, and other actions. Federal courts allowed law enforcement agents to delay the process of informing the suspect of issuing a judicially approved search warrant. This delay, defined by the act as reasonable, gave federal agents enough time to take

certain measures such as the identification and arrest of the suspect and the elimination of all kinds of threats to individual lives and the community. Practiced before and proved its efficiency, courts upheld this technique as "fully constitutional" (2).

Under the provisions of the PATRIOT act, courts were authorized to examine business records of any suspect based on federal agents' requests as access to such records is a key element in investigating terrorism. These records include, for example, bank transaction records; sending money to terrorists and the use of money to finance terrorist groups and actions, selecting records related to hardware stores or "chemical plants" to identify the sources of certain materials used in making bombs. In fact, obtaining business records as a technique dates back to decades but investigators had limited access to obtain certain records. PATRIOT act insisted on the collaboration between law enforcement agents and the federal courts, particularly the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, to aid in investigation. It is very important to note that federal courts' process of issuing a record comes after the governmental demonstration that this information is needed for an authorized investigation and aims at preserving homeland security and countering international terrorism and other clandestine intelligence activities (2).

For the sake of putting aside any obstacles that might hinder the enforcement of law and other intelligence activities, the PATRIOT act facilitated the coordination and information sharing among federal governmental agencies. The act insisted on the removal of all restrictions that hinder sharing information with other agencies. Under this technique, known as "connecting the dots", intelligence agents, police officers and federal prosecutors can preserve individual and communal security through uncovering terrorist plots in advance. According to the DOJ, connecting the dots

proved its efficiency in the *Virginia Jihad Case*. The technique enabled prosecutors

and federal agents to investigate members of Dar Al Arqam Islamic Center who had

paramilitary training, called *Jihad*, in Northern Virginia. Throughout connecting the

dots, the investigation revealed that between 1999 and 2001, eight members of the

center traveled to terrorist training camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan (USDOJ *USA*

Patriot Act 3). It uncovers that many members of the Islamic center are related to a

Pakistani group known as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET), which is considered as one of Al

Qaeda subgroups.[13] The *Virginia Jihad Case* investigation ended in charging nine

members of the center with "targeting homeland security through levying war and

conspiracy to provide financial and logistic support to Taliban and Al Qaeda" (3).

Sentences ranged from four years to life imprisonment.

The PATRIOT act urged laws' updates so that they cannot be in a conflicting

status with high-technology techniques. Authorized high-tech tools helped federal

agents to identify and arrest of the murderers of Daniel Pearl, a journalist in *Wall*

Street Journal. Moreover, the act widened the possibility of issuing search warrants

through enabling law enforcement agents to ask for search warrants outside their

zones of jurisdictions. Among the other procedures is the one that aims at protecting

victims of computer hackings. The act authorized federal agents to monitor electronic

hackers after receiving requests of the computer hacking victims.

Penalties related to terrorism and terrorism-related crimes were increased. The

act insisted on harsh punishment on groups and individuals who participate in terrorist

actions at the local and international levels. These penalties included the harboring of

terrorists involved in actions as the use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons,

piracy, bombing, sabotage, arson, destroying energy facilities, damaging American

defense materials, and other actions. In these cases, penalties range from five years to life imprisonment (USDOJ *USA Patriot Act* 4).

3.4.2. The PATRIOT Act: Critical Perspectives

The September 2001 attacks and its aftermath resulted in a state of warfare in the United States with a series of endless conflicts under the banner of the 'war on terror.' Taken to Afghanistan and Iraq, this war was fought on the internal level as well. Many Americans supported the increased security measures arguing that any patriot should stand loyal to his nation's policies and strategies. One of the *Plain Dealer* editorials explained the meaning of patriotic behaviors during the period of war: "In a state of war, civil liberties become secondary, at best. In a sense, we all become the eyes and ears of our country, that is one of the costs of war and one of the duties of patriotism" (Morris). For him, the main concern of a patriot citizen is not the question of his civil and individual liberties but the homeland security as a whole. Another editorial in *Los Angeles Times* explained that Liberty is "little if it doesn't include the freedom from attack. That's the liberty we want to preserve now" (Balzar). Nonetheless, other Americans perceived the PATRIOT act as a radical departure from the political and ethical standards that exist in the heart of America's democratic principles. They proclaimed that the coercive strategies used by the U.S. government established a climate of fear.

The American government's official rhetoric of freedom became controversial and inconsistent with the passage of the PATRIOT act. Many provisions of the act violated the terms of the Bill of Rights including the extension of the law enforcement agents' power to conduct secret searches and use different tools for surveillance, target specific religious groups (Muslims) and other political affiliations (critiques of U.S. politics and policies). The PATRIOT act violates the first amendment to the U.S.

Constitution that protects the freedom of religious affiliation, speech, press, and assembly, and the fourth amendment that protects people from any unjustified searches and seizures (US. Cons. Amends. I and IV). More, tens of thousands of suspects were detained secretly. The strategy of keeping people in custody with no bail is considered as a violation of the fifth, sixth, eight, and the fourteenth amendments that guarantee the due process of law; the right to speedy public trial, informing the detainees of the reasons behind their detention, and access to bailing rights (US. Cons. Amends. V, VI, VIII, and XIV; Henderson et al. 3).

The set of regulations passed post-9/11 shows that nothing was done arbitrarily. Institutional racist policies provided law enforcement agents with powers and tools for engaging in the 'war on terror'. These powers included increased surveillance, monitoring of bank transfers, extra searches at airports, detentions without charges, long hearing sessions and random interviews, policing on intellectual publications of college campuses, and the authority to search for people, namely immigrants' homes. The governmental logic used to explain 9/11 events to the Americans redeployed old orientalist myths. This new discourse regenerated stereotypes that the American values, principles, and identity are free, modern, and democratic and Arab and Muslim Americans are backward, offensive, and barbaric. Bush's reference to America as the democratic nation that saves other nations, in reference to Afghanistan and Iraq, from tyranny suggests the existence of two extremes: the American citizen and the enemy terrorist.

Aimed at protecting the lives and properties of Americans and avoiding any further attack against the United States, the PATRIOT act sought to define terrorism and all actions pertaining to it. The act defined 'domestic terrorism' as any violent act that is committed for the sake of changing governmental policies. 'Terrorist activity',

however, includes a wide range of perceptions including "the support of the otherwise lawful and nonviolent activities of virtually any group that has used violence, and any use or threat to use a weapon against person or property" (Cole 58). The complexity and width of 'terrorist activity' gave the American government the authority to put in custody and evict persons by simply connecting them to certain ethnic and religious groups that are related to terrorism. According to David Cole's *Enemy Aliens* (2003), the non-fixed definition of terrorism and government manipulation of the term resulted in the criminalization, deportation, and arrest of thousands of individuals with no justified reasons (61). In November 2001, just few days following the enactment of the PATRIOT act, the Attorney General issued a memorandum in which a list of 5000 men aged from 18 to 23 who entered the U.S. since January 2000 from different countries where Al-Qaida exists were to be interviewed (Cainkar "Post 9/11" 247; Office of Field Operation 2011). Under the provisions of this "volunteer interview" program, the interview is voluntary but immigration status questions might be asked (Donohue).

According to John Dean, the entire political spectrum stood against this piece of legislation. This opposition to the PATRIOT act included many neoconservative Republican politicians. Known for his political conservatism, former Republican Speaker of the House of Representatives Newt Gingrich noted that he "strongly believes Congress must... limit its [PATRIOT Act's] use to American security concerns and prevent it from developing 'mission creep' into areas outside of American security" (*Worse than Watergate 129*). Many reports noted that the House Majority Leader and chair of the House Select Committee on Homeland Security Republican Richard Armey told President Bush that he thought "his Justice Department was out of control." Armey added: "Are we going to save ourselves from

international terrorism in order to deny the fundamental liberties we protect to ourselves? It doesn't make sense to me" (130).

The reactions of the Democrats to the enactment of the PATRIOT act were not productive. There exists a successful attempt by Senator Patrick Leahy and several Democrats to lessen some provisions of the PATRIOT Act. Others would have been possibly has it not been for Bush's loyal teammate, Attorney General John Ashcroft. The latter strongly stressed the idea that more terrorist attacks were expected and that Congress, in case not approving the government's legislations, would be blamed. The Democrats complied, and the polemic bill faced "no markup by the Senate, no meaningful floor debate, no committee reports that explain the bill, and no real conference between the two houses" (Navasky xxiii). Ashcroft's reaction to the critics of Bush administration's anti- terrorism policy after 911 was ferocious. He responded: "To those who scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost liberty, my message is this: Your tactics only aid the terrorists, for they erode our American unity and diminish our resolve. They give ammunition to America's enemies, and pause to America's friends" ("America after 9/11" U.S. Congress 46).

The analysis of Ashcroft's testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee indicates that any kind of criticism to the White House is not accepted and critics run a risk of becoming state enemies. Many political analysts argued that the declarations of the Attorney General jeopardize the image and position of the United States as the country that works for the establishment and spread of peace and democracy worldwide. Ashcroft's ideology of associating the opposition with terrorism and considering critics as traitors resulted in more debates about the Bush administration, particularly DOD, unilateral actions and decisions and contributed to a more mobilization against the administration's security strategy. Commenting on Ashcroft's

frenzied statements that aimed at disheartening any feasible debate over Bush's war on terror, Jacob Weisberg depicted his testimony as "an arrogant, bullying performance that went a long way to substantiating the views of his harshest critics." He noted that any kind of expected threats to the America's homeland security comes as a fruit of Ashcroft's excesses but never from the critics. He added, "to contend that it is somehow the defenders of civil liberties who threaten our American unity takes some chutzpah. It's the mugger blaming his victim for contributing to crime." Despite the fact that the PATRIOT act did not target a specific ethnic group, all religious and ethnic groups suffered from its negative impacts in post-9/11 period.

3.5. Implementation of Homeland Security Strategy

The aftermath of the September attacks and the atmosphere of the war on terror necessitated collaboration between the U.S. government and its citizens to counter terrorism. Counterterrorism operations included state and public policing and surveillance. The PATRIOT act encouraged American citizens' active participation in scrutinizing immigrants and recounting any suspicious activities on their neighborhoods (Rodriguez 382). Patriotism played a significant role in making the passage of laws like the PATRIOT act and Special Registration Initiative (SRI) without any usual public scrutiny or debate. To preserve and strengthen patriotism, the U.S. government mobilized its citizens in the process of keeping American safety. This collaboration resulted in the creation of the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative (NSARI). In this project, the federal, state, and other local agencies gather and share security information about any suspicious activities and actions that could be effective in helping the war on terror (NSARI *Technical Implementation Option* 2010). As counterterrorism lacked a clear definition, people

had no choice but their own assumptions and stereotypes to report actions and activities they consider as suspicious or pertained to terrorism. Furthermore, the initiative encouraged an atmosphere of mistrust and therefore, widened the gap between Americans and other citizens from minority groups.

3.5.1. Engaged Citizenry: Hindrances and Success

Under the terms of the PATRIOT act, the U.S. government defined the role played by its citizenry as a 'call of duty'. Fighting terror requires collaborations between the federal government and all American citizens. The terrorists' tactics of wearing non-unified uniforms, blending with the diverse populations, and targeting undefined people necessitates that every single citizen should act as a warning alarm. Allison J. Cregg, White House Press Secretary, illustrated the statement best as she supported surveillance and the use of hi-tech. In a plain neoconservative discourse, she encouraged students for learning Arabic, Persian, and Chinese to serve their country as spies after graduation. She argued:

> We need spies; human spies. Spy satellites are great if you're trying to detect whether or not Kruschev's put missiles in Cuba. But if you want to overhear a conversation over Turkish coffee in Khyber Pass, you need a spy. You guys want to get a great job after college and serve your country? Study Arabic, Chinese and Farsi. [...] Look, I take civil liberties as seriously as anybody, okay? I've been to the dinners and we haven't even talked about free speech yet and somebody getting lynched by the patriotism police for voicing a minority opinion. That said [...] we're going to have to do some stuff. We're going to have to tap some phones and we're going to have to partner with some people who are the lesser of evils. I'm sorry but terrorists don't have armies

and navies. They don't have capitals. Some of these guys we're going

to have to walk up to them and shoot them. Yeah, we can root terrorist

nests but some of these guys aren't going to be taken by the 105th

armored tank division. Some of these guys are going to be taken by a

busboy with a silencer. So it's time to give the intelligence agencies the

money and the manpower they need. (qtd. in Fiderer)

This discourse is similar to the official rhetoric of the U.S. government

following 9/11 events. Craig stated that the government is performing its duty of

fighting terrorism. The war on terror should be placed before civil rights and

individual liberties and other 'secondary' concerns.   She added that those terrorists

with their radical views and unknown reasons want to destroy civilized America and

harm innocent Americans and the only way to stop this is through spying on and

killing them. Craig's speech is an echo of President Bush language when he argued,

"this act will not stand" and "we will find those who did it. We will smoke them out

of their holes, we will get them running, and we will bring them to justice"

(Vulliamy).

Accordingly, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) developed a

campaign called 'if you see something, say something'. It described it as an

"awareness campaign of the indicators of terrorism and violent crime, to emphasize

the importance of reporting suspicious activity to the proper state and local law

enforcement authorities" (U.S. Department of Homeland Security "If You See

Something" 3). On its side, the NSARI initiative of DOD trained state and other local

law enforcement agents to identify and track terrorist and terrorist-related actions

(U.S. Department of Homeland Security "If You See Something" 3). NSARI targeted

faith and ethnic communities as well as major sport events nationwide. DHS and DOD

collaborated for the implementation of both campaigns. New York City, being the site of the plane attacks that hit the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001, was the first to introduce and implement the 'if you see something, say something' campaign.

Janet Napolitano, Secretary of DHS, argued that the U.S. government is simply "asking the American people to be vigilant recognizing that our security is a responsibility that all of us must participate in" (Starr 1). On the contrary, what seemed easy for DHS officials was risky for citizens. Among the different obstacle that faced the campaign was immunity. Fear of revenge was the main concern that paralyzed informants' actions. The prevailing post-9/11 atmosphere was characterized by fear of terrorists violent reactions to any action deemed dangerous to them. In addition to immunity, JasserZuhdi, President of the American-Islamic Forum for Democracy, listed the different obstacles that hinder the application of "If You See Something, Say Something" campaign:

a) Citizens fear being labeled 'sectarianists', 'anti-Muslim', and 'Islamohobic'.

b) citizens fear certain groups' 'legal reprisal';

c) citizens fear inaccuracy in reporting terrorism and related actions or activities;

d) they fear demonizing the reported person/group;

e) Americans are convinced that they should never "sacrifice liberty for security". Rather, they argue that people who under government's surveillance measures should be protected;

f) Last, citizens fear financial ruin from the time and cost of the lawsuits that come after reporting any suspicious action or behavior. (Committee on the Judiciary (*Testimony of M. Zuhdi*4).

In many cases, however, the "If You See Something, Say Something" campaign proved its success and importance. The "Fort Dix Six" case was a victory

for citizens' notifications. In 2007, two men asked a teenage clerk in New Jersey to transfer a videotape to a DVD. When he and another employee started the process, they watched several men wearing traditional non-western garments and using big guns. For that, he contacted law enforcement agents. Months later, FBI agents arrested a group that became known as the 'Fort Dix Six'. Investigators concluded that the group was on a final stage of a terrorist assault on Fort Dix (Winter). The members of the group were convicted in December 2008. This case shows that citizens can help in the war on terrorism.

The "Fort Hood Massacre" was another famous case. In august 2007, an army psychiatrist, Major Nidal Malik Hassan was scheduled to lecture on the subject of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Instead, his lecture was entitled "*Is the War on Terror a War on Islam? An Islamic Perspective.*"Two minutes after the beginning of Hassan's presentation, the instructor stopped him. Hassan's views caused chaos and protests inside the class. Many testimonies mentioned that Hassan's presentation defended Osama Bin Laden's views, justified the suicide attacks, and gave reasons for the anger against the United States (Lieberman and Collins 29). The Committee on Homeland Security Hearing mentioned that Hassan's presentation is one of three he pursued as a fellow at the Uniformed Service University of Health Science in Maryland where he advocated and justified Islamic extremism and the use of violence. His fellow doctors noticed the weird way in which he deals with his patients and asking them different questions about Islam and Muslims. They recounted their experiences with Hassan and his repeated attacks and criticism against them based on their faith and his open claims that he is "Muslim first and American second" (29). Despite the fact that Hassan's friends reported that he placed his faith before the U.S.

constitution, they were afraid of being accused of discrimination and anti-Islam and therefore they were punished by the army and federal courts (Allen).

This incident showed that even the U.S. military members could not free themselves from the culture of fear and therefore they failed to identify the threat and report it. Hassan's commanders interrogated for having allowed him to act freely; those superiors were professionally trained to evaluate his capacities as a physician and psychiatrist. Zuhdi's testimony showed that despite the fact that the commanders knew and were concerned about Hassan's radical and extremist methods in the daily interactions with his patients, they feared that reporting him would tag them as Islamophobes, anti-Islam and zealots. Commenting on the incident, General Jack Keane stated that "it should not be an act of moral courage for a soldier to identify a fellow soldier who is displaying extremist behavior, it should be an obligation" (6).

The so-called "Flying Imams Case" illustrates the fear of legal reprisal and lawsuits mentioned in Zuhdi's testimony. In November 2006 and following a conference of the North American Imams Federation (NAIF), a group of six Arab imams was ordered to quit their flight from Minneapolis, Minnesota to Phoenix, Arizona simply because their prayers and the use of Arabic language frightened passengers. In March 2007, the imams and the Council on American and Muslim Relations (CAIR) filed suits against the airlines, Minneapolis Metropolitan Airports Commission, and the passengers who reported them. In reaction to this case, Congress passed legislation (HR 963) to protect private citizens who report suspicious activities as well as law enforcement authorities who act in good faith on the information. This legislation expended immunity to all Americans arguing that vigilant citizens are the most useful weapon in counterterrorism (Zuhdi 8). October 2009 witnessed the settlement of the case. The amounts paid by the defendants (airlines…) remain

confidential (Johnson).This case shows that for many years post-9/11, Arab and Muslim Americans were easy targets of mistreatment and racialization.

3.5.2. The PATRIOT Act and Ideological Reconfiguration of Arab Americans

Historically, Americans and Arab Americans' relations were fluctuant. As all other immigrants, Arab Americans were blamed for seizing jobs and threatening American identity. Few months before 9/11 events, an advertising company removed a racist anti-immigrants slogan sign from its headquarter. This sign accused immigrants of changing life conditions and other aspects of the American society. The company's general manager expressed his worries about offending people. He referred to the point that the sign targeted Arab Americans because the company's location is the eastern area of Dearborn, Michigan; one of the largest city of Arab American immigrants' concentrations in the United States (*The Arab American News* 5). This anecdote shows that even before 2001, many were not in good terms with foreign immigrants including Arab Americans.

Anti-immigration groups and other racist groups that stood against the presence of immigrants in the U.S. led movements and campaigns and mobilized people against different ethnic and religious minority groups. GordanaRabrenovic in "When Hate Comes to Town: Community Response to Violence against Immigrants" (2007) estimates that 13% of all hate crimes in the U.S. prior to 9/11 were based on ethnicity and American origins (352). The reaction of Americans against Arab Americans following 9/11 events is not coincidental. Like the majority of Americans, Nilson Craig, a citizen from Michigan, stated that the main reason behind the ethnic and religious differences in the U.S. is the allowance of too much immigrants (*The Arab American News* 5). Nilson's statement proves that the ethnic lines existed before

9/11. This situation worsened after investigators revealed the identity of the hijackers, which linked Arabs and Muslims to terrorism (Ghazali).

In a society where the history of its identity is linked to norms as whiteness and Christianity, and where patriotism and loyalty are the main pillars for deserving citizenship, Arab Americans fear to speak openly and criticize government policies on racialization and ethnic profiling. Worse, criticizing post-9/11 policies such as the PATRIOT act and wars against Afghanistan and Iraq was not acceptable. These 'anti-American' discourses were met with accusations such being unpatriotic and supporting terrorism. Those who supported the view that 9/11 events were the fruits of America's foreign policy for decades were accused of anti-Americanism. Being unpatriotic in the American context is synonymous to terrorism and disloyalty. Arab Americans' religious identity might criminalize them directly and indirectly as being sympathizers with those who are classified by the United States as terrorists. In fact, the phobia of being associated to and sympathized with terrorists is not mere paranoia but related to the political and social status of Arab Americans following the introduction of the PATRIOT act. The act instituted laws that criminalized individuals and groups that fund and help terrorists through almsgiving, charity and other so-called terrorism-related activities.

The prevailing discourse of homeland security controlled and restricted TV contents, namely popular shows and drama. Contents that disagreed with America's foreign policy, its wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and government racialization policies were faced with ban and proscription. *CNN* reported the way in which Dixie Chicks' musicals were pulled from the country stations' music playlists across the United States after criticizing President Bush's war on Iraq. In a concert in London, Natalie Maines, one of the group members, declared that she is "ashamed" that "the President

of the United States is from Texas." Maines was accused of being unpatriotic and the Chick critics encouraged their fans to "dump their tapes, CD's, and concert tickets into trash cans" (Herskovitz).

In addition to different forms of racial profiling and being put on the Transportation and Security Administration (TSA) watch list at U.S. airports, Arab Americans faced mass deportations and FBI searches of homes and mosques. In addition, law enforcement authorities including FBI agents conducted series of raids and interrogations against many Arab and Muslim Americans. In spite of the fact that none of those actions resulted in arresting terrorists, the U.S. government considered them as legal actions and necessary for reinforcing homeland security. In addition to the negative impacts it caused, the disruption of Arabs and Muslims' religious freedom is deemed as a violation of the American democratic principles.

Lisa Lowe in *Immigrant Acts: On Asian American Cultural Politics* (1996) referred to official policies and its role in creating the 'racial shift.' She argued that many American legal institutions function as apparatuses for racializing and gendering "in response to the material conditions of different historical moments" (22). Lowe States that, in technology as well as intelligence services, the United States of post-9/11 is different from the one of Pearl Harbor. During the 1940s, more than 120,000 Japanese were detained under the cover of American security. In 2002, CAIR reported more than 1717 anti-Arab and anti-Muslim incidents. These incidents included 372 reports on public harassments, 289 physical attacks and property damages, 166 cases of discrimination in the workplaces, 224 cases of threats and harassment by the FBI, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and policemen, 191 incidents of ethnic profiling in airports, 74 cases of discrimination in schools and colleges, 315 reports on hate mails, 56 death threats, and 16 bomb threats (CAIR *Status of Muslim Civil Rights*

9). Using the guise of homeland security, all these practices were legalized by the PATRIOT act.

Under the DOD initiative "voluntary interview program", tens of thousands of Arab and Muslim Americans who might have information regarding terrorism were interviewed. The majority of those interviewed feared that not complying with the government's interviews voluntarily would be deemed as disloyal and therefore would jeopardize the status of their citizenship and expose them to detention or deportation. Correspondingly, DOJ considered any information related to the detainees' numbers, identities, and charges as classified (Vries). On his side, LetiVolpp in "The Citizen and the Terrorist" (2003) argues that:

> while the government refused to release the most basic information about these individuals -their names, where they were held, and the immigration or criminal charges filed against them- the public did know that the vast majority of those detained appeared to be Middle Eastern, Muslim, or South Asian. We knew, too, that the majority were identified to the government through suspicions and tips based solely on perceptions of their racial, religious, or ethnic identity. (148)

U.S. government countered accusations of racializing Arab Americans with the argument that the interviews were voluntarily. "Voluntarism" is used to keep the government away from the tyrannical use of power; voluntarily interviews excuse the government from wrongdoing. Concurrently, collaborating Arab Americans were patriot citizens who are collaborating with their government in its efforts to counter terrorism. The execution of the PATRIOT act means that civil rights are to be suspended. According to the American government, individual liberties' suspension is not necessarily a totalitarian or dictatorial policy, but cooperative and built upon well

intentions. The aftermath of 9/11 is an exceptional time of crises and hence the government's policies are crucial and justifiable now as opposed to ordinary circumstances.

GeorgioAgamben'sHomo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (1998) analyzed the way in which the United States used different tactics and policies to justify its illegal practices domestically and internationally. Agamben argues that modern imperial powers use ambivalence as a key element in dealing with certain situations. According to him, ambivalence refers to considering one act as necessary and unjustified simultaneously. This 'logic' comes to effect during the exceptional moments of crises and wars where a nation suspends the established laws and policies to legitimize its illegal actions and tyrannical use of power. Agamben noted that these imperial powers are not using these measures provisionally; the exception moves to become the rule. He indicated that the state of exception becomes "the hidden foundation on which the entire political system rests" (9). Post-9/11 politics showed that the U.S. was not necessarily in a state of war but it used the 'state of exception' to justify its policies of racial profiling, deportation, detention, and surveillance against Arab Americans and its wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The U.S. government used ambivalence to justify its abuse of power; for justification, it was necessary to redraw a new image for racism as negative in general but legitimate in particular cases (the case of Arabs and Muslims post-9/11). Debates continued over the nature of racial profiling, its advantages and shortcomings, and the level of its acceptance and rejection. Racism came to be articulated as negative, untenable, and simultaneously required for a short period because the U.S. witnesses an exceptional situation. The PATRIOT act, in one way or another, participated in the reconfiguration of perceptions of race and racism in the United States following 9/11

events. The new ideological redefinition of the American citizen as patriotic and united in fighting terrorism created bipolar definition whereby Arabs and Muslims were defined as terrorists and unpatriotic.

While non-Arab racial minorities including the historically discriminated against groups like Blacks, Hispanics and Asian Americans became temporarily included into the notion of American identity, Arab and Muslim Americans were racialized and considered as a threat to America's homeland security. Racialization resulted in confusion between 'Arabs' and 'terrorists' and the interchangeable use of the two terms. Although Arabs and Muslims were not mentioned, many political analysts argued that the PATRIOT act played a significant role in legitimizing racism against Arab and Muslim Americans and denied that the same practice was used against other racial groups. Rachad Antonius described the process of justifying racism against Arab Americans as a 'respectable racism'. He argued that respectable and necessary racism requires pardoning individual practices as hate crimes and discrimination in colleges and workplaces and ignoring government policies that racialize Arab Americans as deportations, detentions, and surveillance (1-2). Disappointed of being demonized instead of being victimized, Arab Americans lost faith in their government, policemen, and all American law enforcement agencies. Their anger of being blamed of terrorism and other crimes that they never committed is confronted by officials' statements that these governmental agencies are doing their job and trying to help Arab Americans and other ethnic groups in the United States.

Concerns about the PATRIOT Act and the increasing powers of law enforcement agencies are reflected through the state of fear of civil liberties violations. Under the Freedom of Information Act, community groups that advocated more transparence in the use of the PATRIOT act sued the Department of Justice.

According to a report released in 2005 and as a result of the suit, 13 cases of investigation and surveillance were carried out by FBI agents without "proper paperwork and oversight." These violations included the seizure of bank records and improper physical searches (Eggen). During a community meeting prepared by DOJ in Dearborn, Michigan, participants expressed their concerns about the new federal legislations and civil liberties. These concerns hindered law enforcement agents' attempts to reach out the Arab American communities. In New Jersey, FBI efforts to recruit agents who master Arabic were met with hesitation and suspicion by community members fearing that any affiliation to a governmental agency or organization would threaten their lives and the ones of their relatives. Following September 2001, Arab American reports over the excessive use of power by police increased. In many parts of Michigan, residents expressed that the same features of ethnic profiling that was practiced against Black Americans is applied following 9/11 on Arabs, Muslims, and those who look similar (Sheriden; Leonard).

Studies and reports over hate crimes against Arab Americans following September 2001 ranged between 10 to 17 fold increases (AAI *In the Aftermath of the Tragedy*). Different circumstances encouraged underreporting. Many Arab and Muslim Americans were subjects to bias and hate crimes but because they are undocumented or recently applied for citizenship they preferred to avoid problems with the immigration authorities in case of reporting. Moreover, little or poor understanding of the U.S. legal system and legislations created a state of fear of vengeance from the reported person or group (Bruner). Vengeance against Arab Americans ranged from discrimination in colleges and workplaces to attacks on their businesses and religious sites (mosques and headquarters of Arab and Muslims American organizations). After the murder of man in Arizona because the turban he

wore resembled the one of Osama Bin Laden, Arabs and Muslims and those misidentified (Sikhs and Hindus) removed their ethnic and religious signs and clothes (Beards, headscarves, and shalwars) and adopted a western-style look. The majority noticed that nationwide spread of "quiet but persistent" bias in schools and workplaces cannot go unnoticed (Sachs).

As one of many policies to counterterrorism, the government's collaboration with its 'patriot-citizens' prompted public hostility and suspicion. Arab Americans' relations with their neighbors, work colleagues, and colleges' mates (many were enrolled as spies and informants) became cold and distrustful.

Conclusion

Unveiling the identities of 9/11 hijackers resulted in increasing the focus on Arab American communities and launching a wide range war on terror. On the domestic level, the neoconservative government led by President George W. Bush introduced a new American security strategy. Federal policies and measures including special registration programs, voluntary interviews, detentions, and deportations played a significant role in legitimizing racialization against Arab Americans. Government officials argued that homeland security should be placed before individual and civil liberties. Internationally, President Bush's war on terror included the launching of two military campaigns. The first was in 2001 against Taliban in Afghanistan that was considered as a safe place for Al Qaeda and the second was against Iraq for allegations about President Saddam Hussein's link with Al Qaeda and possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

This chapter argues that homeland security strategy was confronted by opposition and criticism because the PATRIOT act of 2001 violated the constitution and particularly the Bill of Rights. Regardless of this objection, Bush and his neoconservative administration along with Congress authorized its renewal in 2006. As a reaction to the systematic campaigns that targeted Arab Americans, CAIR and other Arab and Muslim organizations reported the unprecedented increase in hate crimes and discrimination against Arab Americans and those perceived to be Arabs and Muslims. The level and pace of racialization is difficult to measure due to the large dissimilitude between statistics given by the Arab American community-based organizations and American federal agencies. The federal government's counterterrorism initiatives heightened patriot-citizens vigilance, which created an environment of surveillance, hate, and suspicion. On many levels, the new homeland security environment and reconfiguration of old perceptions about race and racism polluted the lives of Arab Americans. The following chapter illustrates the intensification of racialization, its legitimization, and manifestation in schools, workplaces, airports, and other public spheres.

CHAPTER IV

Conceptualization of Islamic Terrorism and Racialization of Arab Americans

Introduction

In the United States, post-9/11 socio-political climate was characterized by the widespread stereotype of the Arab terrorist as the opposite to the patriot citizen. This dichotomy resulted in the creation of an atmosphere that, in a way, decriminalized the process of Arab Americans' racialization. While Ad Council and CAIR attempted to ease tensions and recreate a new image of Arabs and Muslims as an indivisible part of the nation's multiculturalism, the official silence participated in increasing the number of hate crimes, discriminatory actions, and vengeance against Arab and Muslim Americans. Schools, workplaces, airports, and all public spaces became the least secure places where all forms of racialization were implemented.

In addition to calling attention to the state of Arab and Muslim women and the prejudice, discrimination, and suspicion they were subject to, this chapter investigates the government's silence as well as DOJ's decriminalization of racialization against Arab and Muslim Americans. The analysis of specific cases of racialization illustrates the United States' official position towards racializing Arab and Muslim Americans.

4.1. The Citizen/Terrorist Paradigm: Multiculturalism Questioned

Historically, racial and religious identities in the United States were configured and reconfigured to meet certain contextual circumstances. Following the 9/11 events,

the category of the white American citizen was reconfigured and redefined to reversely confront the category of the terrorist. However, while the conception of the American citizen became abruptly and temporarily multicultural, Arabs, regardless of their religious orientations, and those perceived mistakenly as Arabs were stigmatized as non-citizens and terrorists (Vollp 147). This new racial reconfiguration is not unfamiliar. However, the intensity used to deal with those communities accused of being in charge of the events of September 11 indicates that there have been particular dimensions that intersect with this racialization. Leti Volpp in "The Citizen and the Terrorist" (2003) suggests three elements: legitimization of racial profiling as a practice, regeneration and redeployment of old pejorative myths about Arabs/ Muslims and their culture, and reconsideration of concepts such as identity, patriotism, and citizenship (147).

4.1.1. The War on Terror and the 'New' Arab and Muslim

For homeland security purposes, a new status for Arabs and Muslims emerged. First, Arabs and Muslims were subject to arrests, detentions, deportations, and terror by the U.S. government. Congressional and governmental attitudes confirm the creation of a new category of the Arab, Muslim, and Middle Eastern American. Under the guise of the 'War on Terror' and most particularly the Patriot Act, about ¼ million Arab and Muslim Americans were interviewed, tens of thousands were either detained or deported, thousand were subject to unjustified registrations, and many Arab and Islamic centres and organizations were closed. As discussed in chapter III, the Patriot Act allowed more surveillance that included unusual searches at airports, watching banks transfers, covert surveillance, and even intellectual productions at the level of colleges and universities were watched (148).

Second, government and media discourses aimed at regenerating old stereotypes of the Middle East throughout portraying the United States as a nation of freedom, democracy and human rights and the 'east' as a region of barbarism, fundamentalism, social injustice and religious backwardness. Such discourses as the ones of the U.S. President George W. Bush referring to America as a democratic nation that bears the responsibility of saving some countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq from tyranny and oppression suggest the existence of two opposite perceptions; the citizen and the terrorist. Third, these regenerated stereotypes are reflected through the negative and violent reactions of American individuals to Arabs, Muslims and Middle Easterners. Hate crimes, harassments, excessive intimidation, and attacks were justified as executions of the Patriot act. More, verbal expressions such as "go back to your country", "you are not Americans" and others were frequently used (Volpp 157). These three ingredients; government policies, media portrayals and government discourses, and individual violent acts contributed to strengthening the citizen/ terrorist paradigm. What Volpp suggested was confirmed with the 2004 Media and Society Research Group (MSRG) report that came to the conclusion that 44% of the Americans favored regulations and even restrictions on Muslims and Arabs' civil liberties (Nisbet and Shanahan 1).

Among the major concerns that Arab Americans faced was the question of cultural citizenship. Renato Rosaldo analyzed cultural citizenship through the investigation of Latin Americans' experience. He argued that regardless of the fact that they are born and raised in the United States, Latinos consider themselves second class citizens (254). Thus, cultural citizenship can be defined "as a broad range of activities of everyday life through which Latinos and other groups claim space in society and eventually claim rights" (Flores and Benmayor 15). Accordingly, Arab

American citizens post-September 2001 have been perceived outside the framework of American citizenship. They were placed in a position where they have to prove their loyalty to the U.S. constitution and institutions.

As an attempt to redefine the binary relations of the citizen/terrorist, non-profits organisations as well as some groups advocating civil rights established Public Service Announcements in the form of newspaper and television advertisements with the aim of isolating and ending up all forms of hate crimes against Arab and Muslim Americans. The resistance of citizen vs. terrorist dichotomy came through overemphasizing the multicultural, multi-ethnic, and multi-religious nature of the United States. The examination of 'discourses of multiculturalism' demonstrates the conceptual framework of the American cultural citizenship at this historical turning point.

4.1.2. Ad Council's "I am an American"

Three weeks following Pearl Harbour, The American government created the War Advertising Council (commonly known as the Ad Council). Following WWII, President Harry Truman urged the Council to carry on acting as a peacetime public service organization. Today, a non-profit organization, it produces, spreads, and promotes public service announcements on behalf of various sponsors, including NPO's, NGO's and government agencies. Among their successful campaigns: "Buy War Bonds," "Friends Don't Let Friends Drive Drunk," and "Loose Lips Sink Ships" (Ad Council "Our History"). The official website of the Council shows the impressive results from its advertising campaigns including the mounting use of car-seatbelt from 21 to 73% and saving tens of thousands of lives, raising over $1.9 billion for the United Negro College Fund which enabled 300,000 African American students to go to college, and the decreasing number of forest fires which resulted in reducing fire

devastations from 22 million acres to less than 4 million acres per year (Ad Council "Our Work").

Following 9/11, Ad Council launched extensive advertising campaigns that were broadcasted on mainstream network televisions. Families of the attacks' victims were directed to sources of financial support, the conduction of a sensitization campaign over challenges post-9/11 as well as attempts to unify Americans across racial lines and solidify patriotism. These campaign included "I am an American," in direct reaction to the hate crimes that targeted Arabs, Muslims, and those perceived mistakenly as Arabs. Timothy Luke in "From "Am I an American?" to "I Am an American!" (2010) described the advertisement displaying a diverse group of people, one-by-one, stating: "I am an American." This ethnic diversity included Latin, Caucasian, Black, Caribbean, Asian, Native, young and old American men and women. The advertisement ends with the American traditional motto: "E Pluribus Unum" literally meaning "Out of Many, One" followed by a small smiling girl waving the American flag (86).

The major aim of "I am an American" is inhibiting all forms of insults and hate crimes that target Arab and Muslim Americans by promoting unity via the use of "American," which should gain back its original signification. The advertisement seeks to picture a multicultural community; the one that identifies all diverse people with being Americans and belonging to one multicultural community. Ending with "E Pluribus Unum, Out of Many, One," indicates that the conveyed message was relatively successful; the American identity is reinstalled into a new multicultural framework. Accordingly, regardless of the different ethnic affiliations and religious orientations of Americans, they can be united under one banner: 'American. The ad advocated tolerance, social cooperation, and discouraged all sorts of racialization. The

presentation of people who belong to different ethnic groups and gender indicates that all these different manifestations are unified by Americanism. More, the use of accented English by some of those featured in the Ad shows that English is their second language and they belong to the early generations of immigrants. However, English is the only language used. The Council's website explains:

> Diversity is what defines America. In the wake of this national tragedy, it is time to embrace our differences and celebrate that diversity, rather than let it divide us. Our nation's motto sends a message that has never been more appropriate -E Pluribus Unum, or Out of Many, One. We are all Americans and our differences create the very foundation and spirit that define this nation (qtd. in Alsultany 135).

EvelynAlsultany in*Arabs and Muslims in the Media: Race and Representation after 9/11* (2012)argues that in its attempt to deconstruct the opposition between American citizen and Arab Muslim terrorist, the Passenger Service Agent (PSA) regenerated what she described as "restrictive representations of diversity" or what she preferred to define as "diversity patriotism"; the version of patriotism that highly praises the notion of a diversified citizenry and strengthens the nation's multicultural unity concurrently(17). Alsultany examines the PSA's three different versions of 'diversity patriotism.'

a. The first version of diversity patriotism takes the form of vague assimilative diversity. In this way, diversity is defined through representations that avoid religious symbols. There are no visible signs or indications of anything Arab, Muslim, or Sikh in the ads (veil, mosque, beard, turban, and clothing) except for an African-American man with a suit and bow tie who could likely be a member of the Nation of Islam, but

this is uncertain. The ad present two men who appear to be South Asian, without any indication of their identity, one of them could possibly be an Arab. While all in the ad say, "I am an American," the possibly Arab American man, is the only one who finds it difficult to articulate it and thus, it is particularly meaningful to indicate that his strong emotional affiliation to America is the reason behind his inability to speak (136). Attacks, hate crimes, deportation, and surveillance against South Asians post-9/11 prove that Americans do not distinguish between these identities. The Ad Council continues this mix up through the ambiguous representation of this Arab/South Asian man as an American.

b. The second version of diversity patriotism approaches patriotic uniformity through the representation of good Arab and Muslim Americans. This includes portraying Arab and Muslim Americans similar to all Americans by elucidating their family values, services they provide the nation with, and their diversity and legacy in the United States.

c. The third is the global imagined version of American diversity patriotism. It advocates the notion that the United States is represented as a land of opportunity, freedom, and equality for all and Arab and Muslim Americans, most particularly, are represented to the global audience as prospering in the United States. These American values should be exported to the Islamic, Arabic as well as other countries worldwide (134).

Despite all the claims that the Ad Council's "I am an American" was created in response to the hate crimes and other violent actions that targeted Arabs and Muslims in the United States, the absence of Arabs Muslims' religious markers leads to the major question of why are not these groups visibly represented in the ad and included

in redefining and promoting a diverse American citizenry? While this ad targets a multicultural, multireligious, and multi-ethnic America, the absence of Arabs and Muslims from this diverse community at this particular moment is revealing of the limits of American citizenship at this juncture (Luke 86).

The Ad indicates that being accented or having a little understanding of English have nothing to do with being a patriotic citizen. The limits lie at the point whereby images of a man wears a turban or a woman with a headscarf are totally absent. Turning a blind eye on the first amendment of the constitution that guarantees freedom of religion, certain markers such as headscarf and beard are perceived as a contradiction to the conception of the American citizen. Without taking into consideration that the locus of racialization post-9/11 that became fully based on religion, "I am an American" unnaturally avoids religious connotations and emphasizes uniquely on presenting the racial mosaic in the United States. While Christianity and Judaism are not openly represented in the ad, they are already figured as part of the American nation. Islam, in the post-September 2001 anti-Arab/ Muslim atmosphere, remains signified as that which is not American and therefore terrorist (Luke 86-87).

4.1.3. CAIR's "I am an American Muslim"

`   Contrary to the Ad Council which did not address the relationship between Arab and Muslim Americans and American citizenship, the Council for American Islamic Relations (CAIR) did. As a major organization that advocates Muslim Americans' civil liberties in the United States, CAIR launched 'I am an American Muslim'to promote a better understanding of Islam, its teachings, and principles and counter hate rhetoric and racializing Arab/ Muslim Americans post-9/11. Initially planned to produce 52 PSA flights for its campaign, only six had been produced. The

first print ad had appeared in February 2003 in *The New York Times*. Each of CAIR's

six ads intended to discuss one part of Islam and to clarify different points related to

that part. In fact, the ads sought to redraw a new image about Islam and its teachings

far from the prevailing stereotypes of the clash between Islamic and western principles

and the portrayal of Arabs and Muslims as the other. The use of "I'm an American

Muslim," as a motto aimed at disintegrating the constructed dichotomy American and

Muslim American; to include Muslims in the imagining of America and to associate

American diversity with the diversity within Islam (CAIR "*CAIR Launches*"). This

suggests that the only way to create compatibility between Americans and Arab and

Muslim Americans and the possibility of integrating Arabs and Muslims into the

national mainstream identity is through multiculturalism. CAIR ads assert American

and Arab and Muslim as compatible through stressing on a number of issues such the

necessity of Arab and Muslim Americans' enrolment in the U.S. army to refute the

image of Muslims as anti-American violent extremists. The ad takes place in a studio

where the background is blank and the music of the synthesizer creates an optimistic

atmosphere. The featured Muslim speaker appears to be middle aged:

Narrator: America is the land of diversity and service.

African-American Man: I am an African-American. My forefathers overcame

the trials of Slavery.

Native American Woman: I am Native American. I'm a journalist, wife, and

mother.

White man: I am of European heritage. One of my ancestors was a member of

the Continental Congress.

Latina (in a *hijab*): I'm Hispanic American. I've been a girl scout since I was

six years old and now I'm a troop leader.

African-American Man: I served on our nation's armed forces, as have many of my relatives.

Native American Woman: My father served two terms duty in Vietnam.

White man: Another fought for freedom at Gettysburg.

Latina: Two of my uncles fought for our country in the Korean War.

African-American Man: And I am an American Muslim.

Native American Woman: And I am an American Muslim.

White man: And I am an American Muslim.

Latina: I am an American Muslim.

Narrator: Muslims are part of the fabric of this great country and are working to build a better America. (Griffith and McAlister 74; Alsultany 141)

This advertisement conveys three connected messages. First, it seeks to disassociate between Islam and Arabs through correcting the common general mistaken view that all Arabs are Muslim and all Muslims are Arab. Second, through mentioning slavery, representing a Native American, and speaking of ancestors, the notion that Muslims are "foreign" or "other", thus not American, should be defied. Third, it emphasized on the portrayal of Muslims as productive citizens and patriots who served their country through being scouts and soldiers fighting for the nation the way their ancestors did. The advertisement's conveyed message is that patriotism is represented through the virtue of Arab and American legacy of patriotic service to the nation and defined by the person's readiness to fight and put his life in jeopardy for the United States (Alsultany 142).

All subjects that included Arab and Muslim Americans were intentionally linked to multiculturalism and the sacrifices they made for America. Multiculturalism, from CAIR's perspective, can be understood through the representation of Muslims

who belong to different ethnic groups (beyond the narrow circles of Arabs) in the United States. This includes African Americans, Asian Americans, and Latin Americans. More, the manifestation of multiculturalism appears in the inter-racial marriage mainly of Muslim Americans with other racial groups. Arab and Muslim American sacrifices to the nation are symbolized via military service as the typical manifestation of patriotism for males and acting as girl-scouts, nurses, or participating in volunteer or relief work for females. In other words, unlike the Ad Council that used verbal messages to declare and identify the Americanness of U.S. citizens, CAIR stressed on transforming these speeches into concrete actions; while male's loyalty as a feature of patriotism needs to be realized in military service, the one of female is realized through scouting, nursing, and other emergency actions:

a. "We're Americans and we're Muslims."

b. "On my honor, I will try: To serve God and my country. And to help people at all times."

c. The members of Santa Clara Muslim Girl Scout Troop #856 have made a pledge to serve their community, their country and God. The American values that all cherish - like service, charity and tolerance - are the same values that Muslims are taught to uphold in daily life.

d. Muslim life and worship are structured around the Five Pillars of Islam - faith, prayer, helping the needy, fasting, and pilgrimage. The third pillar teaches that all things belong to God and are only help in trust by humans, so we are expected to share a percentage of our wealth every year to help the poor.

e. Devotion to God and the teachings of Islam strengthen our commitment to community and country. Like Americans of all faiths, we use the principles of our religion to guide us in an ever-changing world, and we teach our children

to respect the values that make our country a secure place for all Americans. "We're American Muslims." ("The Greenville News")

For the sake of drawing images of tolerance and diversity, CAIR sought to create strong ties between Muslim Americans and other Americans from all other racial groups. Its ads addressed all other religious Americans with the major aim of placing Islam within the American mainstream understanding of faith in accordance to other faiths, namely Christianity and Judaism. These ads aimed at conveying the message that there exist no differences between the Islamic and American values, particularly America's conservative principles. This compatibility is manifested through shared views on different subjects as diversity, patriotism, belief in God, and the significance of the family role. The Islamic world, according to CAIR's ads, is as diverse ethnically and geographically as America. Accordingly, Muslims are not the O*ther* as stereotyped but have a long history in the United States and similar to all Americans, they are concerned about homeland security. It is very important to note that the analysis of the Ad Council's "I am an American" campaign and the idea of exporting a specific Arab and Muslim American identity to the Arab and Muslim audiences abroad indicates that the imagined version of American Islam is different from the one that exists in the Islamic world; while Muslim Americans (simply because they live in the United States) are progressing, other Muslims (particularly Middle Eastern Muslims) are regressing (Luke 88).

4.2. The Muslim/Terrorist and Public-Official Cooperation

4.2.1. The Muslim/TerroristParadigm

Regardless of the minor moderate voices that repudiate the portrayal of Arab and Muslim Americans as terrorists following 9/11, the official discourse and government actions forced the public to engage in racialization and profiling through certain strategies. The creation of a climate of fear and overemphasizing patriotism were associated with the official references to "arresting and deporting Muslim terrorists" and the use of slogans like "United We Stand". Homeland security hotlines were everywhere and FBI urged all Americans to report suspicious persons and doubtful actions. Many political analysts argue that the real reasons behind the government's action of spreading American patriotism were to ease pressures on government actions and to silent voices that stood against Bush's security strategy post-9/11. The tactic was relatively successful; the overwhelming majority of Americans participated in framing the terrorist/Muslim paradigm through contacting hotlines to report any suspicious individuals and 'terroristic' attitudes. Worse, some Americans responded through the commitment of hate crimes.

The analysis of the nature of these hate crimes that ranged from attacks, beatings, harassment in schools and workplaces to the murders of Arabs, Muslims, and others physically perceived like them indicates that the dynamic of racialization took dangerous dimensions. While it was manifested through stereotypes and negative portrayals before 9/11, racialization of Arab and Muslim Americans post-September 2001 was intensified and took new radical forms that were manifested through anti-Arab and anti-Muslim attitudes. These attitudes are manifested through different occasions: In one of the anti-mosques demonstrations in Chicago, one of the American protesters stated "I'm proud to be American and I hate Arabs and I always

have." In Virginia, the director of the Manassas mosque stated that the answering machine of his office received many contempt and hate messages such as "We hate you so-and-so Muslims and we hope you die" (*Anti-Islamic violence*).

Following the attacks, tens of people died as a result of hate crimes including some who are neither Arab nor Muslim. On September 14, 2001, Balbir Singh Sodhi, a Sikh 49 year old gas station owner, was shot in Mesa, Arizona. Fortunately, after hitting Sodhi, the shooter's bullets did not find a way to a clerk from Lebanese origins and an Afghani family (Lewin). The report of the Sikh American Legal Defense and Educational Fund noted that the shooter targeted Sodhi "simply because he had a beard and wore a turban in accordance with his Sikh faith" (*The First 9/11 'Backlash'* 2). One of the American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC) reports noted that in September 2001 alone "the number of personal attacks on Arabs and Arab Americans reported to ADC exceeded the number of such attacks cited in ADC's two years' (1998-2000) (R*eport on Hate Crimes* (47). In the parking lot of a shopping mall in Huntington, New York, an old drunk man from tried to run over a woman from Pakistani origins. The man after that followed the woman into a store and threatened to kill her for "destroying my country" (Coffee; Lyons).

Days following September 11, the Pew Research Center conducted a poll whereby 1200 individuals nationwide were asked whether they are with or against a possible government procedure to detain all legal immigrants from hostile countries during times of crisis. Shockingly, the poll resulted in 29% who were with and 57% against. According to Michael Dimock, director of the poll, the only interpretation of these results is that "a clear majority were opposed. But I know people who looked at that number and went, 'oh my god, nearly three in 10 people are in favor of this?'."

He added that "a higher proportion said, 'don't know' or refused to answer this than the other questions. There may be some people in their heart of hearts who support the idea and don't say so over the phone. I'm sure that it did happen" (qtd. in Lee).

Six days after 9/11 attacks, Richard Berke and Janet Elder of *The New York Times* chose as a headline "After the Attacks: The Poll; Public Voices Overwhelming Support for the Use of Force against Terrorism." They argued that "the public is willing to alter the way they live, and even sacrifice some of their own liberties, for safety considerations." Accordingly, after a survey conducted in November 2001 by the *National Public Radio* (NPR)reported that homeland security is placed before civil liberties and individual rights. The survey concluded with the general public agreement over their confidence in Bush government's security strategy implemented for countering terrorism (*NPR*).

The nationwide discourse of the terrorist Muslim male was adopted and fostered by the general public. This public and government-sponsored discourse aimed at maintaining and perpetuating the image that Islam and terrorism are two sides of the same coin. For example, some pilots and even passengers refused to travel with Muslim-looking and Arabic-speaking passengers who passed through all security measures. Ten days following 9/11 attacks, after a thorough scrutiny, three Arab Americans from Utah were expelled from a Northwest aircraft company because allegedly they frightened many passengers. These Arab Americans were expelled by the company under the argument that government security rules state that any passenger can be "re-accommodated" if his/her actions or presence discomforts other passengers (Jensen and Reavy). The expression 'Flying while Arab' became used widely as Arab and Muslim Americans became associated with terrorism in American

public consciousness. Arab, Muslim, and Middle Eastern Americans taking off their shoes, belts, and even clothes became a common scene at American airports.

In addition to the particular measures taken at airports, Arab and Muslim Americans were racialized in workplaces where many incidents of employment discrimination were reported. One week after the 9/11 attacks, Trans States Airlines, Missouri ended the contract of Mohammed Hussein, a native of Fiji, despite his outstanding career (EEOC *Muslim Pilot Fired*; Salter). In a similar discrimination incident, Bank Air, another airline company, fired Aziz Baroody from his job in December 2001. Before being fired, Mr. Baroody, an Arab American from Lebanese Christian origins, was remorselessly interrogated with the use of polygraph test (ADC *Arab American Pilot)*.

In fact, there existed a high level of coordination between private airlines companies and the U.S. government and its security agencies in accessing confidential information. After September 2011, mainly Northwest and JetBlue, two private airline companies, provided the government with information about millions of passengers in an attempt to help "fight terrorism and improve aviation security" (Goo).

4.2.2. Public-Official Coordination and Arab Americans' Racialization

Following 9/11, public reporting of dubious actions and suspicious individuals on different security hotlines, until then not widely-known, accelerated. It is considered as one of the main successful means to stop and arrest Arab, Muslim, and Middle Eastern Americans who were characterized as terrorists. Notifying suspected individuals, groups, and activities started right after the attacks when FBI set up a network of hotlines and asked people night and day to report terrorists and terrorist-like activities. The government's strategy of stressing on possible attacks, portrayals of Islamic radicalism that aims at destroying infidel America, and the continual

references to "sleeping cells" and "terrorists among us" aimed at mobilizing general support and creating a hyper-vigilant atmosphere.

In its report over the collaboration of citizens in countering terrorism, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) announced that, "by September 18, 2001, one week after the attacks, the FBI had received more than 96,000 tips or potential leads from the public, including more than 54,000 through an internet site it published for the Penttbomcase" the majority of these calls reported doubtful actions of "Arab men" (USDOJ OIG *September 11 Detainees*).Coleen Rowley, one of the FBI whistleblowers in Minneapolis referred to the tips received through FBI hotlines right after 9/11:

> The most common "citizen tip" we receive is something to the effect of, "I don't want you to think I'm prejudiced because I'm not, but I just have to report this because one never knows and I'm worried and I thought the FBI should check it out." This precedes a piece of general information about an "Arab" or "Middle- Eastern" man who the tipster lives by or works with that contains little or nothing specific to potential terrorism activities (360).

According to her, FBI found enough time to think and strategize right after the hotline tips started to ease up. Before that, people notifications were the primary source to initiate investigations. Before September 2001, calls of unknown people were customarily ignored. However, post-9/11 homeland interests revolutionized all security strategies. These changes were described by Bill Carter, FBI spokesman as:

> At one time, when information came to us, a lot of times based on experience, the investigator would say, "Nah, this is something we will

follow through on," but after the September 11 attacks, the director has stated that no counterterrorism lead will go uncovered (Rowley 362).

FBI agents traced every single lead that helps in recognizing terrorists and other violent attitudes and behaviors. Outside New York City, FBI agents used the vetting process as a new tactic to make sure that only worthy cases were classified as September 11 investigations, and detainees whose detentions are associated to 9/11 events are held with neither warranty nor bails and the only way to be released is a clearance by the FBI. Yet, this vetting process "was not applied in New York City. It is no surprise that 64% of cases of special interest came from New York City" (USDOJ OIG *September 11 Detainees 22*).

Government agencies' and public coordination through the hotlines network had a negative impact on Arab and Muslim communities. The oftentimes false reporting resulted in a number of unjustified interrogations, detentions and deportations. Even those misidentified as Arabs and Muslims were targets. In fact, simple actions could be perceived as suspicious behaviors; a Northern California Sikh man was reported because he asked for the direction to a small airport. Later, he was detained on immigration charges. In November 2001, in a similar incident, two Somali men were reported because of a suspicious activity in a parking lot in Texas; although the two Somalis were praying, they were arrested on minor technical violations and fortunately, were released the following day. In Maryland a hotel clerk reported an Egyptian man his look was suspicious. After being detained, the Egyptian was initially charged with entering the hotel without permission (trespassing). Based on a separate immigration violation, he was deported to Egypt after four days (Moran; "Two Muslims Arrested").

After months of solitary confinement, Ali Yaghi, a Palestinian holding a Jordanian passport, was deported. He was arrested October 2001 in Albany, New York because one of his neighbors reported that he was expressing anti-American sentiment. Likewise, Yaghi was accused of immigration violation. In New York, Ali, a Pakistani American, was arrested and put for months in jail after a call from a "concerned neighbor" who claimed that "people make bombs here" (HRW *Illusion of Justice*). Notifications and accusations continued to play a role in the increasing number of arrests after 9/11. In June 2002, a South Asian Muslim teenager from African origins was wandering with his friends in Flushing, New York when one of his friends asked about renting a boat from a shopkeeper. After few minutes, security forces represented by ten to twelve FBI, many secret agents, and local police cars barricaded the region and interrogated the young guys about terrorism. The shopkeeper called to report what he considered as a suspicious behavior. All teenagers were detained and later released on bail (HRW *Illusion of Justice*).

Oftentimes, some people seized the opportunity to report Arabs and Muslims based on personal reasons. In November 2001, Syed Ali, a successful Muslim American businessman in New York, was reported to the local police as affiliated to a terrorist organization and he sent amounts of money to back up terrorists in Pakistan. Without taking into account that Ali had a valid green card, a family whose members are U.S. citizens, a large house in the suburbs, and an established business and political connections, bail was denied for months and eventually set at one million dollars. After months in detention, Ali filed a lawsuit against his business partners accusing them of linking him to terrorism in an attempt to retain all the business profits (Rabbi 73).

In its report sent to United Nations' Human Rights Committee, Meiklejohn

Civil Liberties Institute listed tens of situations similar to the one of Syed Ali:

> In New York, the FBI jailed Abdullah Higazy after 11 September 2001,
> on suspicion that he had helped guide the hijackers into the twin
> towers. An informant, Mr. Ferry, told the FBI that he had found a
> ground-to-air radio in a hotel room occupied by Higazy. The FBI agent
> who took the tip failed to press Ferry for a sworn statement, to subject
> him to a lie detector test, or even to interview a second guard who
> helped search the room. Higazy was finally released after nearly a
> month in custody when the charges proved to be groundless. (12)

According to the same report, in December 2001, Mohamed Alajji, a Yemeni-born

truck driver from Michigan, was jailed for a week before interviewing his accuser,

who turned out to be "making false claims against him to press a family feud (12).

4.3.1. Post-9/11 Racialization: 'Old Wine in New Bottles'

4.3.2. Racialization atWorkplaces

The counterattack Arab and Muslim Americans have experienced following

9/11 was anticipated. Even the used stereotypes and animosities were not

unprecedented but reinvigorated. The cultural counteraction against Arab and Muslim

American communities was heretofore well-placed (Love 412). Dated back to their

early arrival to America, Arab and Muslim Americans experienced the same fate and

were commonly perceived as "different, strange, foreign, violent, oppressive, and

threatening" (Peek 59). Media, official, and public racialization, negative stereotypes,

and unfavorable imagery participated in their portraying as the *Other* and out-group.

Besieged by the general public' antipathy and media's antagonistic messages in the

aftermath of 9/11, racialization took more direct and violent actions. School and airport harassment, ethnic profiling, and hate crimes became omnipresent (Marvasti and McKinney 67). Through her analysis of true Islam in a hostile environment (referring to New Jersey where she conducted her research), Jennifer Bryan indicated in her "Constructing 'The True Islam' in hostile Times: The Impact of 9/11 on Arab Muslims" (2005) that "nearly all of the Muslims I interviewed mentioned [felt] hostility from employers, coworkers, store clerks and bank tellers, police officers, neighbors, random passerby, and even former friends" (143).

In post-9/11 social climate, city streets, restaurants, hotels, and public transportation represented the minimally-protected areas from all racialization aspects. During the first few days following the attacks, moving outside home environment makes any Arab and Muslim American directly exposed to racialized attitudes from members of more dominant groups. They are most often identified by various individual and group markers. These markers include religious icons like *hijab*, beard, or Islamic dress, cultural symbols like Arabic surnames and language, and organizational affiliation like attending a mosque, cultural centers, agencies and other gatherings (Peek 276). In their study *Middle Eastern Lives in America* (2004), Amir B. Marvasti and Karyn D. McKinney and McKinney urged participants to present their experiences about the way in which once secure public spaces, including neighborhood streets and parking lots, became cautionary places because of bullying, intimidation, and other discriminatory incidents. Describing their confusion and vulnerability, participants indicated that any American, even non-Arabs and non-Muslim, might be vulnerable to such hostile and malevolent acts in these open-to-public places (70-71). Similar to Marvasti and McKinney study, participants in Lori A. Peek's study "Reactions and Response: Muslim Students' Experiences on New

York City Campuses post 9/11" (2003) suffered from sharp and inimical looks and gazes in many public spaces. Odd looks in public spaces became an ordinary routine for Arab and Muslim Americans mainly the ones identified with religious and cultural markers. In many occasions, these looks turn into more violent attitudes (71).

According to Haddad et al., the intersection of personal and professional lives is very complicated when one involves his/her religious beliefs. Regardless of the free religious practice which is manifested in the U.S. Constitution's Bill of Rights, personal religious beliefs evoke fearfulness when they overlap with work. the actions of demonstrating a religious passage in a workplace, reading a sacred scripture at lunch break, or evoking religion with other employees, raise many concerns in post-9/11 social and political climate in the United States. Because of its hypersensitivity, many people prefer not to discuss their religious identity (*Muslim Women* 107).

Undoubtedly, the workplace is another theatre Arab and Muslim Americans racialization. An important number of discriminatory cases have been reported to different advisory Arab American organizations such as CAIR and ADC. These cases include employees' unjustified dismissal and refusal to recruit and accommodate individuals based on their religious or cultural orientation. Despite the fact that workplace discrimination was practiced against all ethnic minorities in the United States, reports on Arab and Muslim Americans racialization increased to the extent that following 9/11, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) recorded a notable increase in the number of charges of workplace discrimination based on religion and national origin. The majority of these cases have been reported by "individuals who are or are perceived to be Muslim, Arab, South Asian, or Sikh. These charges most commonly allege harassment and discharge" (EEOC *Questions and Answers;* Haddad et al. *Muslim Women* 103).

Employers often deal with veiled Arab or Muslim women suspiciously thinking that their clients or even some employees consider it as unfamiliar or may signal religious fundamentalism. In many workplaces, women are unauthorized to wear *hijab* as part of general regulations against attractive clothing. Paradoxically, these regulations were introduced as a response to the seducing clothes such as miniskirts. In post-9/11, these regulations included clothing that serves the opposite purpose. CAIR strived to expose cases of prejudicial behaviors in the workplace. Cases in which Arab and Muslim Americans are not hired because of the veil, beard or not allowed to advance professionally because of the way they dress are promptly documented, reported, and publicized in the Arab and Muslim-sponsored press and made public over the Internet. In many occasions, CAIR was able to force many companies to apologize, compensate, reinstall and promote workers, and even to undertake anti-discrimination training (Haddad et al. *Muslim Women* 39-40).

Hyath vs. Decatur City, 2002, 2004

Among the different employment discriminatory cases reported by CAIR was the case of Mohamed Hyath vs. City of Decatur, Georgia. Hyath is a Muslim who descends from Mauritius origin. He was hired as a police recruit in April 2002 where he spent weeks of his employment in a training course at the North Central Police Academy in Austell, Georgia. Following his graduation from the police academy, he joined the Decatur police department as a probationary officer in the patrol division. Hyath reported that immediately after joining the police department, he became the object of "constant taunting and harassment" because of his race and religion. His associate officers, realizing that he was a practicing Muslim, perceived him to be an Arab from the Middle East and frequently referred to him by nicknames "Taliban" or

"Al Qaida." More than that, Hyath stated that officers made fun of Muslim dressing and dietary traditions and wondered about not eating pork. Often, these officers asked for a "pork sandwich or hot dog" for their guest; Hyath. In the same context, Hyath noted that Karolyi, who was his field training officer, and often rode with him in the patrol car, was repeatedly asking him whether women they encounter in traditional Muslim dress were his "wife" or "mother" (U.S. District Court, Northern District of GA 2-3; Harrington-Sullivan).

According to the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division, Hyath avowed two incidents of racialization by his co-worker, Hensel, and his chief commander and supervisor, Richards. The first incident took place when Hyath was training in the use of oleoresin capsicum or pepper spray. All new enlisted in police are exposed to pepper spray for seconds. This exposition causes different disturbing reactions. In most cases, while trainees are exposed to pepper, members of the police gather to watch. In July 2002, Hyath received the test in the presence of Hensel, a Decatur police officer, and tens of police members. After being exposed to the spray, Hensel stated, "That's what you get for bombing us you damn Taliban". The second incident involved Richards, Hyath's chief commander and supervisor. Like all other police departments in the United States, the Decatur, from time to time, receives FBI posters of suspected terrorists. After a month of the pepper spray incident, the department received a poster of a Saudi Arabian individual suspected of involvement in the September 11 attacks. Richard mounted a picture of Hyath's face onto the FBI poster, so that the poster depicted Hyath as a most wanted Islamic terrorist. Richards showed the poster to Hyath after passing copies of it to all officers in the roll call room (U.S. District Court, Northern District of GA 3-4; Harrington-Sullivan).

In September 2002, because of fears of reprisal for having filed a harassment lawsuit, Hyath submitted his official resignation from Decatur police department. Thereafter, he filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC claiming that he was subject to a "hostile work environment". Notwithstanding that EEOC did not issue a notice of right to take legal action against the city, Hyath filed a lawsuit in April 2004 asserting his claims against the city for "creating and maintaining a hostile work environment". His claims against the City and individual police members in their individual and official capacities were in accordance with 1981 and 1983 state laws "where various state law theories of recovery, including negligent supervision and retention, and intentional infliction of emotional distress are fully highlighted" (U.S. District Court, Northern District of GA 10).

The lawsuit was rejected by the federal District Court of Georgia. The Court noted that while Hyath sought "relief" pursuant to 1981 and 1983 state laws, he failed to demonstrate that, according to these state laws, the city deprived him of one of his constitutional rights. According to the court's decision, plaintiff must show that "the constitutional deprivation occurred pursuant to a policy or custom of the City" (U.S. District Court, Northern District of GA 11). It added that his claims consisted of allegations of aggressive and offensive statements. The Court noted that

> A hostile work environment generally does not arise from the mere utterance of an epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee. To create a hostile work environment, racial slurs must be so commonplace, overt and denigrating that they create an atmosphere charged with racial hostility (U.S. District Court, Northern District of GA 15; "Muslim Police Officer"; "Muslim Police Trainee").

Even when one assumes that Hyath's claims were genuine, Northern District of

Georgia Court concluded that the accused parsons' statements and actions

> Do not indicate an atmosphere charged with racial hostility. The City's
>
> investigation revealed that, though the statements were inappropriate,
>
> the officers expressed no hostility or ill will towards Hyath. Hyath also
>
> acknowledges that, while he was offended by the statements, they
>
> occurred in the context of persuasive nicknames, joking and teasing
>
> within the Police Department as opposed to an atmosphere charged
>
> with racial hostility (U.S. District Court, Northern District of GA 16).

The Court came to the conclusion that the statements were neither severe nor deemed

as intimidation and threatening actions. More, they did not influence the plaintiff's

performance (See Appendix I).

Noticeably, the pace of Arab and Muslim Americans' racialization in the

workplace did not decrease after many years of September 2001 events. In September

2018, CAIR filed a complaint with the EEOC against Detroit Energy Company (DEC)

in association to Ibrahim Canales case. After joining the company in 2017, Ibrahim

was allowed to attend Friday prayers with working further hours in return. The

situation changed with the coming of a new company manager who did not allow

Ibrahim to move out of the company in Friday despite the fact that, according to

CAIR's complaint "several other non-Muslim employees were allowed to work long

hours during the week and take Fridays off completely" (CAIR MI *Files*). Because of

the toxic work environment and the biased evaluations that affected his pay and

promotion opportunities, Ibrahim left the company and took a new job out of

Michigan (Hicks; "Muslim Worker").

Long after 9/11, Arab and Muslim Americans are still experiencing workplace racialization. On 14 August 2020, and supported by CAIR attorneys, Diamond Powell, 28 years-old American from Baltimore, took legal action against her former employer, McDonald's Franchisee of Lanham, Maryland. After her conversion to Islam and wearing *hijab* in February 2017, Powell became subject to religious teasing. According to the suit allegations, becoming Muslim annoyed Powell's coworkers and managers. While a manager told her to "take that hoodie off", another told her "You don't have to wait for God to wake up for you to pray." In addition to being bullied for her new look, she was prohibited to pray in a calm place and was given a dirty stock room instead. Later, her manager forced her to sacrifice her religious devotion for continuing her employment in McDonalds. Powell resigned, filed a suit against McDonalds for the violation of Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Commenting on the incident, ZainabChaudry, CAIR's director of Maryland office stated that "this disturbing case is a glaring reminder of the challenges that Muslim employees often face within the workplace" ("Muslim Woman").

4.3.2. Racialization at U.S. Schools

As a matter of fact, the challenges adults experienced at work places are shared with children and young adults, particularly in schools and colleges. The climate of fear from Islamic radicalism and the escalation of Islamophobia had negative impacts on Arab and Muslim Americans, including men, women and children inside and outside the educational institutions. Some teachers are indifferent and unaware of racist behaviors among students. In many cases, young Arab Americans' failures and dropping out of school is the result of pupils' psychological deterioration related to

their schools' disinterest and ignorance of their culture, religion, and experiences (Smith 9-10).

Among the different studies on the way young Arab and Muslim Americans are racialized in schools is Marvin Wingfield and Karaman Bushra's "Arab Stereotypes and American Educators" (2002). It highlights accounts of racism against Muslims and Arabs in schools, noting that other minorities were also subject to molestation and harassment. However, teasing the girls who wore the *hijab* is worse compared to other forms of 'discomforting individuals from the racial minorities.' Going beyond the general view that depicts Arabs and Muslims as terrorists, their negative images, mainly the one used in media and popular culture, have affected the way they are perceived in schools. Wingfield and Karaman demonstrate how some educators' biased views infiltrated into the classroom after 9/11 attacks. Some behaviors included making fun of Arab and Muslim names and taking no actions with students who participate in harassing Arab and Muslim students. Additionally, Arab and Islamic-related contents were totally inexistent in the classrooms (135).

In her "Islamophobia in classrooms, media, and politics" (2012), Mayida Zaal referred the experience of two students in a class discussion about 9/11. While some of his students were Muslims, the teacher described everyone who practices Islam as a terrorist. Zaal urged for exchanging the biased and subjective discourse with a fairer, more flexible, and non-judgmental pedagogical strategies. Furthermore, she emphasized the necessity of collaboration between politics and media in the creation of positive perceptions of Arab and Muslim Americans (555). The increasing number of cases of bullying, Islamophobia and other aspects of racialization is related to the unready and unprepared school teachers and the entire educational staff to stand effectively in front of these attitudes and behaviors. In fact, some teachers reacted

ineffectively when some students call their Arab and Muslim classmates terrorists and Bin Laden. They consider these references as a form of joke and teasing and Arab and Muslim students are not supposed to take them seriously. This kind of reaction indicates a total lack of cultural sensitivity and understanding and accordingly saps any effort to encourage and foster respect between inter-racial students and simultaneously, impacts Arab and Muslim students' engagement negatively (Richardson and Wood 179).

Affecting all Arab and Muslim communities and their way of life, 9/11 and its aftermath resulted in a complicated relationship between teachers and Arab/Muslim students. Some teachers had directly displayed their own personal views about the Islam as a faith, Arabs as a race, and Arabic/Islamic culture and community as a whole. Noticeably, those teachers intended to exclude any information related to the immense contributions of Arabs and Muslims in the rise of western academia and sciences and the long-established history of Islamic civilization. This strategy participates in depreciating the students' academic performance and damping their mental status. Unintentionally, other teachers' disinterest in studying cultures of other racial groups takes part in widening the academic and cultural gap between teachers and students (Niyozov and Pluim 641).

In his articles "Negotiating Muslim Youth Identity in a post 9/11 World" (2011), Tindongan explained how young Muslim and Arab Americans struggle with their identities. Arabs and Muslims had been disconnected from the American mainstream culture and society and after 9/11, the rift became wider and "children were caught in the middle of it." He argued that the youth's cultural and social collision of their American and Arab/Muslim identities results in a shaken character and becoming neither Arab and Muslim because of the negative American stereotypes

or because they are not Muslim "enough" nor Americans because culturally and ideologically they are not American enough (82-83). One of the arguments presented is the necessity that American schools should act as institutions that provide education about social interactions and building relationships regardless of the racial, cultural, and religious differences. Educators, according to Tindongan, are supposed to be teaching to engage the perspectives of Muslims, so they can build a peaceful coexisting community. He concluded with a recommendation that stresses the social climate of schools that score high levels of bullying and racialization cases (85).

Based on a study that examined the peer relationships of 748 fifth grade students of different ethnic groups both at one month and eight months post-9/11, diverse forms of ethnic tensions were omnipresent. Hundreds of students were asked about the more and least liked students in their schools (DeRosier 6). The study came to the conclusion that students who descend from Muslim, Arab, and Hispanic origins were the least liked and the most bullied. The conclusion of this study advocated an urgent need for dynamic school-based programs to enhance tolerance between interracial students (DeRosier 15).

As a reaction to different racialization scenes against Arab and Muslim students post-9/11, different studies on education called for greater accountability and for new and daring voices from educators and not being hesitant to take actions that challenge the unfairness that continues to prevail and affects all minor ethnic groups. Educators should assume the responsibility of defying and unveiling racialization and inequitable system starting from the government's policies, school's curriculum, and textbooks that failed in creating and providing opportunities to engage students and indoctrinate respect, thoroughness, justice, and equality.

On its most recent report over the analysis and evaluation of the current school climate for American Muslims in Texas, CAIR warned about the increasing number of incidents related to bullying and the discomfort Muslim students feel in schools. This report came to the conclusion that 48% of Muslim students experienced some type of bullying that is varied between verbal insults, physical attacks, and online bullying because of their religion. These statistics, according to CAIR's report, are almost double the national statistics. In addition to this, 1 out of 4 students felt that they were not welcomed in their schools and 44% preferred not to engage in classroom discussions over Islam and Muslims (CAIR *Singled Out* 6). One of the report's findings is the increase in targeting Muslim students wearing *hijab*. Nearly 1 out of 7 veiled students reported "having their hijab tugged, pulled or other forms of offensive touching," and 1 out of 6 students were racialized by their "teachers, administrators, and other officials" (7).

A 2020 study over school principals' racialization on Muslims in schools, a research crew sent emails to about 5000 public school principals nationwide. In an illusionary way, these emails were sent by a family interested in sending their child to the principal's school and asked principals for a meeting. The religion of each family included a random selection of Muslims, Christians, Catholics, and so on. To stress on the families' religious orientations, the emails included expectations of support and compatibility of the school with the family's religious beliefs. This study came to the conclusion that the majority of Muslim families received no reply and the majority of schools' principals who replied were less likely to arrange meetings with Muslim families. Furthermore, they concluded that be it in rural or urban areas, systematic racialization against Muslim Americans is widespread (Pfaff et al. 1-10).

4.3.3. Racializing Arab and Muslim Women: Realities and Challenges

Before delving into investigating the status of Arab and Muslim women in the United States post-9/11 one must turn back to draw clear lines between being Arab and being Muslim. It is important to note that Arabs and Muslims are not as homogeneous as they are perceived in the American media and public consciousness. As it was noted before, while the majority of Arab Americans are not Muslims, the majority of Muslim Americans are not Arabs. However, Arabs and Muslims share common historical and cultural bonds through the religion of Islam. They share the same negative stereotypes; both are characterized by mainstream Americans as violent, war-like people who aim at expanding Islam at any cost. Worse, the actions of few numbers of radical extremists affected the perception of peace-loving majority. Following 9/11, misconceptions and inaccurate reporting of mainstream Media played a significant role in worsening their images.

Similar to men and school students, Arab and Muslim women are subject to regular forms of racialization and negative stereotypes at all levels. In fact, Muslim women who wear headscarves (veiled) suffer from the lack of proper representation mainly in educational settings. Educators are disinterested in understanding the historical background and the reasons behind being their veiled and knowledge regarding Islamic perception of gender. These experiences include non-violent discriminatory attitudes such as unpleasant looks and verbal abuse; calling them wives of terrorists and social isolationists (Livengood and Stodolska 192). For many Americans, those methods of discrimination and negative stereotypes are not seen as violent. However, these behaviors, even non-violent, had negative psychological effects on Arab and Muslim women and limit their engagements in schools, neighborhoods, and the community as a whole (Livengood and Stodolska 199).

Karima, a veiled Pakistani young woman with an excellent academic record, reported feeling that the entire academic environment including teachers discarded her academic ambitions based on the prevailed ideology that education for Muslim women is worthless. The unhelpfulness and non-cooperation of the guidance counselor stood against Karima's attempts to be graduated from high school in three years instead of four. She was later told by the counselor himself that "she surprised him" with her persistence and firmness in spite of being a female Muslim. Moreover, Karima's academic environment was not supportive when she took the decision of taking math and science courses; rather she was guided towards "general, non-academic tracks." Similar to her, many Muslim students were recommended to the non-collegiate tracks despite their academic achievement or place in ESL (English as a Second Language) classes in spite of their knowledge and mastery of English (Bonet 50).

Many reports and studies indicated that after 9/11 Muslim women in high schools and higher education were subject to verbal abuses from teachers and classmates. Because their clothes are unusually different from western women, Arab and Muslim women are hypervisible in the American society. The veil, considered as symbol of protection and part of every Muslim woman's religious responsibility, became the target of extremely negative criticism and different forms of violence. Wearing *hijab* is considered as a crime and thus, veiled women were excluded from public settings, bashed, received disdainful remarks, and being spat in the face (ADC *Report on Hate Crimes* 48-54; Chapman). The so called 'non-violent racialization' ranges from statements as "Are you bald?" and "Do you have a head injury?" to asking them to remove their *hijab* or go home (Bonet 50).

ADC's *Report on Hate Crimes and Discrimination against Arab Americans from 2003 to 2007*(2008) discussed the way in which people were criminalizing and disgracing veiled Muslim female students. They recited experiences of being treated harshly and how being veiled is perceived as a marker of terrorism and other cunning forms of prejudice. Veil as a discriminatory marker became a hindrance that hampers any forms of interaction with other students. Many Americans think that the overwhelming majority of veiled Muslim women wore the veil as a result of family and particularly parental oppression. While western women consider themselves as free and "in charge of their destiny", they see Muslim women as persecuted, passive, and depressed (15-16).

According to Sally Bonet's "Educating Muslim American Youth in a Post-9/11 era: A critical Review of Policy and Practice" (2011), many Arab and Muslim students felt that teachers had lower academic expectations of them compared to other students from other races and faiths. Worse, some Arab and Muslim students were discouraged to attend colleges and universities based on the notion that Arabs and Muslims consider higher education as a secondary concern and women do not have the right to be equally educated as men (50). Although 9/11 attacks had been fully discussed, Arab and Muslim women did not take a worthy part in the discussion. Research on topics related to their home management and the growing of their children covered other important topics as how they were racialized, oppressed, unfairly treated, and other challenges the face.

According to Jasmin Zine in "Unveiled Sentiments: Gendered Islamophobia and Experiences of Veiling among Muslim Girls (2006), the discourse is historically based on Orientalist representations of Muslim women who are portrayed as backward and oppressed victims (224). Haddad et al. in *Muslim Women in America*(2006) went

further to argue that these representations of 'subjugated' Muslim women are closely tied to the familiar portrayal of the violent nature of the religion of Islam and its adherents. These stereotypes of Islam as a women-oppressing religion have been frequently used in post-9/11 American security strategy to mobilize support for the United States' imperialist plans abroad. They demonstrated that the regrettable effects of these wrong and stereotypical concepts of Islam have been misconception and prejudice. The latter is reflected through making life more difficult for Muslim women who must fight on two fronts; confronting anti-Islamic hatred and challenging the notion that Islam oppresses women (3).

Haddad et al. affirmed that Americans perceive the veil as a symbol of cultural and ideological difference and simultaneously a danger to the prevailing perceptions of secularism. These notions placed the Muslim female's covered body into the framework of the clash of civilizations between the Islamic regressing world and western progressing one. This symbolism (liberating Muslim women from their male oppressors) was used to justify wars overseas. Among the justification used to involve the militarily in Afghanistan, Bush and the neoconservatives stated that the military campaign aims at, among many aims, saving women from the tyrannical use of power by the Taliban *sharia*-based regime (23). In February 2005, Marine Corps Lt. Gen. James Mattis expressed his joys when many Afghani women were liberated: "You go into Afghanistan, you got guys who slap women around for five years because they didn't wear a veil. You know, guys like that ain't got no manhood left anyway. So it's a hell of a lot of fun to shoot them" (qtd. in Graham 94). Surprisingly, while Taliban were supported logistically and militarily and were perceived as freedom fighters during their war against the Soviets, they were described as terrorists and nest of terrorism post-9/11. This highlights how the discourse on Islam and its 'violent

teachings' is used selectively, specifically at times when administrations need to mobilize support for wars.

In addition to schools, universities and other public settings, veiled Arab and Muslim women suffered from racialization in airports. One month following 9/11 and in a flight from New York City to Minneapolis, three Arab American women were not allowed to board because airline staff had figured out that they were noiselessly praying before flying and were concerned on hearing one of them uttering the word "Allah."In November 2001, a young Muslim American woman was asked to take off her veil after passing through an airport metal detector as well as a manual detector along her body without any signal. Later, she was escorted to a private room where airport security crew (composed of females) conducted a full body search throughout running their fingers through her hair (Ghazali 65).

As a reaction to the view that the *hijab* is symbol of subjugation, Muslim women have used the veil to resist Euro-centric and American norms, the depiction of women's bodies as objects, and a protection from unwanted gazes. According to Haddad et al., *hijab*, from the Islamic perspectives, is a way to maintain modesty (22). It is, in fact, considered as a liberatory practice and a space where Arab and Muslim women can proclaim their identities and openly practice their faith. To change the negative image, Arab and Muslim Americans started a campaign to engage the American public. Wives of Arab ambassadors to the U.S. led this initiative. They reacted through press declarations and the publication of detailed information believing that this would end misconceptions. Nuha al-Hegelan, wife of the Saudi Ambassador to the United States in the early 1980s, told a group of high school social studies teachers that "the veil has always been more than a piece of cloth." She wondered about the way in which the veil was given a specific meaning in the

American context. Nuha took off her Yves St. Laurent shawl from her shoulders and put it on her head and said: "When this designer scarf rests on my shoulders, you see it as stylish and fashionable, when I cover my hair with it you see it as a symbol of my oppression" (qtd. in Haddad "Post 9/11 Hijab" 161-162).

After joining the National Organization for Women (NOW), Arab American women thought that the real test of this organization's commitment to Arab women came following the invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Supposed to defend oppressed women worldwide, the organization's refusal to condemn the war disappointed its Arab American affiliates. The death of over 20,000 Lebanese and Palestinian innocent civilians, including women and children, were of no interest to NOW. Haddad asked the question: Did they not think that Arabs and Muslim women were human? Or did they not hear their cry of agony? ("Post 9/11 Hijab" 262). Because they are veiled by the stereotypes implanted in their minds, American feminists were neither able to appreciate Muslim feminists nor to come closer to them. American feminists did not even try to read about Muslims' culture and way of life:

> This attitude has already resulted in western feminists silencing
> Muslim/Arab American women, not through coercion, but rather by
> their astounding inability to hear us regardless of how loudly we
> protest. And that inability to hear is not the result of a cultural gap!
> Some of us were right here, in the forefront of U.S. women's
> movement in the 1960s! Oh yes; you may not have noticed, but many
> of us are U.S. feminists. We are part of you. We live among you, and
> we have invisibly struggled by your sides for decades (Al-Hibri 161).

The silence of American women whenever the concerned are Arab and Muslim women could be interpreted as a collaboration which affirms the notion of the universality and supremacy of American culture and the urgent need to spread it over the world. This discourse is not associated to September attacks but dates back to early historical encounters between Europeans and Muslims where dichotomies of *us* and *them*, East and West, and regressive and progressive were used to denote the cultural difference between the two civilizations.

4.4. Muslim Americans and Airport Security post-9/11

4.4.1. Creation of the Transportation and Security Administration (TSA)

For the sake of better understanding the controversy of Arab American identity and citizenship in U.S. airports, one might initially examine the new security measures introduced by the Transportation and Security Administration (TSA) post-9/11. The TSA was created by the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, which Congress passed following the attacks. The newly created agency shortly became an important branch of the DHS. Without any warning, airport security moved from being a privatized sector before 9/11 to a federalized program (Thomas 11-12). The title of the article of Roger Roots "Terrorized into Absurdity: The Creation of the Transportation Security Administration" (2003) alone speaks for post-9/11 frenzied attitudes. Roots expand: Nationalizing the nation's 28,000 airport screeners resulted in a newly established agency with more personnel than the Department of Labor (DOL) and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) all together. The spokesman of the Department of Transportation (DOT) estimated that to fully screen passengers and their luggage, the agency would need more than 70,000 employees. Few months following the establishment of TSA, Congress approved funding for at least 45,000

screeners but the agency's officials insisted that they needed thousand more. Few months after its creation, TSA personnel surpassed the ones of Social Security Administration (some 65,000). Few years later, they surpassed the personnel of the legislative and judicial branches of the federal government combined(504). TSA is positioned amongst the largest governmental agencies since the 1930s that was created for the aim of enhancing airport security and preventing further terrorist attack

Preventing dangerous objects from entering airports or airplanes through the effectuation of a strict screening of all passengers and their luggage is one of TSA priorities. Before 9/11, checking passengers and their possessions was done private security companies. Following 9/11, the TSA assumed this responsibility and mobilized tens of thousands of screeners to accomplish the mission. Moreover, screening as a practice moved from being limited to become full and common. Among the strategies used to curtail terrorism and terrorist-like activities, TSA utilized random checks as well. TSA strategy includes random checks at two main posts: the security checkpoint and in the airport terminal gate. However, passengers might be required to go through additional searches; some passengers are also subjected to inspection at the boarding gate where their bodies are inspected with a hand-held x-ray scanner, they may experience another check, or have their belongings searched again (U.S. Senate *The Transportation Security*). Usually, Passengers who are selected randomly for searches report feeling of unfairly targeted because of religious markers or ethnic identity (Bonikowski 317).

Additionally, TSA developed a Behavioral Detection Officer program (BDO). Agents are well trained to conduct investigations to identify passengers who show menacing and doubtful behaviors. Screening Passengers through Observational Techniques (SPOT) is one of TSA main techniques in which agents are trained to

detect behaviors that may associate or indicate terrorist-like activity. SPOT targets travel patterns, the way tickets were purchased, and passengers' travel destination. In addition to behaviors, Agents are well trained to be careful of passengers' reactions and facial expressions; fear, hurry, contemplation are deemed as abnormal. Suspects are subject to a series of questions over aims and plans of their travel. If answers stirred up the agent's suspicion, he reacts through sharing the suspects' information with various internal organizations, such as the Office of Intelligence and the Office of Law Enforcement Federal Air Marshal Service. The suspect's information may also be shared with local law enforcement. Presently, SPOT is applied in more than 150 airports in the United States (Meyer 310). Again, the title of Deborah L. Meyer's article is eloquent in depicting racialization; "The Spot Program: Hello Racial Profiling, Goodbye Fourth Amendment?"

In addition to SPOT, TSA uses technology to identify suspects in airports. As affiliates to the FBI's Terrorist Screening Center, TSA agents are authorized to retrieve data from the government's terrorist watch list. This watch list is used to determine who should undertake extra inspection or forbidden to fly. Suspects' testimonies indicated that any individual whose name resembles a watch list name would be subject to further scrutiny and examination. In June 2007, TSA adapted a new technology. Travel document checker tool began to be used at security checkpoints. This tool allows agents to identify false and expired travel documents. Passengers with expired documents are forced to further inspection by airport security. In case of finding false identification, passengers are reported to local authorities. Nowadays, more new technological tools are still developed and tested at airports including advanced scans and x-ray detectors for the sake of detecting dangerous products used for producing explosives (chemical and non-chemical products and

substances), biometrics (the use of retinal scans and fingerprints), and Cast Scopes (technology that scans passengers' casts and prosthetics) (TSA *Security Screening;* GAO 1).

4.4.2. FlyingWhileArab

The discussion of differential racialization drives one to analyze the way in which African Americans, Hispanics, and recently Arab Americans shared parallel experiences of racialization. While historical discussions on racializing African Americans spot the light on "Driving While Black", post-9/11 racial discourse regenerated the Afro-American experience through referring to the Arab American model as "Flying While Arab". This phrase epitomizes the convergence of two forms of racialization: the unprecedented level of surveillance and inspection in U.S. airports and the perpetuation of a discourse that portrays all Arabs and Muslims as devoted terrorists.

The campaign known as the 'war on drugs' that was launched in the 1970s intensified control and surveillance against African Americans and all black people in the United States for decades. 'Driving While Black' defined the process of highway stops that is considered as one of the strategies used to biologically (skin color) racialize black Americans. According to Tindongan, Blacks were subject to frequent stops twice compared to whites while driving vehicles notwithstanding that both were equally speeding.

Post-9/11 sociopolitical climate indicates that Arab Americans' use of airport is a risky practice and may cost humiliation, detention, and most of the time deportation. The new American security strategy focused on the necessity of looking for scapegoats to blame for all sorts of danger that threaten the United States homeland security, terrorism outstanding (81). This strategy was reflected through the

split of the American society into two models. The good citizen who abides by and adheres to certain normative standards and the bad citizen who is portrayed as the monstrous *Other* who does not fit within the American imagined profile.

9/11 was not the starting point in the history of racialization against Arabs and Muslims in U.S. airports. In May 1986, days after the American bombardment of Libya following the country's alleged involvement in a Berlin bombing attack, an Arab American woman was taken out of a Delta flight because she was reading a book that tackles the Palestinian issue. She was informed that someone (a passenger) expressed his concerns about the title of the book. Moments later, the airline representative told her that the subject's hypersensitivity requires from her to leave it off (McCarus 172). Regardless of the differences between circumstances surrounding the bombardment of Berlin and September 11 attacks, Arab and Muslim Americans suffered from the increasing levels of inspection and screening whenever the United States engaged in conflicts with Arab actors via Arab-Israeli conflicts and when it was directly attacked in 2001. Never perceived as forms of racialization, the DOJ considered these 'efforts' made by civilian passengers and transportation companies as practical endeavors to maintain people and airports' security.

Among the features of racializing Arab Americans in airports is that Airline companies allowed passengers and flight crews to determine whom they feel comfortable/uncomfortable to fly with on board (Ahmad 104). Post-9/11 political climate shaped the standards used by passengers and crew members to report suspicious people and activities in planes. These standards were related to cultural and religious markers as *hijab*, beards, and prayers as well as Arabic language which is widely known via the use of certain terms as Allah and Mohammed. Images of airport security agents searching laptops, baggage, and stripping off people's clothes,

shoes, and belts became an everyday routine in American airports. While hundreds of racialization cases were reported to civil rights groups and Arab and Muslim organizations in the United States, many racialized people preferred not to report due to fears of detention and deportation. Reports of airport-related mistreatment varied and included unjustified detention, strip searches, the use of handcuffs, people shackled in chairs, and the cancellation of tickets without compensation. Furthermore, insulting treatments and interrogations about people's religious affiliation, racial belonging, and political beliefs became common practice.

A 2002 Human Rights Report indicated that after receiving a huge number of religious and ethnic-based complaints and reports over backlash incidents, DOT and EEOC tried to track these forms of racialization against Arabs, Muslims, and other darker skinned people. These efforts did not end the Arab and Muslim plight in American airports (15). In fact, 'Flying while Arab' and other related airport experiences have been well documented since September attacks. Two decades after the attacks, Arabs and Muslims have come to realize that the pace of racialization in airports did not lessen.

The widespread hegemonic discourse that portrays Arabs and Muslims as terrorists resulted in increasing the climate of fear and hostility in U.S. airports. Passing all screening procedures and checkpoints was not enough for many people to fly. Arabs, Muslims, and people look-like needed the approval of other passengers and plane crews. Ten days after 9/11, three Arab Americans from Utah were expelled from a Northwest aircraft after extensive scrutiny and boarding for the reason that some passengers refused to fly with Arabs. Northwest justified the action through stating that government security measures recommended "re-accommodating"

passengers whose actions and even presence make other passengers inconvenient (*Associated Press* "Arab-Americans").

Vahid Zahrehvandi's case is not different from the three Utah Muslim Americans' case. After boarding the flight from Seattle to Dallas, Vahid, a software developer from Iranian origins, was reading his paper when an airline agent asked him to carry his luggage and leave the plane. Vahid was interrogated by three security agents about subjects related to his workplace, social status, religious affiliation, and address and phone number. According to him, when he asked about the reasons behind driving him out of the plane and investigation, he was told that "the pilot does not feel comfortable flying" and "does not like how you look" (U.S. Congress *Profiling for Public* 7; CNN "Airline, Passengers").

The case of Raed Jarrar illustrates the way in which people were accused of being terrorists with no justified reasons. in his JetBlue flight from John F. Kennedy International Airport to Oakland, California, where he lived at that time, Jarrar, an Arab American of Iraqi origins, was not allowed to board on the basis he was wearing a T-shirt which reads, in Arabic and English, "We will not be silent." some passengers, security guards, and TSA official (identified later as Inspector Harris) asked Jarrar to cover up his T-shirt. According to the Jarrar's complaint against JetBlue, Inspector Harris states that going to an airport with a T-shirt in Arabic script is "like wearing a T-shirt that reads 'I am a robber' and going to a bank" (ADC *Report on Hate* 16; Thomas 118). Based on Jarrar's request, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and its New York wing filed a federal civil rights lawsuit against a TSA official (inspector Harris) and JetBlue Airways charging them of racialization. According to the ADC report:

It is a dangerous and slippery slope when we allow our government to take away a person's rights because of his speech or ethnic background," said Reginald Shuford, a senior staff attorney with the ACLU's Racial Justice Program. "Racial profiling is illegal and ineffective and has no place in a democratic society." "It was clear that Mr. Jarrar was not a security threat and was singled out solely because of his ethnicity and the constitutionally protected speech on his T-shirt," said Aden Fine, an ACLU senior staff attorney who represents Jarrar. "Rather than censor Raed, the TSA official and Jet Blue should have assured any uncomfortable passengers that there was absolutely no public safety or security risk. We hope this case sends the message to TSA officials and to airlines that they cannot discriminate against passengers because of their race or the content of their speech (16).

Post-9/11 hostile attitudes in airports included Arab and Muslim American employees in different airline companies. Aziz Baroody, a Christian American pilot in Bank Air private company was subject to persistent investigation that included the polygraph test days following the September attacks. After being downgraded, Baroody was fired. Similar to Baroody's case and despite his excellent conduct and career as a pilot, Muhammad Hussein, a Muslim from Fiji was fired from Trans States Airlines Company in Missouri (EEOC *Muslim Pilot*). EEOC brought a law case against Trans States Airlines on the basis that firing Mohammed Hussein is a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Later, Circuit Judges of United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri argued that they were not persuaded that Hussein and ACLU arguments are based on evidence sufficient to support

intentional discrimination (U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Missouri 1) (See Appendix II).

United States of America vs. Arwah J. Jaber, 2007

In June 2005, Arwah Jaber and his wife Dawn, two researchers on Chemistry and Geography at the University of Arkansas, attempted to travel from the U.S. to the Netherlands, and later to Jordan. While Arwah planned to visit his family in Jenin, Palestine, the program of Dawn included the conduct of research for her MA thesis. Waiting for their turn to board the plane, two FBI agents drove Arwah and Dawn away from the line to a separate interrogation room. Dawn was interrogated about the reasons behind Arwah's travel not from Arkansas to Amsterdam but from Amsterdam to Jordan. Never thinking that Palestine is a symbol of hostility and a hypersensitive subject in the American context, Dawn spontaneously answered that after landing in Jordan, they will travel by car to Palestine, Arwah's homeland. After being investigated, Arwah was handcuffed and sent to detention (Otten 26).

The story of Arwah began on May 11, 2005 after sending emails to his PhD academic supervisor, Dr. Charles Wilkins, and to the University of Arkansas Associate Dean of the Graduate School, Dr. Pat Koski, informing them that he is planning for a travel to Palestine to become a member of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and "fight against Israel." While Dr. Koski declared in the court that she was not concerned about Arwah's mail because the majority of students "tend to be dramatic", Dr. Wilkins, Arwah Supervisor, forwarded a copy of the email to the FBI. After granting a search warrant, FBI agents entered Arwah's house and confiscated his laptop, a few credit cards, a social security card, and other electronic equipment. FBI's Computer Analysis Response Team (CART) found slogans of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) on Arwah's laptop and a few epic songs in Arabic that praise martyrdom,

jihad, holy war in Fallujah, and 9/11 bombers (Otten 27). In June 2006, the U.S. Western District Court of Arkansas counted six charges against Arwah:

a) Attempting to Provide Material Support to a Foreign Terrorist Organization;

b) Use of False Social Security Number;

c) False Statement on a Naturalization Application;

d) False Statement on a Passport Application;

e) Use of False Social Security Number;

f) Procurement of Naturalization Unlawfully (U.S. District Court, Western District of Arkansas 4) (See Appendix III).

The evidence given by the prosecution to convict Arwah of "providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization" was not built on firm grounds. The prosecutors failed to prove that Arwah took practical actions to join the PIJ. The court's decision was built upon the emails that were sent to Arwah's advisors as well as the slogans and songs on his computer with a conclusion that a man with such attitudes, words, and psychology is a potential threat to America's homeland security. Depending on the testimonies and expertise of Christopher Hamilton, a former FBI agent and expert witness on PIJ, who declared that Islamic Jihadi groups in Palestine use TriAcetoneTriPercoxide (TATP) as an explosive substance for making their bombs, prosecutors argued that Arwah manufactured a small quantity of this substance for the University of Arkansas Chemistry Lab and he seeks to use his knowledge for making bombs in Palestine (Otten 30). On November 16, 2006, nearly two years after Arwah's initial arrest at the airport, he was sentenced to 15 months in a federal prison with revoking his citizenship and deportation after release (Otten 46).

The National Security Division's International Terrorism and Terrorism-
Related Statistics Chart (ITTRSC) listed the case of Arwah Jaber as a first category:

> Category I cases involve violations of federal statutes that are
> directly related to international terrorism and that are utilized
> regularly in international terrorism matters. These statutes prohibit,
> for example, terrorist acts abroad against United States nationals, the
> use of weapons of mass destruction, conspiracy to murder persons
> overseas, providing material support to terrorists or foreign terrorist
> organizations, receiving military style training from foreign terrorist
> organizations, and bombings of public places or government
> facilities (DOJ *Introduction to National Security* 1).

The increasing number of judicial lawsuits of racialization against Arab and
Muslim Americans in U.S. airports did not stop this practice. Many years following
9/11 events, stories of Arab and Muslim Americans escorted off, multiply checked,
and perceived as potential danger became ordinary routine. In July 2007, *BBC News*
reported that a Pew Research Center's survey indicates that nearly half of Muslims in
the U.S. said that they have experienced discrimination in 2016 (BBC "US Muslims").
Pew research that surveyed more than 1000 Muslim Americans came to the
conclusion that 74% of the people targeted stated that President Donald Trump is not
friendly with them (Diamant).

The most recent case of airport hate incidents against Arab Americans is of an
Arab American Muslim political activist and the first Muslim woman to run in New
Jersey for a seat in the U.S. Congress. In October 2020, after boarding, Amani Al-
Khatahtbeh was arrested, handcuffed, and taken off plane at Newark airport, New
Jersey. The incident started when a man crossed the line going through airport security

to the domestic flight before Amani's turn. This stimulated a running debate and altercation between Amani and this passenger. An airport security agent told her that many passengers along with the plane crew are not "comfortable" and they do not want to fly with her. After taken into custody by the airport authority, Amani was finally released. Later, Amani was charged with delaying transportation and defiant trespass for refusing persistent orders to disembark. Commenting on this incident, CAIR's national executive director, Nihad Awad, declared that "the airline must immediately explain why it singled out Amani by contacting the police and ejecting her from a flight based on the word of a man who had allegedly harassed her" (Tracy; Coffey; Comstock). The most recent case of Amani Al-Khatahtbeh indicates that after two decades of 9/11, racialization of Arab/Muslim Americans is still persevering in the United States.

Conclusion

This chapter investigated the conceptualization of Islamic terrorism and the way it was associated to Arab Americans and the interchangeable use of Arab American/Muslim American and Arab/Muslim. It covers the escalation of Arab Americans' racialization, the way it was accepted by the public as an ordinary reaction to Islamophobia, and its legitimation by the government. It also examined the significant attempts to reconfigure a new image of Arabs and Muslims in the United States. It showed that the efforts of the different Arab American organizations and other moderate voices, such as the Ads Council's "I am an American" and CAIR's "I am a Muslim American" campaigns, were not successful in changing the negative stereotypes and misconceptions created post-September 2001.

In addition to highlighting the citizen/terrorist paradigm, this chapter stressed the collaborate work of government, media, and general public to convict Arab Muslim Americans and perpetuate images that portrays Islam as synonymous to terrorism. Unveiling racialization of Arab Americans post-9/11 necessitated a deep scrutiny of the way in which males, females, and even children were racialized in workplaces, schools, airports, and other public spaces. The lawsuits of Mohammad Hyath, Mohammad Hussein, and Arwah Jaber are among thousands of cases in which the government showed no reaction to the systematic racialization of Arab and Muslim Americans; instead, it intensified it through post-9/11 legislations, policies and counterterrorism programs.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

Racialization is not as much studied as racism; however, it is as old as the history of United States. It manifests through different discriminatory and racist attitudes that scapegoat and *other* minority ethnic groups. Two decades after 9/11, Arab Americans, the last in a long list of racialized ethnic groups, are still subject to systematic racialization.

After scrutiny of the process of racialization, this research work ends up in a number of conclusions. First, racialization of Arab Americans, although never overt and violent as post-9/11, manifests through misconceptions and stereotypes.While first wave Arab immigrants are perceived as barbarians, backward, villains, and culturally inferior, post-9/11 Arab/Muslim Americans are tagged with radicalism and terrorism. In addition to orientalist stereotypes, political issues such as Arab-Israeli wars, the Suez Crisis, and the Hostages Crisis played an important role in racializing Arab Americans. Government and public side-taking with Israel and anti-Arab American foreign policy resulted in dire consequences on Arab/Muslim Americans who came to be perceived as terrorists with a crisis-associated troubled identity. Such views generated particular racial meanings that influence daily interactions of Arab Americans with mainstream American society. Government policies and public attitudes provide a 'permission to hate' perception, which oftentimes unfolds through different forms of racialization.

Second, this research comes to the conclusion that racialization, i.e.: racial categorization of Arab Americans is neither biological/genetic nor skin-color construct. Although early Arab American immigrants took a similar approach as

European immigrants and actively appealed and sued for incorporation in the racial hierarchy as white, it took them decades of struggles and debates to enter the 'whiteness circles'. In this matter, the research finds out that even belonging to the white Semitic race was not fully convincing to consider Arab Americans as white and equal to Americans. Their religious beliefs and cultural orientations stood as a hindrance in the face of their assimilation and acculturation.

Third, the research concludes that the post-9/11 sociopolitical climate that represented Arab Americans through new American security strategies took the locus of racialization to further dimensions. Stereotypes and misconceptions generated more direct and violent forms of racialization. Furthermore, the introduction of a series of legislations restricted civil liberties and individual liberties. The PATRIOT act of 2001, although it never referred to any ethnic group specifically, authorized surveillance and unjustified arrests which contradict many provisions of the U.S. Constitution. Worse, because of the identity of the 9/11 attackers, the act served to target and therefore further racialize Arab Americans.

More, the analyses in chapters I and IV show that the image of Arab Americans shifted from being perceived as barbaric, lascivious, and stupid to being terrorists, bombers, and radical fundamentalists. The perception of the veil (*hijab*), once accepted as an impediment to seduction and temptation, moved to become a menace and a cover up of terrorists' wives identities. While images of fancy palaces, sandy deserts, and oases turned into wreckage, ruin, and smell of death, portraits of the *East* as an exotic and imaginative part of the world were substituted by images of the area as a safe haven for terrorism. Post-9/11 Arab Americans' hypervisibity brought more sufferance and impacted the image of the *East* and Middle Easterners negatively.

This research argues that post-9/11 ethnic, social, and political climates provide a unique framework to gain insights into the processes of racialization in the United States. It concludes that, in addition to the media-created and regenerated stereotypes, government legislations play a major role in the perpetuation of Arab Americans' racialization. The collaboration between the media, the government, and the general public facilitate and legitimate the process. The perceived images of a racialized group determine who is entitled to Americanness and who is not. The depiction and representation of Arab/Muslim Americans as terrorists produce distorted political and public views. These views are overwhelmed by the ones that exalt American domestic and foreign policies to counter terrorism and praise the government for keeping the nation safe from all forms of threats, including Arab and Islamic terrorism.

This work unveils the role of the American media in Arab Americans' racialization in times of crises. During the first decade following 9/11, the stereotypical representation of Arab American characters increased in the mainstream media. Simultaneously, sympathetic portrayals that aimed at humanizing and acquitting Arab Americans decreased. It concludes that attempts at counterbalancing the stereotypical negative representations of Arabs/Muslims failed because the portraits of Arab Americans that were overloaded guilt overshadowed those that depicted their scapegoating and innocence.

The new geopolitical realities have a direct impact on cultural representations and discourses related to Muslim/Arab Americans in post-9/11 social and political climate. This research shows that perceptions of Islam moved from being solely the subject of Orientalism preceding the September attacks to become the main contemporary dilemma and threat the United States faces. The American media turned

the coverage of Islam, Islamic world, and Muslims from the category of 'ordinary news' into the one of 'breaking news.' Thus, the American perception of Islam moved away from its traditional theological context. What was perceived for centuries as one of the monotheistic religions became seen as a political movement that aims at spreading international *Jihad* through the use of violence and terrorism. According to Americans, this situation urges a reaction of global reach. Hence, the neoconservatives in the American government viewed the 'war on terror' as the most suitable policy to counter 'Islamic terrorism.' Analysis of American perceptions of Islam and counterterrorism security strategies led to the conclusion that post-9/11 accelerated the racialization pace of Arab Americans.

The American public was overwhelmed with contents and messages of media and government officials, particularly President George W. Bush utterances, which regenerated and intensified the old discourse of the *self* and the *other* and *us* and *them*. This research argues that the correlation of these discourses with the cooperation between the American government and the public at large resulted in legitimizing racialization. Hence, it concludes that all public spaces (workplaces, airports, schools, restaurants, neighborhoods, and public transportation) became the least-safe areas for Arab Americans and therefore nests for racialization. In workplaces, the case of *Hyath vs. City of Decatur* shows that racialization was not officially incriminated. The U.S. District Court of Georgia viewed the prejudiced attitudes of the defendants as just good-natured fun. In airports, Arab Americans became subject to a new form of surveillance. 'Flying while Arab' became widely used to indicate the harsh measures used for screening and profiling Arab Americans. Traveling in planes became risky and resulted in humiliation, at best, and detentions and deportations.

America's security strategy, namely the 'war on terror', media's day-to-day coverage of news related to terrorism, and the redeployment of old oriental stereotypes resulted in long-lasting profiling and racialization processes. This work shows that the process of racialization intensifies in wartimes and continues in peacetimes. The course of events shows that the portrayal of Arab Americans as members of an out-group has increased since 9/11. Consequently, Arab Americans portrayals as victims and members of an in-group have decreased. The American government used these representations to minimize domestic concerns about civil and individual rights. This research draws the conclusion that instead of incriminating racialization, the government blames Arab Americans for the entire problems facing the United States.

In order to ease pressures on Arab/Muslim Americans, activist organizations launched some campaigns. While the Ad Council's "I am an American" deploys ideas of the necessity of preserving the multicultural, multiracial, and multireligious nature of the United States, CAIR's "I am an American Muslim" aims at reminding all Americans that Muslims, be they Arabs or not, represent an indivisible part of American mainstream society. After analysis of the two campaigns, this research concludes that the both had no impact on public opinion and the image of Arab/Muslim Americans terrorist perseveres.

On a different level, analysis proves a correlation between the suggested theories and the research findings. In the light of the cultivation theory, this research comes to the conclusion that American media played a major role in sustaining and redeploying old stereotypes about Arabs/Muslims. This situation created a climate of fear, accelerated racialization, and widened the gap between Arab Americans and other Americans. In wartimes and political crises, particularly issues related to the

Middle East, the American media portrays Arabs as terrorist, radical, and anti-democratic. The incrustation of the image of the Arab terrorist in American public consciousness facilitated official-public counterterrorism coordination. Despite criticism and opposition, FBI hotlines and "See Something, Say Something" maintained that image unaltered; therefore this proves the accuracy of the theory in relation to Arab Americans.

Taking into consideration the differential racialization theory, the research shows that in association with certain historical events, particular ethnic and religious groups become highly visible. The locus of hypervisibility changes along with the change of the group of interest. Past events indicate that the increased attention, mistrust, and racialization of Arab Americans post-9/11 are similar to those Japanese Americans endured following the Pearl Harbor attacks of 1940s. Post Pearl Harbor and post 9/11 events show that both ethnic groups are perceived as foreigners and therefore threats to the security of the United States and its citizens.

Yet, the new racialization that Arab/Muslim Americans experienced post-9/11 represent a completely different situation in which a new racialized group was formed in the American public mind. In addition to the widespread of ideas of *otherness* and *foreignness*, Arab/Muslim Americans became perceived as culturally stagnant and religiously backward. This research concludes that this cultural dimension of racialization came to replace the scientific/physical racism that blames people, namely African Americans and Asians Americans, for their skin color and corporal construction. Even before September 2001, there existed instances of differential racialization against Arab Americans. During the 1960s and 1970s and because of the Arab-Israeli conflicts, the American sociopolitical climate was characterized by anti-Arab/Muslim sentiments. Accordingly, following the Oklahoma City bombing of

1995, media and public voices focused on Arab/Muslim Americans who, after investigation, were found innocent. The identification of the prime suspect, a WASP American, did not stop the passage of government legislations that limited the number of immigrants from the Middle East.

While Racial Triangulation refers to the placement of a specific minority as an intermediate group between black and white, it indicates, in this research, the ambivalent and mostly ambiguous racial status of Arab Americans. Similar to the Hispanics, Arab/Muslim Americans are not perceived as biologically inferior but usually assaulted for their cultural and religious backgrounds, perceived lack of moral values, and non-ability to melt down in the American mainstream society. This justifies the way in which Arab Americans are used as a substitute to the Asian American model.

The Racial Triangulation theory and its adoption in the Arab American model act in accordance with the urgent call for moving outside the 'black and white paradigm' which became monotonous in racial studies. This research concludes that the hypervisibility of Arab Americans post-9/11 resulted in the demise of the American bipolar racial binary. The projection of the racial triangulation theory on the Arab American experience shows that despite their categorization as white, Arab Americans are perceived as neither 'fully white' nor 'fully non-white'. This logic illustrates the discrepancy between perceiving Arabs racially as 'white' and culturally 'non-white'.

In 2020 and as a result of the pandemic situation the world witnesses, many racial theories, including differential racialization and racial triangulation became well-grounded. In the United States, the overwhelming majority of racialization

incidents shifted from Arab Americans to Asian Americans. Following the assertion of the U.S. President Donald J. Trump that Covid 19 pandemic is a 'Chinese virus', many Asian Americans, including non-Chinese, became subject to racialization in workplaces, schools, and other public spaces. Stories of Chinese Americans singled out, abused, and told not to return to schools and workplaces became widespread. Overall, the four theories proved their suitability in for the study of Arab Americans rationalization in the United States.

Endnotes

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[1] Born in 20 July 1925, Frantz Omar Fanon, the black doctor from Martinique, resigned from his post in a psychiatric hospital in Blida, Algeria to join the National Liberation Front (NLF). Due to his leading efforts for an African recognition of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Algeria (PGRA), he was appointed as the ambassador of the GPRA to Ghana in October 1960. He died in 6 December 1961 in Maryland, United States. More information on Frantz Fanon's biography are found in David Macey's *Frantz Fanon: A Biography* (2012).

[2] G.I. Bill officially known as the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944 is a law which provides returning World War II veterans with a range of benefits including low-cost mortgages, low-interest loans and financial support. African Americans did not benefit as much as White Americans. Many historians argued that "the law was deliberately designed to accommodate Jim Crow" (Kotz).

[3] Called also estevanico, estevanillo and esteban, Estavan was a Morisco conquistador who accompanied Alvar Nunez Cabeza de Vaca on his well-known 1528-1536 journey from Florida to Mexico City; he is even credited with the discovery of Arizona.

[4] The Levant is a former name of the eastern Mediterranean area which is occupied nowadays by Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine. By the beginning of the 19th century, the Levantine people became perceived as *Oriental* due to the expansion of *Orientalism* as a notion to include cultures of the Near East with the ones of the Far East (Said 58-59).

[5] In western literatures, the 1967 June war is best known as the Six Days' War.

[6]More on the Arab Israeli war of 1973, known in the Arab World as the Ramadan war and in Israel as the Yom Kippur War, can be found in George Gawrych's *The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory* (1996) and Howard Blum's *The Eve of Destruction: The Untold Story of the Yom Kippur War* (2004).

[7]*Modus operandi,* Latin word, means a normal mode of operation of a person/thing. It refers to a known criminal's established habits and mode of work when committing specific offences, especially fraud, matched with characteristics of an unsolved crime to narrow down (limit to a specific list) or profile suspects. See topmeaning.com

[8]For more information about Operation Enduring Freedom see Tucker-Jones's *The Afghan War: Operation Enduring Freedom 2001-2004*(2014) and Christopher Koontz's *Enduring Voices Oral Histories of the U.S. Army Experience in Afghanistan, 2003-2005* (2008).

[9]For more information about Operation Iraqi Freedom see Tucker-Jones's *The Iraq War: Operation Iraqi Freedom 2003-2011* (2014) and Thomas Donnelly's *Operation Iraqi Freedom: A Strategic Assessment* (2004).

[10]Spending his entire life calling for the Gospel of Jesus Christ, Franklin Graham is President and CEO of Samaritan's Purse and the Billy Graham Evangelistic Association. See samaritanspurse.org

[11]Pat Robertson is the founder of the Christian Broadcasting Network and well known for his talk show *The 700 Club*. He is an influential Christian Evangelist who devoted his life for attacking Islam and Muslims. See Caryle Murphy's "Remarks by Pat

Robertson Insult Islam, Muslims Say" (1997) and Richard Cimino's ""No God in Common": American Evangelical Discourse on Islam after 9/11" (2005).

[12]The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration categorized Methamphetamine as Schedule II Stimulant. This highly addicted stimulant is legally available only through medical prescriptions for people who suffer from attention deficit, hyperactivity, and a short-term treatment for losing weight. See visionsofthecross.com

[13]Lashkar-e-Taiba(LET), literally meaning 'army of the righteous', is a Pakistani organization that provided support to wanted individuals including Osama bin Laden and other Al-Qaeda members. The organization financed, facilitated, and perpetrated acts or activities related to international terrorism. See the list of terrorist organizations on un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

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The Department of Justice's first priority is to prevent future terrorist attacks. Since its passage following the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Patriot Act has played a key part -and often the leading role - in a number of successful operations to protect innocent Americans from the deadly plans of terrorists dedicated to destroying America and our way of life. While the results have been important, in passing the Patriot Act, Congress provided for only modest, incremental changes in the law. Congress simply took existing legal principles and retrofitted them to preserve the lives and liberty of the American people from the challenges posed by a global terrorist network.

The USA PATRIOT Act: Preserving Life and Liberty
(Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism)

Congress enacted the Patriot Act by overwhelming, bipartisan margins, arming lawenforcement with new tools to detect and prevent terrorism: The USA Patriot Act was passed nearly unanimously by the Senate 98-1, and 357-66 in the House, with the support of members from across the political spectrum.

The Act Improves Our Counter-Terrorism Efforts in Several Significant Ways:

1. The Patriot Act allows investigators to use the tools that were already available toinvestigate organized crime and drug trafficking. Many of the tools the Act provides to law enforcement to fight terrorism have been used for decades to fight organized crimeand drug dealers, and have been reviewed and approved by the courts. As Sen. Joe Biden (D-DE) explained during the floor debate about the Act, "the FBI could get a wiretap to investigate the mafia, but they could not get one to investigate terrorists. To put it bluntly,that was crazy! What's good for the mob should be good for terrorists." (Cong. Rec., 10/25/01)

- **Allows law enforcement to use surveillance against more crimes of terror.** Before the Patriot Act, courts could permit law enforcement to conduct electronicsurveillance to investigate many ordinary, non-terrorism crimes, such as drug crimes, mail fraud, and passport fraud. Agents also could obtain wiretaps to investigate some, but not all, of the crimes that terrorists often commit. The Act enabled investigators to gather information when looking into the full range of terrorism-related crimes, including: chemical-weapons offenses, the use of weapons of mass destruction, killing Americans abroad,

and terrorism financing.

- **Allows federal agents to follow sophisticated terrorists trained to evade detection.** For years, law enforcement has been able to use "roving wiretaps" to investigate ordinary crimes, including drug offenses and racketeering. A roving wiretap can be authorized by a federal judge to apply to a particular suspect, rather than a particular phone or communications device. Because international terrorists are sophisticated and trained to thwart surveillance by rapidly changing locations and communication devices such as cell phones, the Act authorized agents to seek court permission to use the same techniques in national security investigations to track terrorists.

- **Allows law enforcement to conduct investigations without tipping off terrorists.** In some cases if criminals are tipped off too early to an investigation, they might flee, destroy evidence, intimidate or kill witnesses, cut off contact with associates, or take other action to evade arrest. Therefore, federal courts in narrow circumstances long have allowed law enforcement to delay for a limited time when the subject is told that a judicially-approved search warrant has been executed. Notice is always provided, but the reasonable delay gives law enforcement time to identify the criminal's associates, eliminate immediate threats to our communities, and coordinate the arrests of multiple individuals without tipping them off beforehand. These delayed notification search warrants have been used for decades, have proven crucial in drug and organized crime cases, and have been upheld by courts as fully constitutional.

- **Allows federal agents to ask a court for an order to obtain business records in national security terrorism cases.** Examining business records often provides the key that investigators are looking for to solve a wide range of crimes. Investigators might seek select records from hardware stores or chemical plants, for example, to find out who bought materials to make a bomb, or bank records to see who's sending money to terrorists. Law enforcement authorities have always been able to obtain business records in criminal cases through grand jury subpoenas, and continue to do so in national security cases where appropriate. These records were sought in criminal cases such as the investigation of the Zodiac gunman, where police suspected the gunman was inspired by a Scottish occult poet, and wanted to learn who had checked the poet's books out of the library. In national security cases where use of the grand jury process was not appropriate, investigators previously had limited tools at their disposal to obtain certain business records. Under the Patriot Act, the government can now ask a federal court (the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court), if needed to aid an investigation, to order production of the same type of records available through grand jury subpoenas. This federal court, however, can issue these orders only after the government demonstrates the records concerned are sought for an authorized investigation to obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a U.S. person or to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence

activities, provided that such investigation of a U.S. person is not conducted solely on the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment.

2. The Patriot Act facilitated information sharing and cooperation among government agencies so that they can better "connect the dots." The Act removed the major legal barriers that prevented the law enforcement, intelligence, and national defense communities from talking and coordinating their work to protect the American people and our national security. The government's prevention efforts should not be restricted by boxes on an organizational chart. Now police officers, FBI agents, federal prosecutors and intelligence officials can protect our communities by "connecting the dots" to uncover terrorist plots before they are completed. As Sen. John Edwards (D-N.C.) said about the Patriot Act, "we simply cannot prevail in the battle against terrorism if the right hand of our government has no idea what the left hand is doing." (Press release, 10/26/01)

- Prosecutors and investigators used information shared pursuant to section 218 in investigating the defendants in the so-called "Virginia Jihad" case. This prosecution involved members of the Dar al-Arqam Islamic Center, who trained for jihad in Northern Virginia by participating in paintball and paramilitary training, including eight individuals who traveled to terrorist training camps in Pakistan or Afghanistan between 1999 and 2001. These individuals are associates of a violent Islamic extremist group known as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET), which operates in Pakistan and Kashmir, and that has ties to the al Qaeda terrorist network. As the result of an investigation that included the use of information obtained through FISA, prosecutors were able to bring charges against these individuals. Six of the defendants have pleaded guilty, and three were convicted in March 2004 of charges including conspiracy to levy war against the United States and conspiracy to provide material support to the Taliban. These nine defendants received sentences ranging from a prison term of four years to life imprisonment.

3. The Patriot Act updated the law to reflect new technologies and new threats. The Act brought the law up to date with current technology, so we no longer have to fight a digital-age battle with antique weapons-legal authorities leftover from the era of rotary telephones. When investigating the murder of *Wall Street Journal* reporter Daniel Pearl, for example, law enforcement used one of the Act's new authorities to use high-tech means to identify and locate some of the killers.

- **Allows law enforcement officials to obtain a search warrant anywhere a terrorist-related activity occurred.** Before the Patriot Act, law enforcement personnel were required to obtain a search warrant in the district where they intended to conduct a search. However, modern terrorism investigations often span a number of districts, and officers therefore had to obtain multiple warrants in multiple jurisdictions, creating unnecessary delays. The Act provides that warrants can be obtained in any district in which terrorism-related activities occurred, regardless of where they will be executed. This

provision does not change the standards governing the availability of a search warrant, but streamlines the search-warrant process.

- **Allows victims of computer hacking to request law enforcement assistance inmonitoring the "trespassers" on their computers.** This change made the law technology-neutral; it placed electronic trespassers on the same footing as physical trespassers. Now, hacking victims can seek law enforcement assistance to combat hackers, just as burglary victims have been able to invite officers into their homes to catch burglars.

4. <u>The Patriot Act increased the penalties for those who commit terrorist crimes</u>. Americans are threatened as much by the terrorist who pays for a bomb as by the one who pushes the button. That's why the Patriot Act imposed tough new penalties on thosewho commit and support terrorist operations, both at home and abroad. In particular, theAct:

- **Prohibits the harboring of terrorists.** The Act created a new offense that prohibits knowingly harboring persons who have committed or are about to commit a variety of terrorist offenses, such as: destruction of aircraft; use of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons; use of weapons of mass destruction;bombing of government property; sabotage of nuclear facilities; and aircraft piracy.

- **Enhanced the inadequate maximum penalties for various crimes likely to becommitted by terrorists**: including arson, destruction of energy facilities, material support to terrorists and terrorist organizations, and destruction of national-defense materials.

- **Enhanced a number of conspiracy penalties**, including for arson, killings infederal facilities, attacking communications systems, material support to terrorists, sabotage of nuclear facilities, and interference with flight crew members. Under previous law, many terrorism statutes did not specifically prohibit engaging in conspiracies to commit the underlying offenses. In such cases, the government could only bring prosecutions under the general federalconspiracy provision, which carries a maximum penalty of only five years in prison.

- **Punishes terrorist attacks on mass transit systems.**
- **Punishes bioterrorists.**
- **Eliminates the statutes of limitations for certain terrorism crimes andlengthens them for other terrorist crimes.**

The government's success in preventing another catastrophic attack on the American homeland since September 11, 2001, would have been much more difficult, if not impossible, without the USA Patriot Act. The authorities Congress provided have substantially enhanced our ability to prevent, investigate, and prosecute acts of terror

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION

MOHAMED HYATH,

        Plaintiff

V.

CITY OF DECATUR, W.S. RICHARDS,
Individually and in his official capacity as
Lieutenant, T.G. KAROLYI, individually and
in his official capacity as Corporal, and M.H.
HENSEL; individually and in his official
capacity as Corporal,

        Defendants.

BACKGROUND

This is an employment discrimination case. Plaintiff is a practicing Muslim, of Mauritian origin. Defendant City of Decatur ("Decatur" or "the City") hired plaintiff as a police recruit in April, 2002. Plaintiff spent the first 10 weeks of his employment in a training course at the North Central Police Academy in Austell, Georgia. Following his graduation from the police academy, plaintiff joined the Decatur police department as a probationary officer in the patrol division. Plaintiff alleges that as soon as he joined the police department, he became the object of "constant taunting and harassment" based on his ethnicity and religion. (Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts "PSMF"). Plaintiff's fellow officers were aware that he was a practicing Muslim and, because of his ethnicity, perceived him to be from the Middle East. Plaintiff contends that, as a result of his religion and ethnicity, officers in the police department frequently referred to him by the nickname "Taliban" or "Al Quaeda." In addition, plaintiff claims that officers teased him about Muslim dress and dietary restrictions, asking plaintiff why he did not eat pork or suggesting that he order the "pork sandwich or hot dog" for lunch. In the same vein, plaintiff alleges that defendant Karolyi, who was plaintiff's field training officer and often rode with him in the patrol car, asked plaintiff on several occasions whether women they encountered in traditional Muslim dress were plaintiff's "wife" or "mother."

In addition to these general comments, plaintiff asserts two specific incidents of alleged racial harassment by his co-worker, defendant Hensel, and his shift commander and supervisor, defendant Richards. The first incident involved plaintiff's training in the use of oleoresin capsicum, more commonly known as "OC" or "pepper spray." As part of their training, all new police recruits are exposed to pepper spray for three to five seconds. Exposure to pepper spray causes an unpleasant reaction, and members of the police department typically gather to watch the new recruits undergo the training. Plaintiff received pepper spray training in July, 2002. Approximately 25 people were present at the training, including defendant Hensel, a Decatur police officer. Plaintiff alleges that after he was exposed to the pepper spray, defendant Hensel stated, "That's what you get for bombing us you damn Taliban."

The second incident involved an altered FBI poster. The Decatur police department

occasionally receives FBI "Seeking Information" posters requesting information about suspected criminals. In August, 2002, the department received a "Seeking Information" poster concerning A.S. Al-Rasheed, a Saudi Arabian suspected of being involved in the September 11, 2001 hijacking. Defendant Richards used his computer to superimpose plaintiff's photograph onto the FBI poster, so that the poster depicted plaintiff as a suspected Islamic terrorist. Richards showed the poster to plaintiff, and then left it in the roll call room for other officers to see.

Although the City maintains an anti-harassment policy, plaintiff did not complain about any of these incidents when they occurred. Neither did plaintiff tell defendants Hensel, Karolyi, or Richards that he found their comments offensive, or ask defendants to stop making the comments.

Plaintiff first complained about the alleged harassment when he contacted Assistant Chief of Police David Junger by telephone on September 11 or '12, 2002, and requested a meeting to discuss his allegations. Pursuant to plaintiff's request, Junger scheduled a meeting for September 13, 2002. In addition to plaintiff and Junger, Director of Public Safety Sherrard White and Assistant Chief of Police William Clark attended the meeting. During the meeting, plaintiff informed White, Junger, and Clark about the alleged harassment. According to plaintiff, Clark stated that he believed the comments were not intended maliciously, but were a form of inappropriate joking. White added that he took plaintiff's complaints seriously, and that the City would investigate the alleged conduct. White further assured plaintiff that if his allegations were true, the City would discipline the individuals involved. Upon plaintiff's request, White agreed to allow plaintiff to take a paid leave of absence during the investigation.

Following his meeting with plaintiff, White appointed Lieutenant David Hipple to conduct an internal investigation into plaintiff's allegations. Hipple subsequently met with plaintiff to discuss his complaint. Hipple then interviewed defendants Hensel, Richards, and Karolyi, as well as Officer Sibley, who worked with plaintiff on a regular basis.

On September 19, 2002, while Hipple's investigation was ongoing, plaintiff's wife sent a letter to Peggy Merriss, the City Manager, and indicating plaintiff's desire to resign from the police department. The following day, Merriss responded in writing, assuring plaintiff's wife that "the City of Decatur takes the conduct reported by Officer Hyath very seriously." Merriss further stated that "Officer Hyath is a valued member of the City of Decatur Police Department, and we would like him to continue employment" with the City. Merriss reassured plaintiff's wife that "[e]very effort is being made to address [plaintiff's] complaint."

In late September, 2002, Clark informed plaintiff that Lieutenant Hipple had completed his investigation and that discipline of the offending officers was pending. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff submitted his letter of resignation to Clark and Junger. Plaintiff claims that he resigned because he feared retaliation for having raised a harassment complaint. However, plaintiff never experienced any harassment or retaliation after his meeting with White, Clark, and Junger on September 13th. Neither is plaintiff aware of any other officers who have experienced retaliation for making complaints against the City or fellow officers. Plaintiff also concedes that, prior to resigning, he had a telephone conversation with defendant Richards, who indicated that he had no ill feelings for plaintiff and encouraged plaintiff to return to work.

After plaintiff resigned, he filed for unemployment benefits. The Department of Labor determined that plaintiff has resigned from the police department for good cause, and granted benefits. On appeal, the Dekalb County Superior Court affirmed the decision,

also finding that plaintiff resigned for good cause.

Plaintiff subsequently filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC), claiming that he was subjected to a hostile work environment. Although the EEOC never issued a notice of right to sue, plaintiff filed this lawsuit on April 26, 2004. In his Complaint, plaintiff alleges that he was subjected to a hostile work environment on the basis of his ethnicity and religion. Plaintiff seeks relief against the City, and against the individual defendants in their individual and official capacities, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. Plaintiff also asserts various state law theories of recovery, including negligent supervision and retention, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. All of the parties have filed motions for summary judgment, which are presently before the Court. The City has also filed a motion to strike untimely exhibits submitted by plaintiff, and a motion for sanctions to address alleged discovery abuses.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court **GRANTS** defendant Richards' Motion for Summary Judgment, **GRANTS** defendant Hensel's Motion for Summary Judgment, **GRANTS** defendant Karolyi's Motion for Summary Judgment, **GRANTS** defendant City of Decatur's Motion for Summary Judgment, **DENIES** as moot defendant City of Decatur's Motion for Sanctions, **DENIES** plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, and **DENIES** defendant City of Decatur's Motion to Strike.

The docket also indicates that three other miscellaneous motions remain pending. Plaintiff had filed a Motion to Extend Time to Respond to Motion for Summary Judgment, which this Court **GRANTED** on June 27, 2005. Still pending is plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File His Statements of Undisputed Material Facts out of Time, which the Court **GRANTS**, and defendant City of Decatur's Motion to Exceed Page Limitation, which the Court also **GRANTS**.

SO ORDERED, this day of March, 2006.

JULIE E. CARNES
UNITED STATES DISRICT JUDGE

APPENDIX III

E.E.O.C. v. Trans States Airlines, Inc. (Extract)

No. 05-2009, 05-2010, 05-2046

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHT CIRCUIT
462 F.3d 987 (8th Cir. 2006)
Decided Sep 19, 2006
Submitted: March 16, 2006.
Filed: September 19, 2006.

COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, Thomas C. Mummert III, J.

Jerome J. Dobson, Jonathan C. Berns, Michelle D. Neumann, Weinhaus Dobson, St. Louis, MO,
Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
James N. Foster, Jr., William B. Jones, Christopher M. Sanders, McMahon Berger, David John Arthur Hayes,
III, Trans States Airlines, Inc., St. Louis, MO, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Before SMITH, JOHN R. GIBSON, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.
COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") brought this action alleging that Trans States Airlines terminated Mohammed Shanif Hussein in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Hussein subsequently intervened, asserting claims under Title VII and the Missouri Human Rights Act. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 213.010 *et seq.* Trans States moved for summary judgment on all claims, and moved for attorneys' fees. The district court granted summary judgment for Trans States, but denied its motion for fees. We affirm the judgment of the district court.

I.

Hussein is a man of Indian descent who is a native of the island of Fiji, where he was raised as a Muslim. He moved to the United States in 1997. Trans States, which is based in St. Louis, Missouri, hired Hussein as a pilot on February 26, 2001. On September 13, 2001, when commercial air travel was suspended as a consequence of the terrorist attacks on September 11, Hussein returned a Trans States plane to the St. Louis airport. He then rented a room at a nearby Howard Johnson's hotel.

At some time between September 14 and September 17, 2001, Captain Daniel Reed, Trans States's vice president of flight operations, received what he said was an anonymous phone call regarding Hussein. According to Reed's testimony in this case, the caller reported that a pilot in a Trans States uniform had been in a bar at the Howard Johnson's hotel making comments about the attacks of September 11, and that a bartender had asked him to leave. Reed said that he asked how the caller knew the person was a Trans States pilot, and the caller replied that he had read the pilot's identification tag and then gave his last name as Hussein. Reed remembered the caller saying that a Trans

World Airlines pilot had followed Hussein out of the bar, at which time Hussein took off some of his uniform pieces and went into another bar at the hotel.

Reed testified that he asked his flight managers about Hussein, and they confirmed that Trans States employed a pilot named Mohammed Hussein. Reed said he asked a manager on his staff to verify that Hussein was in St. Louis at the time of the reported incident. He recalled that within an hour, he received a report that Hussein should have been in the St. Louis area, and that he was a probationary employee. Reed stated that he then decided to dismiss Hussein and directed one of the flight managers to carry out the termination.

Michael Swoboda, then a flight manager at Trans States, informed Hussein of his termination on September 18. Swoboda testified that when Reed returned from taking the anonymous telephone call, he asked for information about Mohammed Hussein. Swoboda recalled telling Reed that Hussein was a first officer based in St. Louis, and that he was probably a probationary employee. Swoboda testified that Reed then directed Swoboda to terminate Hussein's employment. Another flight manager, Rodney Aman, overheard Reed speaking on the telephone when he received the anonymous call about Hussein. Paraphrasing the conversation, Aman remembered Reed saying, "It doesn't matter," and "It doesn't matter, he was in a bar in uniform," during the course of the call.

It was later revealed that the anonymous caller was a pilot employed by Trans World Airlines named Emmet Conrecode. Conrecode was staying at the Howard Johnson's hotel in St. Louis on September 13. He testified in this case that while he was in a bar at the hotel eating dinner, he observed a man walk into the bar wearing a pilot's uniform. According to Conrecode, the man drank a beer at the bar, and when a television showed a replay of an aircraft hitting one of the World Trade Center towers, the man raised his beer "as in a salute and took a swig." The man eventually left the bar, and another pilot told Conrecode that he told the man to "get out of the bar in uniform." Conrecode said the man later returned with epaulets removed from his uniform, and that during this second visit to the bar, the man announced that he was going to fly an airplane the next day. Conrecode testified that he later inquired about the man's identity at the front desk of the hotel, and the desk manager identified him as a Trans States pilot named "Hussein."

Conrecode testified that he could not sleep that night, and he decided to contact the Federal Bureau of Investigation early in the morning of September 14. He left a message, and the FBI interviewed Conrecode later that day. Conrecode stated that he also contacted the airport police when he realized that the man he observed in the bar could gain access to an aircraft if flight operations resumed in the morning. He described to the duty officer "the behavior of a pilot in uniform drinking in a bar and reporting that he was going to be flying the next day and that he was acting in a strange manner." Conrecode further testified that he called Trans States Airlines on September 14 and spoke with a manager who left a meeting to take the telephone call. Conrecode recalled that he told the Trans States manager that Hussein had been drinking in a bar in uniform, and that he "seemed to be intimidating passengers by that action." Conrecode "may have" mentioned what he perceived as Hussein's support for the September 11 terrorists. Conrecode said he was not sure whether he identified himself to the Trans States manager.

We are not persuaded that these arguments based on circumstantial evidence are sufficient to support a finding of intentional discrimination. First, the disciplinary policies and procedures adopted by Trans States do not support an inference of discrimination. Plaintiffs point to Trans States's employee handbook, which states that a system of "progressive discipline" will be used when employees violate company procedures or rules.

In a letter dated June 16, 2003, the EEOC asked for a further reply by June 20, 2003, absent which the agency would consider conciliation a failure. Before Trans States had an opportunity to calculate back pay and submit a counteroffer, however, the EEOC determined on June 18, 2003, that conciliation efforts had failed and filed this suit. We are troubled by the EEOC's failure to adhere to its own deadline of June 20 before declaring that conciliation had failed. But it is true that the parties agreed throughout negotiations that they were far apart on the terms of a settlement, and it does not appear that there was a reasonable prospect of settlement when the EEOC declared that conciliation efforts were unsuccessful. Accordingly, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in denying Trans States' motion for attorneys' fees.

* * *

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

APPENDIX IV

United States of America v. Arwah J. Jaber

No. 06-3913

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_____

United States of America,

      Appellee,

  v.

Arwah J. Jaber,
      Appellant.

Appeal from the United States
District Court for the
Western District of Arkansas.

_____

Submitted: October 15, 2007
Filed: December 5, 2007

_____

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, GRUENDER, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

_____

BENTON, Circuit Judge.

A jury convicted Arwah J. Jaber of false statement on naturalization application under 18 U.S.C. § 1015(a), false statement on passport application under 18 U.S.C. § 1542, unlawful procurement of naturalization under 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a), and two counts of use of false social security number under 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B). Stripped of citizenship, he was sentenced to 15 months' imprisonment concurrently on each count. Jaber argues the district court lacked jurisdiction and venue to convict for false statement on the naturalization application and unlawful procurement of naturalization. Alternatively, he asserts error in denying his jury instruction for venue. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.

I.

Jaber became a permanent resident of the United States in September 1996. He prepared an Application for Naturalization on August 16, 2000. Specifically, he wrote "none" to whether he had used other names since becoming a permanent resident, and checked "no" to whether he had knowingly committed a crime for which he had not been arrested. Jaber filed the application in Lincoln, Nebraska, on August 21, 2000. Immigration

Services contacted him via letter, asking him to come in for an interview in Kansas City, Missouri.

On January 30, 2001, Jaber arrived at the Kansas City immigration office. Placed under oath, he said that his address had changed from Pittsburg, Kansas, to Fayetteville, Arkansas. This change was noted on the application. Jaber also affirmed he had not used any other names since becoming a permanent resident and had not knowingly committed any crime for which he had not been arrested. After changing the address, the immigration officer recognized that Kansas City no longer had jurisdiction. The officer, though, completed the interview, instructed Jaber to sign the application (thus affirming his oath), and then forwarded the application to Fayetteville, which is located in the Western District of Arkansas.

The Immigration Service sent Jaber the Notice of Naturalization Oath Ceremony, asking him to attend the naturalization ceremony in Fayetteville. He also completed a questionnaire in connection with his naturalization application, reaffirming that he had not knowingly committed a crime for which he had not been arrested. He was asked to bring this questionnaire to the ceremony. His signature on the questionnaire certified he signed it at Fayetteville, Arkansas. On July 2, 2001, Jaber was naturalized in Fayetteville.

II.

Jaber argues venue was not proper in the Western District of Arkansas for the two charges whose acts he alleges occurred in other districts. Proper venue is required by Article III, section 2 of the United States Constitution, the Sixth Amendment, and Rule 18 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. *United States v. Morales*, 445 F.3d 1081, 1084 (8th Cir. 2006), *citing United States v. Romero*, 150 F.3d 821, 824 (8th Cir. 1998). The government must prove venue by a preponderance of the evidence. *United States v. Diaz-Diaz*, 135 F.3d 572, 577 (8th Cir. 1998); *United States v. Bascope-Zurita*, 68 F.3d 1057, 1062 (8th Cir. 1995); *United States v. Delgado*, 914 F.2d 1062, 1064 (8th Cir. 1990). Venue may be established by direct or circumstantial evidence. *United States v. Chandler*, 66 F.3d 1460, 1470 (8th Cir. 1995).

A violation of false statement on a naturalization application requires that someone "knowingly makes any false statement under oath, in any case, proceeding, or matter relating to, or under, or by virtue of any law of the United States relating to naturalization." **18 U.S.C. § 1015(a)**. The indictment alleges Jaber made a false statement on his naturalization application in the Western District of Arkansas on or about August 16, 2000, by stating "none" to whether he had used other names since becoming a permanent resident.

III

Jaber contends that the district court erred in denying his jury instruction on venue. This court reviews for abuse of discretion the district court's determination whether to submit a particular jury instruction. *Bascope-Zurita*, 68 F.3d at 1062. Venue ordinarily

is a question of fact for the jury and must be instructed upon if in issue. *Id.* However, when the evidence establishing venue is very clear or uncontradicted, the district court may resolve the issue as a matter of law. *Id.*

Here, the facts relating to venue are undisputed. Therefore, failure to give the jury a venue instruction was not abuse of discretion.

IV.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.